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ABSTRACT
Socio-economic rights are the subject of much debate in South Africa and
elsewhere. At first they were simply denied the status of any rights at all. Lately, there
is a fair amount of recognition for them as rights. The tendency is, however, to
relegate them to paper rights and invest very little effort in bringing about their actual
realisation.
In this thesis I inquire into the question of what a human right, properly so
called, is, and then whether, in the light of that inquiry, there is a basis for the
reluctance to embrace socio-economic rights.
South Africa is uniquely fortunate in having a constitution that gives
recognition to socio-economic rights and requiring the Human Rights Commission to
monitor their implementation. But again there is a risk that the recognition of socio-
economic rights is left as a constitutional matter, and nothing or little is done for their
practical implementation.
Therefore I inquire into the manner in which the Human Rights Commission
monitors the implementation of these rights. The inquiry into the Human Rights
Commission's monitoring role is largely a question of methodology. Whether, in
other words, the methods of the Commission are such as to yield reliable information
on the subject.
I also inquire whether the government's budgetary allocations indicate a
serious approach to these rights. The budgetary allocations that are brought under the
microscope relate to the seven core rights enshrined in the constitution, namely,
housing, health care, food, water, social security, education, and environmental rights.
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ABSTRAK
Sosio-ekonomiese regte is die onderwerp van vele debatte in Suid-Afrika en
elders. Aanvanklik was daar nie erkenning gegee aan die status van hierdie regte nie.
Hierdie situasie het die afgelope tyd begin verander. Die tendens is egter steeds om dit
te sien as regte slegs op papier en daar word nie 'n poging aangewend vir die
realisering van hierdie regte nie.
Ek ondersoek in hierdie tesis die kwessie van wat 'n mensereg, korrek so
genoem, is en ook of, in die lig van hierdie ondersoek, daar 'n basis is vir die
huiwering om sosio-ekonomiese regte te aanvaar.
Suid-Afrika is uniek in die sin dat die konstitusie erkenning gee aan sosio-
ekonomiese regte en die Waarheid-en Versoeningskommissie opdrag gegee het om
die implementering daarvan te monitor. Daar is egter weereens die risiko dat die
erkenning van sosio-ekonomiese regte slegs gesien word as 'n konstitusionele
aangeleentheid en dat niks of baie min gedoen word rakende die praktiese
implementering daarvan.
Ek stel daarom ook ondersoek in na die wyse waarop die
Menseregtekommissie die implementering van hierdie regte moniteer. Die ondersoek
na die monitering van die Menseregtekommissie is hoofsaaklik metodologies van
aard; dus of die metodes wat gebruik is, deur die Menseregtekommissie, betroubare
inligting verskaf.
Ek ondersoek ook of die regering se begrotingallokasies 'n ernstige
ingesteldheid jeens hierdie regte toon. Die begrotingsaspekte wat ondersoek word hou
verband met die sewe kernregte soos vervat in die konstitusie naamlik behuising,
gesondheidsorg, voedsel, water, sosiale sekuriteit, opvoeding en omgewingsregte.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to the Study
1.1 Background
South Africa held its first non-racial election on 27 April 1994. The election was important
because it ushered in a non-racial democracy as well as a government that proclaimed its
commitment to the economic upliftment of ordinary people. In his inaugural parliamentary
address on 24 May 1994, President Nelson Mandela, as he then was, stated:
My government's commitment to create a people-centred society of liberty binds
us to the pursuit of the goals cï freedom from want, freedom from hunger.freedom
from deprivation, freedom from ignorance, freedom from suppression and
freedom from fear. These freedoms are fundamental to the guarantee of dignity.
They will therefore constitute a part of the centrepiece of what the Government
will seek to achieve.l (Emphasis added.)
In order to deal with the legacy of racial discrimination and to correct the social imbalances it
created, the constitution of South Africa:
• Commits the state to "[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens,,;2
• Obliges the state to respect, promote and fulfil the social and economic rights of the
citizens;'
• Assigns the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) the task to monitor
whether government departments and other organs of state are introducing any
measures towards the realisation of social and economic rights;"
White Paper on Science and Technology, preamble, p. 3. An examination of the Science and Technology
White Paper, Reconstruction and Development Programme White Paper, Growth and Development
Strategy, Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy, White Paper on South African Land Policy, and
White Paper on Affirmative Action would confirm that at policy level the government is indeed committed to
the sentiments expressed by Mandela.
2 Act 108/1996: preamble.
3 Act 108/1996/24(b)(iii); 26; 27 & 29.
4 Act 108/1996/184(3). It may be noted that section 184(2)(b) of the constitution empowers the SAHRC to
"take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated". In principle there is no
distinction between the rights here under consideration and civil and political rights, insofar as the SAHRC
has the right and power to take remedial action. Consequently, the SAHRC has the right to take action where
socio-economic rights have been violated. It is suggested that the question is more likely to be: When is a
socio-economic right violated? rather than: Can the SAHRC come to the assistance of the citizen when
his/her socio-economic rights are violated? And then it is also important to note that the Human Rights
Commission Act, 541l99417(e) empowers the SAHRC, in doing its work, to institute proceedings in any
competent court or tribunal, in its own name or on behalf of aggrieved persons, where any of the rights here
under discussion is infringed.
Socio-Economic Rights
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• Provides for all spheres of government to contract for goods or services on such a basis
that they protect and/or advance persons or categories of persons who have been
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.''
• Provides for affirmative action;"
• Commits the state to land reform and to bringing "about equitable access to all South
Africa's natural resources"."
South Africa signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(lCESCR) on 3 October 1994.8 The ICESCR will be discussed in due course. Suffice it now
merely to state that it is "the major international treaty protecting economic and social
rights"." It is clear, therefore, that the government that was ushered in by way of the 1994
election made a commitment to the ideal of socio-economic justice.
1.2 Aim of Study
This study seeks to inquire into the articulation of theory and practice in the commitment
towards the respect, promotion and realisation of socio-economic rights in South Africa. In
other words, this study will inquire whether the socio-economic rights listed in the Bill of Rights were
given effect to in the period considered by the SAHRC in 1988. It also seeks to understand the
processes and procedures followed by the South African Human Rights Commission
(SAHRC) in carrying out its constitutional mandate to monitor the implementation of socio-
economic rights in South Africa.
There is a long-standing reservation about whether socio-economic rights are of the
same order as civil and political rights. Although there is a move away from the tendency to
question the bona fides of socio-economic rights, their recognition has tended to be half-
hearted. Therefore, in Chapter 2, I shall inquire into what human rights, properly so called,
are. I shall use that exercise as a basis, in Chapter 3, for inquiring whether socio-economic
rights deserve to be approached with circumspection. In Chapter 4, I shall inquire into the
5 Act 108/1996/217(2). Subsection 3 directs Parliament to pass legislation to "prescribe a framework within
which the policy referred to in subsection 2 may be implemented".
6 Act 108/1996/9(2).
7 Act 108/1996/25(4). Subsection (5) directs Parliament to pass legislation "to foster conditions which enable
citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis".
8 Department of Foreign Affairs, Position with Regard to Human Rights Treaties, n.d., p. 1. (The document
was distributed by the Department of Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the so" anniversary of the UDHR
on 10 December 1998.)
9 Alston, 1998, p. 2.
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methodological strengths and weaknesses of a study conducted by the SABRC into the
implementation of socio-economic rights in South Africa. In Chapter 5, I shall examine the
findings of the SABRC's study and in Chapter 6 I shall draw some conclusions.
In this study I shall:
• Search for, and try and assign meaning to, variations in the texts that I shall be working
with;
• Try and be as attentive as possible to detail in the texts that I shall be working with;
• Inquire into the manner in which these texts are designed to undermine alternative
views; and
• Try and build up a case for socio-economic rights.
1.3 Methodology
The methodology I propose to follow in this study is meta-analysis. That is, I propose to
analyse the SABRC's analysis'? of the data it gathered in 1998. The data were gathered with
a view to examining whether, and to what extent the state is fulfilling its constitutional
obligation to give effect to socio-economic rights in South Africa.
It is, perhaps, necessary to try and justify my choice of meta-analysis as a methodology
for this study. There are, I believe, two levels at which it might be necessary to justify my
methodological choice. Firstly, what stands to be gained by approaching the study via meta-
analysis? And, secondly, one has, perhaps, to justify the appropriateness of the methodology
to the study.
Social science has been under attack for its failure to be conclusive on the subjects it
studies for many years now.'! The effect of this has been, by and large, to undermine confi-
dence in the social sciences since, in lieu of answering the questions posed at the beginning
of the study, social research findings have tended to raise more questions. Not only has this
tendency created a lot of confusion: it also brought into question the utility of social
research.V
Social scientists came to a point where they found the need to try and make sense of the
"vast amounts of research findings" at hand, rather than do further primary research.l ' With
reference to the current study, I hope to show that the SABRC's analysis of the data it
10 Glass G, cited by Wolf FM, 1986, P Il.
" Hunter JE & Schmidt FL, 1990, P 35; WolfFM, supra, pp 9-10.
12 Hunter JE & Schmidt FL, supra, pp 35-37.
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worked with had some serious limitations. I hope to show that these limitations might well
have the effect of obfuscating the reality that it was meant to illuminate.
Further, in reading a research report, one has to decide whether, and to what extent, one
can "invest trust" in what one reads.l" The question falls to be decided by a variety of factors,
including the credentials of the researcher who wrote the report; the way the research was
conducted and the data analysed; the "level of consensus among other scholars in the same
field" on the findings; and the independence of the researcher.P
Therefore I propose to inquire whether the SAHRC's study satisfies the standard of
credibility, both at the level of data gathering and data analysis.,
The second consideration in respect of which it is necessary to justify my choice of
methodology is the appropriateness of meta-analysis to the study. Ifwe say that meta-analysis
seeks to make sense of "vast amounts of research findings", to what extent is it still
appropriate to the current study? What "vast amounts of research findings" are there in South
Africa in order to warrant meta-analysis thereof?
The SAHRC inquiry forming the subject-matter of this study was the first of its kind.
There were other studies on the matter, notably by the South African Institute of Race
Relations, the Human Rights Committee and Fair Share. Admittedly they were not of the
same scope as the SAHRC study, but they traversed more or less the same ground. Their
findings were not always the same. I shall argue that, in failing to take them into account, the
SAHRC impoverished its analysis of its own data.
I take, moreover, the view that "vast amounts" is an elastic term. It is noteworthy, for
instance, that Cook et al, previously referred to, write instead about "all the studies relevant
to an issue".!6 Locke et al, also previously referred to, speak variously of combining "studies
that have the same focus" and of "combining the results from independent studies"."
Therefore, it seems to me, meta-analysis would be appropriate to the current study
notwithstanding the fact that it is not yet possible in the context of South Africa to speak
about tons of research findings on the state's fulfilment ofsocio-economic rights.
13 Ibid, P 37; Hunter JE, Schmidt FL & Jackson GB, 1982, plO; Cook TD et ai, 1992, p 4.
14 Locke LF, Silverman SJ & Spirduso WW, 1998, P 29.
15 Locke LF, et al, supra, pp 30 & 42; 45-48; 37; 50-51 respectively.
16 Cook TD et al, supra, p 5.
17 Locke LF et al, supra, p 137.
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Chapter 2
What is a Human Right?
2.1 The Bill of Rights
For many, it may seem fairly straightforward what a human right is. We might, for example,
do what lawyers are very good at, and say that a human right is any right that a person has in
terms of the Bill of Rights.l However there are problems about this.
The first problem is one of logical construction. Logic scholars would say that one
cannot define a concept by means of the very terms that one is required to define. Therefore it
is illogical to include the term "right" in the definition of the term "human right" unless one
has already defined the term "right" separately.
Maurice Cranston wants to break away from this circularity where he writes:
[T]here is a sense in which to have a right is to have something which is conceded
and enforced by the law of the realm. To say that I have a right to leave the
country, a right to vote in parliamentary elections, a right to bequeath my estate to
anyone I choose, is to say that I live under a government which allows me to do
these things, and will come to my aid if anyone tries to stop me.'
Cranston refers to rights such as these as "positive rights" because "they are recognised by
positive law, the actual law of actual states't' I think that Cranston's formulation is more
helpful in that he does not say a right is a right. He argues that a right is a claim that you
make against something in the expectation that the state will come to your assistance, should
that be required. But Cranston's formulation leads us to the second problem about the
lawyer's conception of human rights. In order to make the statement that a human right is
See, e.g., Malan, 1996, pp. El - 3 & 4. I believe that this approach is also implicit in Lindholm, in
Amegaard & Landfald (eds), 1998, pp. 12-13. Lindholm writes that people's freedoms and dignity should be
protected "by means of universal legal rights to be called 'human rights', citing, as it were, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights preamble. The problem, of course, is not with the requirement that such
freedoms and dignity be protected by law. The problem relates to the fact that these rights, which are so
protected, must be called human rights. What Lindholm says, and in quite so many words, is that legal rights
constitute human rights. See also Eisler, 1987, p. 288; Bokor-Szegë, 1991, p. 25, footnote 21. Bokor-Szegë
cites the Hungarian Encyclopedia of Law to the effect that a "fundamental right means those individual
rights of citizens which should protect civil liberty and equality before the law ..." Therefore these writers, in
the first place, define a human right in a circular way. In effect they say a right is a right. And then, in the
second place, they say a right is what the law says it is.
2 Cranston, 1973, p. 4.
3 Ibid, p. 5.
Socio-Economic Rights 5
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Before laws were made, there were relations of possible justice. To say that there
is nothing just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is
the same as saying that before the describing of a circle all the radii were not
equa1.4
what the law says, one has to overcome the argument that a right is logically prior to any law.
Montesquieu formulated the matter in the following instructive words:
In order to make the argument that Cranston makes, one has to overcome the problem that we
assert our rights the more so in those situations where the law denies them. Marie-Bënêdicte
Dembour argues:
As soon as you try to capture something, for example by putting it on paper, it is
because you have already lost it ... Very often, constitutional documents present
. themselves as constituting a break from the past. In fact, they follow directly from
the past. They arise because things can no more be taken for granted, because
values and attitudes do not go without saying any more. In this sense, each
declaration of rights encompasses a loss, as well as a promise.'
The Declaration des droits de I 'homme et du citoyen, 1793, specifically stated, with reference
to the rights to express one's opinions and thoughts, to hold meetings and to subscribe to
whatever religion one chooses, that "[t]he necessity of proclaiming these rights presupposes
either the existence or the recent memory of despotism"." But for the fact that he considers
the law as the source of rights, AV Dicey came very close to this position where he wrote:
[T]he law of the constitution, the rules which ... form part of a constitutional
code, are not the source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, as
defined and enforced by the courts.'
On this conception, we do not have rights because the constitution says so, although it makes
our lives a lot easier if the constitution recognises our rights. On the contrary, the constitution
proclaims our rights because we already have them. It is interesting to note that the interim
constitution stipulated that in limiting any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights, the law
4 Montesquieu, 1949, p. 2.
5 Dembour, in Arnegaard & Landfald, supra, p. 168. See also Mbaya, in Eide & Hagtvet (eds), 1995, p. 65.
On p. 74, Mbaya (1995) specifically argues that the "non-exercise ofa duty [should under no circumstances]
be used as an excuse to suspend or abrogate a right". See further Asbjom Eide, in Eide & Hagtvet, supra,
p.6.
6 Marx, 1975, p. 161.
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"shall not negate the essential content of the right in question". 8 It is obvious, of course, that
the interim constitution contemplated only the rights that it entrenched, and no other rights.
Equally obvious, however, is the fact that the interim constitution did not define the essential
content of the rights it entrenched. It left that for the courts. It would not be unreasonable in
my view to suppose that the interim constitution recognised the fact that the essential content
of those rights is, to borrow a term from Lone Lindholt, "supra-regulatory". Therefore it is
not something that one casts in legal terms once and for all times.
Although the importance of this statement might not be instantly obvious, I suggest that
its profundity is established by the preceding discussion. If we have rights because the
constitution proclaims them, we can have only as many rights as it proclaims. We can have
no principle argument with despots when they ensure that the constitution proclaims few or
no rights.
This is the distinction, in the end, between a positivistic and a normative approach to
human rights. The positivist will assert that we have those rights only that already are
embodied in law. The normativist will assert that we are entitled to those rights, too, that the
law does not yet recognise. In my view the weight of opinion in the human rights discourse
favours a normative approach to human rights, rather than a positivist one. And there are.
good reasons for that. But to accept the proposition that we have rights before the constitution
or the law proclaims them merely invites the question again: what is a human right?
2.2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Faced, now, with such a problem, we may wish to fall back on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) and all the other international human rights instruments. We may
wish to argue that human rights derive from these instruments whether or not individual
countries pass legislation to that effect. 9
My view is that this approach would not shift the inquiry much further. All it does is to
shift the problem from the national level to the international sphere. The fundamental
7 Dicey, 1965, p. 203.
8 Act 200/1993/33(i)(b). This stipulation is not part of the current consntution. However in State v
Makwanyane and Mchunu 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) the Constitutional Court was firm in the view that a right
could not be limited in a manner that negated its essential content. Although this judgement was made in
terms of the interim constitution, it is doubtful that the courts might accept a limitation of a right under
section 36 of the current constitution ifit denies the essential content of the right - see Malan, supra, pp. EI
- 7 & lOet seq.
9 See Pienaar & Liebenberg, in Schutte, Liebenberg & Minnaar, 1998, p. 413. Although the authors suggest
that human rights existed before the UDHR, they still attribute them to documents such as the Magna Carta
and the British Bill of Rights of 1688.
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question as to what a human right is, remains unanswered. It is by no means clear to me that
if the question was valid in the national domain, its validity disappears by the sheer act of
internationalising the subject.
It is significant that Dembour and Mbaya cite international human rights instruments as
examples of the point they are making. They argue, for instance, that the extent of human
rights violations during World War II inspired the drawing up of the UDHR.IO If it is so, it
must remain possible to ask even at this stage, what is a human right?
I do not find the cataloguing of rights a useful manner of answering the question at
hand. One could, in my view, accept the catalogue, but legitimately still ask the original
question. In other words, why are life, freedom of expression, administrative justice and all
the other rights mentioned in our Bill of Rights and in the UDHR human rights? From a
philosophical standpoint, a document does not justify itself. Therefore the mere fact that the
UDHR says so, does not seal the debate. Quite the contrary, it invites the question: why does
the UDHR say so? II
2.3 Natural Law
Tore Lindholm suggests that the term "human rights" hardly formed part of the English
vocabulary until after World War II. "Natural rights" and the "rights of man" were more
current terms.v' Cranston suggests that the term "human rights" might in some sense be
ascribable to Winston Churchill. When the United Nations was formed, Cranston writes, "one
of the first and most important tasks assigned to it was what Winston Churchill called 'the
enthronement of human rights ",.13
For current purposes I suggest that the pre-World War II terminology implies the
source of human rights - or the "rights of man", as they were called at the time. An
examination of the writings of some philosophers in the is" and 19th centuries would reveal
that they perceived the "rights of man" as springing from nature.
10 See also Pienaar & Liebenberg op cit, lac eit. And see, indeed, the UDHR preamble which leaves no doubt
that the UDHR was drawn up as a result of "disregard and contempt for human rights" and that the said
disregard and contempt led to "barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind". It further
recognises "the inherent dignity" of the person and so does not claim to be the author of such dignity.
II See, for example, Marx, supra, p. 162, where Marx explores the meaning of the term "rights of man" as it is
used in the Declaration du droit de I 'homme et du eitoyen.
12 Lindholm, in Amegaard & Landfald, supra, p. 15; Cranston, supra, p. 1. See, indeed, the French Declaration
du droit de I 'homme et du citoyen of 1789, 1791 and 1793; and the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776.
13 C 3ranston, supra, p. .
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In Leviathan Hobbes wrote that freedom could only flourish in circumstances where the
ruler has absolute power and the subjects unhesitatingly submit to his authority. He
approached the question in more or less the same manner in Elements of Law, where he
argued for undivided sovereignty. He was of the view that, in his natural state, "man" was
warlike and therefore lived in constant fear. The only way in which "man" would enjoy
freedom, so Hobbes argued, was to tame his natural propensity for war by subjecting him to
the absolute power of the sovereign. Thus, although Hobbes argued a fundamentally
undemocratic proposition, he presented it nevertheless as the framework within which
freedom was possible. And nature, man's natural propensity for war, was the plank on which
he built his theory of the state and, thus, of civilliberties.14
In The Two Treatises of Government Locke proceeded on a premise diametrically
opposed to Hobbes. He argued that, contrary to Hobbes, "man" in his natural state was happy
and peaceful. "Man" had, yes, some inconveniences, which included lack of clear rules. To
solve these, he entered into a "social contract" as a result of which the sovereignty was
established. It was inconceivable, therefore, that the sovereign, being the product of a
voluntary contract of free men, could now have absolute power over them. IS But in any event,
Locke argued, the notion of an absolute sovereign was incompatible with the laws of nature
which impose limits on everyone willy nilly, including the sovereign."
Montesquieu argued in The Spirit of the Laws that the nature of a country determined
what form of government was best suited for that country. In Emile Rousseau argued that
children are naturally good and that, therefore, they should be given freedom. In The Social
Contract he argued that liberty is as important to the human being as fresh air.
It is possible to cite other philosophers who wrote in this period. It seems clear that the
view of a significant body of thinkers in the period held the view that rights are given by
nature. The documents on the "rights of man" that were produced at the time also proceeded
on the basis that these rights are given by nature. I have already referred to some of these, and
wish to add just two more. The Constitution of New Hampshire stated in Articles 5 and 6 that
14 See Berki, 1977, pp. 132-140; Cranston, supra, pp. 25-26; Eide & Hagtvet, supra, pp. 8-9.
15 See Harpham, 1992, pp. 15-29; Eide & Hagtvet, supra, pp. 9-10; Berki, supra, pp. 142-150.
16 Duguit in Archives de philosopie du droit, cited by George Whitecross Paton, made a very similar
argument, save that he was opposed to an a priori approach to law and to rights. See Derham (ed.),
1964, p. 89. Duguit argues that the foundation of the law is not the individual's rights. Law arises
because people live together and it is essential to regulate their relations. Neither, as Duguit saw it,
does law depend on the will of the sovereign, who is himself "bound hand and foot by a law which
he cannot change".
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All men have received from nature the imprescriptible right to worship the
Almighty according to the dictates of their conscience, and no one can be legally
compelled to follow, establish or support against his will any religion or religious
ministry. No human authority can, in any circumstances, intervene in a matter of
conscience or control the forces of the soul. 17
some of "these natural rights" are "by nature inalienable since nothing can replace them".
The Constitution of Pennsylvania stated in Article 9:
Dembour writes that even in our times the concept of human rights emanates from natural
law theories, since it is "conceived as being 'inherent' to the human person".18 This view
received, in South Africa, the unequivocal endorsement of John Dugard, on all accounts a
distinguished jurist. He cites Gustav Radbruch where the latter writes:
When laws consciously deny the will to achieve justice, for instance if they grant
or retract human rights from people according to arbitrary caprice, such laws are
devoid of validity, and the people owe them no obedience and even lawyers must
then find the courage to deny them the nature of law.19
Dugard then comments:
This idea, that a law contrary to the principles of natural law is not a law, has
impeccable jurisprudential roots and finds support in the writings of Cicero, St.
Thomas Acquinas, and Grotius. In recent times it has received endorsement in a
limited form from the American jurist, Lon Fuller of Harvard.2o
If that is accepted, it might provide an escape from the absurdity of ascribing human rights to
the law in circumstances where the evidence seems to suggest that human rights are logically
prior to the law. We would not, then, have to explain where human rights come from when
faced with regimes whose laws constitute a denial of human rights.
In fairness, however, one must state that the theory of natural rights has also been
clouded by much controversy. Hegel argued, for instance, that the notion of natural rights is
defective to the extent that it is contingent upon the concept of natural man. And the problem
about the concept of natural man was that it is arrived at by a level of abstraction that
17 Both constitutions cited by Marx, supra, p. 161.
18 Dembour, supra, p. 153. See, indeed, the preamble to the UDHR and Article 6 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
19 Dugard, 1978, p. 399.
20 Ibid.
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incorrectly leaves out of consideration the very factors that it should be analysing. Hegel
wrote:
[Locke and Hobbes degraded the individual by peeling away the layers of society
and culture] until, finally, one comes by analysis to the abstraction called natural
man. If one thinks away everything which might be regarded as particular or
evanescent, such as what pertains to particular mores, history, culture, or even the
state, then all that remains is man imagined as in the state of nature or else the
pure abstraction of man with only his essential possibilities left."
Bruno Bauer argued that there is nothing natural about the "rights of man" - i.e. they are not
innate. They arise, he argued, out of the manner in which history evolves and in relation to
concrete struggles by people. He wrote:
For the Christian world, the idea of the rights of man was only discovered in the
last century. It is not innate in men; on the contrary, it is gained only in a struggle
against the historical traditions in which hitherto man was brought up. Thus the
rights of man are not a gift of nature, not a legacy from past history, but the
reward of the struggle against the accident of birth and against the privileges
which up to now have been handed down by history from generation to
generation. These rights are the result of culture, and only one who has earned and
deserved them can possess them. 22
Karl Marx attacked the theory of natural rights, calling it a facade for concealing the interests
of those who owned and controlled the means of production. To the working class, on the
other hand, the concept is like an empty shell since, without the means to enforce them,
natural rights were of no consequence to them.23
Cranston argues that all talk about human rights, and thus the concept of natural rights,
outside of positive law comes down to metaphysics. He writes:
21 Quoted by Cobbah, 1987, pp. 316-317. Cobbah cites Hinchman's elaboration on the point made by Hegel:
"Hegel distinguishes between the characteristic Lockeian question, 'What is the origin of X' ... and 'What is
X'? What X is may in fact only come to light when we take into account the developed and articulated form
of 'X', including all the supposedly contingent elements of history, custom, the state, etc.' which the state of
nature approach peels away. In 'taking apart' existing society, studying its 'parts', then reconstructing it,
Hobbes and Locke have left something out - not something accidental, but the very essence of man's social
and political relationships. For this reason their project of grounding human rights in man's pre-political
state appeared to Hegel fundamentally mistaken ... Only if one could purge human memory of everything
not included in Hobbes's and Locke's state of nature, could one possibly re-condition men to think and act
as the liberal theorists say they do ..." (ibid.)
22 Die Judenfrage, 1843, cited by Marx, supra, p. 146.
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There is certainly something suspicious about the things which are said by many
champions of natural law. Consider, for example, a remark made from the
writings of the eighteenth-century jurist William Blackstone: "Natural law is
binding all over the globe; no valid human laws have any validity if contrary to
it". Now if the word "valid" means what it commonly means for lawyers, this
statement is simply untrue. For by a valid law, lawyers commonly mean a law
which is actually upheld and enforced by the courts, a law which is pronounced
valid by a duly established judge. A great many laws contrary to natural law were
upheld by courts in different parts of the globe in the eighteenth century when
Blackstone wrote those words. For instance, there were the laws which authorised
slavery, an institution which Blackstone himself regarded as being contrary to
natural law. Laws even more at odds with natural law were upheld by duly
constituted courts in Germany at the time of the Third Reich .._24
If Cranston had written this critique of natural law, and therefore of natural rights, before the
Nuremberg Trials, there might be a point in engaging with the sentiments he expresses. But
then he wrote it after the Nuremberg Trials, and it seems to me that the issue is fairly settled
now: the Germans who enforced and upheld the positive law he refers to were called upon to
answer to a higher order than the positive law they enforced.
But in any event Cranston misses Blackstone's point completely. The point about
"valid human laws" being invalid when in conflict with natural law is precisely that judges
must refuse to enforce such law!25 More recently, Dembour has made a more interesting
critique of natural law and natural rights:
Natural law [from whence spring natural rights] is a problematic idea ... in that it
assumes that everyone would arrive at the same conclusion as to what is natural
... through adequate exercise of reason. But what appears natural to one person
may not appear so natural to another. This is very clear when one considers
different epochs and different societies. But even people belonging to the same
society often hold different views on a particular issue. ... Examples which are
often mentioned in this respect include the practice of slavery ... and the
subordination of women up to the end of the 20th century. If slaves were slaves
23 See Eide, supra, pp. 10-11.
24 Cranston, supra, pp. 11-12.
25 See Dugard, op cit, lac cit.
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and women subordinates, it was of course in accordance with their so-thought true
nature with so-deemed biological facts.
It appears that what is conceived as "natural" is often nothing else than what
happens to be "mainstream". As a consequence, natural law theories can often be
criticised for justifying the status quo by mistaking what is at the moment ... for
what ought to be."
These challenges to natural law, and thus to natural rights, are very significant. They remind
us how all too often the ideologies and interests of people and of classes are sanitised,
universalised and then presented as objective reality. They are a useful tool for analysing the
conditions under which any claim is made about human rights.
But I am not sure that one can reject the notion of natural law and of natural rights
completely on that account. First, I am of the view that it is possible to speak of natural rights
in a non-metaphysical sense. (I shall return to this in a while.) Second, whilst it is true that the
cost of enforcing rights does not favour the poor, it is also true that very often rights are
respected without having to be enforced. Most of the time, for example, children do not
litigate in order to compel their parents to raise them. Most parents consider it their natural
duty to raise and protect their children. When the need arises for enforcement, the poor will
undoubtedly be disadvantaged. But why should a person's rights be thought less of in those
circumstances where they are respected without coercion? And, third, the discourse on human
rights is bound to have an element of ideology, since it speaks to the manner in which people
should be governed. The critics of natural rights theories are also influenced by their belief
about how society should be ordered. As such, therefore, the intrusion of ideology in our
definition of rights seems inevitable. Therefore, in stead of asking whether our conception of
human rights is not influenced by ideology, it seems more useful to ask how we can define
human rights so as not to be unduly restrictive, given the intrusion of ideology in our
thoughts.
26 Arnegaard & Landfald, supra, pp. 153-154. See also Chimni, 1999, p. 338. Chirnni is not here dealing with
rights as such. He deals with international law and argues that it represents the interests of powerful nations
and masks inequalities in international relations. He writes: "[The] international legal system possesses its
own internal structure and dynamics which shapes its content and discourse. It develops ... only through
certain organised 'sources of international law'. The particular form international law thus assumes defines
its boundaries; anything falling outside it is designated as non-law. lts distinctive nature has served to sustain
the status quo and prevent the substantive transformation of the content of international law in favour of
third world states." Although this is not a direct attack on any theory of rights, it has a bearing on the attitude
one must take towards international human rights instruments to the extent that they represent international
law.
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Once it is admitted that both the proponents and the opponents of natural law (and
therefore also of natural rights) theories proceed from where they stand ideologically, we can
try and shift the debate forward a little. We can try and find some common ground between
the opposing schools. I think that Asbjom Eide begins to move us in that direction where he
writes:
Ideological divisions on the issue of rights have dominated Western societies
since the time of Marx, yet much of this controversy ought to have been overcome
by the Universal Declaration. It transcends both Marxist and liberal ideologies in
several ways: first, because the present human rights system includes both
economic and social as well as civil and political rights; second, because it
emphasizes that the full and free development of any person's personality is
possible only when she or he forms part of a community and observes her or his
duties to it. Collective sovereignty and individual autonomy ideally reinforce each
other under the contemporary human rights systems."
If we accept that the UDHR addresses some of the concerns raised by Dembour about natural
law theories being pro status quo, and some of those raised by Marx, the question as to the
meaning of the term "human right" still seems to me pertinent.
2.4 Human Rights as Human Needs
I incline towards the proposition that human rights should be defined in terms of human
needs. Lone Lindholt formulates the matter in the following words:
A more scholarly approach, seemingly a paradox, is one of defining human rights
concepts according to human needs and basic principles rather than according to
their legal form or subjects ... [T]his approach has the opposite effect of
generalizing and narrowing down the scope of human rights to a handful of
essential all-encompassing principles expressing basic human requirements.r"
She also writes:
In the centre'" we find the basic principles of human rights, expressed as
customary supra-regulatory norms and issues considered to be of such a vital
27 Eide, supra, p. 11.
28 Lindholt, 1997, pp. 29-30.
29 Of flat circles within circles representing rights in order to move away from a hierarchical view of rights.
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importance that they must be protected by international law. Examples hereof are
the right to life and sustenance, freedom from violation of one's mental and
physical integrity, the availability of opportunities to develop one's personal
capacities, and access to form and maintain relationships with others at both an
individual and collective level."
In a similar vein, Johan Galtung writes:
[A human right must be] conceived of as a norm, concerning, indeed protecting,
the rock-bottom of human existence. There is a link to basic human needs which
potentially would make human rights applicable to human beings everywhere."
Galtung also argues that there must be "no hard, positivistic assumptions about the 'nature' of
human rights except that ultimately they are supposed to serve basic human needs".32 I find
this approach appealing because, amongst others, it is not pretentious. It is down to earth in
the fashion argued by George Whitecross Paton about law, namely that "it should not claim
too lofty a justification for acts the reason for which is necessity rather than morality'L''' This
approach suggests that as human beings we have certain needs and that, to ensure that they
are not denied us, we express them as rights. And then we insist on their observance.
Further, this approach grounds the theory of natural rights and renders it less
metaphysical. Human needs are natural. 34 If it is accepted that human rights are an expression
of human needs, then the connection between human rights and nature becomes apparent.
Because human needs are not static, human rights must also, if they are based on human
needs, be dynamic.
It remains possible, however, to object to this conception of human rights too. I can
well imagine that Dembour might argue validly that different people perceive human needs
30 Lindholt, supra, p. 6.
31 Galtung, in Eide & Hagtvet, supra, p. 153.
32 Ibid, p. 154.
33 Derham (ed.), supra, p. 321.
34 Some may wish to argue that some rights are not natural in the sense argued above, and that they evolve,
rather, out of the way in which history has progressed. An example of such rights might be the right to
freedom of expression. In this regard, however, see Van der Westhuizen, 1994, in Van Wyk, Dugard, De
Villiers & Davis, pp. 267-269. See especially p. 269, where he argues, "The desire to communicate ... is an
essential characteristic of human nature" and "Normal human beings want to speak, sing, write, or display
colours and insignia ..." Van der Westhuizen then concludes, and I think rightly, that freedom of expression
is a natural right. Note that he likens it to other civil and political rights and that, therefore, the naturalness of
free expression is not peculiar.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
differently. She might validly still confront us with the objection of "unwanted rights".35
Although Dembour would in my view be correct, the validity of the approach must survive
her. Allow me to elaborate.
I have already made reference to Asbjorn Eide, where he suggests that the UDHR
somewhat bridges the ideological gulf between liberal and radical theories of human rights.
Now, the question of enforcement, which Karl Marx argued, is still pertinent. It is still so that
poor people lack the money and the know-how needed in order to enforce their rights.
Therefore it would still be correct to argue that for them, the rights listed in the UDHR often
do not bring a profound difference to the quality of their lives. As Hanna Bokor-Szëgo states
it, albeit in a somewhat different context, the question is legitimate "whether a person lacking
even rudimentary education is in a position to use his political rights consciously, in
accordance with his interests't."
But the question about the content of these rights is a different matter. If one proceeds
from the list of rights named in the UDHR37 it seems to me that one can no longer argue that
these rights as such are pro status quo. One can no longer argue that, as a body, they
represent the interests of the owners of capital.
If that is accepted, then we cannot, it seems to me, raise the argument against these
rights that, as a body, they are suspect because someone else might think differently about
them. We could argue, to be sure, that it is possible to improve them and that the list should
never be closed. That is a different matter.
And so is the question whether everyone they are available to, wants them. The fact that
the rights are available to a person means that, if he/she chooses to exercise them, he/she can
do so. If he/she chooses otherwise, they do not cease to be rights on that account. The whole
thing is about choice. And even so, the efficacy of these rights is often independent of the
35 Dembour, 1998, pp. 156-157 refers to a study by Heather Montgomery with the title Must Children have
Rights they don't Want? The study happens against the background of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child of 1989. Among others, the Convention directs states to take measures "to protect the
child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse". In her study, Montgomery finds that
prostitution can be a rational choice for the child prostitute. If they did not prostitute themselves, they might
be forced by exigencies of life to engage in other economic activities which offer lower financial returns and
which might expose them to other forms of harm. One 12-year old who was interviewed by Montgomery
even hoped that, in the life hereafter, she might be rewarded "for looking after my parents" with the proceeds
of prostitution. The question therefore arises whether people should be forced to have rights which they do
not want - rights, in effect, which might impoverish them.
36 Bokor-Szegë, supra, p. 22.
37 The "protection" of which rights is "amplified" in, and based on, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (See Bokor-Szegë,
supra, p. 29.)
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choices we make. So, even if I thought nothing of my right to life, I continue to enjoy the
protection afforded by that right because others take it seriously.
The children studied by Heather Montgomery might reject the rights the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child accords them in a given set of circumstances. They
might invoke them in another. To attack the right because, in a given set of circumstances,
the holder of the right disregards or waives it, would in my view not be a sound proposition.
We do not always act consistently in respect of our rights, but that is not an adequate basis for
questioning the validity of those rights per se.
In the end this is really a question about how society functions politically. Even if the
people concerned under no circumstances welcomed the rights accorded them, those rights
would in my view remain valid. A parallel can be found in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's
reconciliation of freedom with democracy. He argues:
The citizen gives his consent to all the laws, including those which are passed in
spite of his opposition .... The constant will of all the members of the State is the
general will; by virtue of it they are citizens and free. When in the popular
assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked is not exactly whether it
approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general
will .... Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the
general will is found by counting votes. When therefore the opinion that is
contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor less than that I was
mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not so. If my
particular opinion had carried the day, I should have achieved the opposite of
what was my will; and it is in that case that I should not have been free.38
Rousseau's views have to be approached, needless to say, with a measure of circumspection.
Things are not quite as simple as he suggests. It is not, for instance, always a matter of choice
where one will reside. I think, however, that the fundamental point he makes is valid, namely
that, in the normal course of events, the validity of a law is not threatened by the fact that
some people reject it. If it is so, then the validity of a right embodied in a law is also not
threatened by the fact that some people reject it.
38 Rousseau, 1973, p. 250.
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2.5 The Law and Human Rights
Nothing I have said should be read to suggest that the law has no place in the discourse on
human rights. It is quite obvious that the law has a tremendous impact on human rights. The
question is therefore not whether the law is relevant in the human rights discourse - it
clearly is. The issue is rather to understand what the law does when it proclaims rights.
The ideal relationship between human rights and the law is, in my view, analogous to
the Brownian movement in physics. So seen, the law is like a liquid and people like particles
moving around in the liquid. The liquid, which is the law, regulates their movement so that
they do not collide. But at the same time it takes its shape from the particles whose movement
it regulates. Every now and then it will expand according to the direction the people it
regulates are pushing it and so, perhaps, recognise other rights. In order to prevent any
collision, the law may occasionally withhold some rights. It may occasionally narrow the
scope of some rights. But the purpose must at all times be to eliminate or to reduce the
potential for collision. If the law withholds rights or reduces them for any other purpose, we
resist that fact precisely because the rights do not derive from the law.
If we accept that rights are not the products of the law, and that we assert them even
where the law denies them, we still have to operationalise them. We still have to define their
scope and find ways to harmonise them. In my view that is the proper place of the law in the
human rights discourse. The law, therefore, is like a medium in which and through which we
enjoy and exercise our rights.
I suggested that this would be the ideal situation. In social life things are not nearly so
neat. Unlike in the Brownian movement, collisions do occur in social life. Rodolfo
Stavenhagen writes:
While contemporary wisdom holds that all human rights are equally fundamental
and none ranks higher than any other, in reality certain rights do hold priority over
others. When conflicts between rights occur, the solution is more often than not
neither technical nor moral, but political. In other words, conflicts seldom occur
between rights in the abstract, but between holders or claimants of rights. The
question is not so much which rights are in conflict, but who holds the rights and
how much political (or military) power does he have to impose his claim. If such
conflict occurs between individuals in a democratic polity, then usually the state
has the means to impose a more or less satisfactory or fair solution. If, however,
the conflict occurs between individual rights and collective rights, other than those
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of the state itself, or between holders of competing collective rights then solutions
are not always easy and may lead to political showdowns."
The place of the law is also, then, to mediate and arbitrate such conflicts as may arise in the
course of enjoyment of our rights. In doing so, the law has to take into account the power
dynamics involved in such conflicts, and ensure that they do not lead to injustice. Taking into
account the power dynamics of the conflict includes ensuring that the outcome of the conflict
is not determined purely and only by the means of the contesting parties.
2.6 Are Human Rights Unconditional?
There is a sense in which, by accepting, however remotely, the proposition that rights are
given by nature, one is condemned to assert that they are therefore unconditional. They
depend on nature, and on nature alone. John Locke, who is generally recognised as a leading
theoretician on natural rights, wrote: "[T]he binding force of the law of nature is permanent,
that is to say, there is no time when it would be lawful for a man to act against the precepts of
this law." He also wrote that even though we do not always act according to the law of
nature, that does not mean we are entitled to "act against the law".4o Edward J Harpham
comments: "In other words, there is no time in which an individual in the state of nature
could entertain a hostile disposition toward others without violating the precepts of natural
law.,,41
By Locke, therefore, it is clear that rights, even if it is accepted that they issue from
nature, are not for that reason unconditional. They are qualified, in the first instance, by
nature itself- one is not at liberty to do what the natural law forbids. And they are qualified,
in the second instance, by our obligations to fellow human beings. Locke was influenced by
his theological outlook to formulate our obligations to one another in the manner that he
did." However I think that it is possible to arrive at the same conclusion from a non-
theological angle as well. It is a condition of our existence that we are in the world. And to be
in the world, as Anita Craig would argue, is to be bodily placed before others" or, as Louis
van Schaik might put it, to be in a state of human relationship.l"
39 Stavenhagen, in Eide, supra, p. 150. See also Bokor-Szegë, supra, p. 25.
40 See Harpham, supra, p. 22.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid, et seq.
43 Craig, 1997, p. 517. See also Macquarrie, 1972, pp. 88 & 92-96.
44 Van Schaik, in Macnamara, 1977, p. 149.
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Our bodiliness before others means that we are limited in what we can do by the
presence of others. The human relationship we have with others means we have responsibi-
lities to other human beings. The UDHR proclaims, indeed, that "[all human beings] are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brctherhood'Vf Arguing the African case on human rights, Josiah Cobbah writes: "Even if
man was originally in a pre-political condition, such a condition is inevitably replaced by a
condition in which human beings give recognition to each other and recognize rights as
correlative to duties.T" Therefore we cannot have unconditional rights. And it is as well
since, in the words of Rousseau, if every citizen could do just as s/he pleases, nobody would
be free.47
I must hasten to add that I am not concerned here with Rousseau's implication that the
limits the law sets to our rights are correct, a proposition I cannot lend unconditional support
to. The correctness of any limits the law sets on our rights is something to be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis, and I do not think that one can make a priori endorsements thereof. The
view that I argue is that the limitation of our rights is an ontological matter. It flows from the
way we are in the world. Therefore we cannot argue with integrity that in principle our rights
ought to never get limited.
2.7 The Obligations of Human Rights
It is generally accepted that a right creates obligations for all those against whom it is
claimed. These obligations may be borne by the state or by other persons, depending on
whom the right is addressed to, and on the circumstances of every case. The nature of the
obligation created by the right depends on the nature of the right itself, but it also depends on
the terms in which the right is expressed. A right might impose an obligation to carry out a
particular act, or to act in a particular way. It might impose an obligation to refrain from a
particular act or from acting in a particular way. 48
So conceived, rights create obligations for the addressee. What is not often grasped
with much enthusiasm is that rights create obligations for their bearer as well. The UDHR
states in Article 29 that:
45 UDHR, Article 1. See also Raz, 1989, in Law and Philosophy, 8(1), April, p. 15; Macquarrie, supra, pp. 209-
214.
46 Cobbah, supra, p. 318.
47 Rousseau, supra, p. 150.
48 See Bokor-Szegë, supra, pp. 28 & 29.
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• Everyone has duties to the community in which one lives; and
• The rights enshrined in the UDHR should in no case be exercised in a manner contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulate in their preambles:
Realising that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the
community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the
promotion and the observance of the rights recognised in the present Covenant.
In Article 5, both covenants direct the state as well as the individual to avoid actions the
result of which might be the destruction of any right mentioned in the covenants. Bokor-
Szegë has commented:
In accordance with the global and national interests determined by the social and
economic conditions of our age, in our days the selfish, egotistic man is replaced
by the ideal man "having duties to other individuals and to the community to
which he belongs" ... by a person who can make use of his rights only so as not to
destroy any of the rights and freedoms of others .... 49
Article 29 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights also conveys the notion that
rights come with obligations for their bearer:
Each person has the duty to preserve and respect hislher family, parents and
nation. Each person must protect the security of his/her State and work for
national solidarity and independence. Each person must work and pay lawful
taxes, and promote positive African values and African unity.
It is possible to disagree about the specific obligations the Charter lays down for the bearer of
a right, but that is not what we are concerned with here. It is crucial, especially in South
Africa today, to cultivate a human rights culture that emphasises both conceptions of
obligations. We have to insist on the obligations attending the addressees of our rights. As
Joseph Raz writes:
To assert a right IS, as we know, to assert that the right-holder's interest is
sufficient reason to hold another subject to a duty. The duty's purpose is to protect
the interest of the right-holder. The protection of that interest is its raison d'être.
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The person subject to the duty is encumbered in the interest of the right-holder.
Their relationship need not be adversarial in fact. ... But the relationship is
confrontational in principle. The duty does not depend on any harmony of
interests between the right-holder and the person subject to the duty. It exists
regardless of the existence or absence of such harmony. 50
But we must insist just as strongly on the duties imposed by those very rights on their bearers.
No one must be allowed to use the rights they have in order to destroy the rights of others.
And there is a sound philosophical basis for that insistence.
If we accept the proposition that our bodily existence in the world places us in a state of
human relationship with others; that, as John Mbiti would say, "I am because we are, and
because we are therefore I am," 51 we must accept that those others have rights too. We must
accept that their rights are as important to them as ours are to us. But even if we thought
nothing about our own rights, we must be prepared to accept that other people's rights may
mean the world to them, and that, therefore, we have obligations to them. These obligations
flow, not so much from the law as from the method of our existence in the world. So seen,
our obligations are an ontological matter. In the words of Maurice Cranston, "[t]o say that a
man has a right ... is to convert that demand into a kind of moral imperative, that is, to
impose on all men a reciprocal duty to abstain from injuring their neighbours". 52 As Hobbes
saw it, this mutual obligation to refrain from injuring one another was a precondition for us to
be in the world as we are. It is not possible to insist on the observance of our rights if we
trample on the rights of others. It is sheer hypocrisy to pretend that a human rights culture can
be built on any other foundation. Therefore the basis on which we can demand and expect
that others will respect our rights, is that we ourselves are committed to respect the rights of
others.
49 Ibid, p. 30.
50 Raz, 1989, p. 8.
51 Quoted by Cobbah, supra, p. 320.
52 Cranston, supra, p. 25.
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Chapter 3
Socio-Economic Rights
3.1 Background
3.1.1 The Universal Declaration of HumanRights
On 6 January 1941, Franklin D Roosevelt delivered his famous Four Freedoms Speech. He
identified what he called the "four essential freedoms" as:
• Freedom of speech and expression;
• Freedom to worship God in one's own way;
• Freedom from want; and
• Freedom from fear. 1
After naming each one of these freedoms, Roosevelt emphatically writes: "everywhere in the
world". He argues that freedom from want translates to "economic understandings which will
secure to every nation a healthy peace time life for its inhabitants". Lone Lindholt suggests
that Roosevelt articulated, in these freedoms, the basis for a sound human rights approach.
She suggests that Roosevelt's statement provides the "essential all-encompassing principles
expressing basic human requirements" on which a human rights system can be built.2
Two important considerations flow from Roosevelt's statement. The first is that human
rights are of universal application. The second is that economic justice belongs in the human
rights domain. He suggests that world peace and the enjoyment of civil and political rights
may well be contingent upon economic justice.
On 10 December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was
adopted, and it proclaims:
• The right to social security (Article 22);
• Economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for the person's dignity and the free
development of his personality (Article 22);
• The right to fair labour practices (Article 23);
I US Information Service, n.d., Living Documents of American History, p. 71.
2 Lindholt, supra, p. 30.
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• The right to a rest period for workers (Article 24);
• The right to an adequate standard of life, including food, clothing, housing, medical
care, security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age
or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond the person's control (Article 25);
• The right to education (Article 26); and
• Cultural rights (Article 27).
Alongside these rights, the UDHR proclaims civil and political rights. It is noteworthy that
the UDHR does not distinguish between civil and political rights on the one hand, and social
and economic rights on the other.' Quite the contrary, it states that all these rights are "a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations" and directs every individual
and every organ of society "to secure their universal and effective recognition and
observance" .
Similarly, the language of the UDHR does not in my view suggest that some
rights should be privileged and others ranked somewhat lower. I am cognisant of Shadrack
Gutto's suggestion that the expression of specific rights or freedoms in the UDHR "differs
and may allow for different implementation or enforcement strategies and means" .4. In
interpreting Gutto, I think that one should take note that the UDHR, unlike the ICESCR,
states in every case that the person has a right to X It does not say that the person has a right
of access to X. Therefore the right is direct. Article 22 of the UDHR, it is true, provides that
the national effort to bring about the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights should
be "in accordance with the organisation and resources of each State". Therefore it can be said
that, according to the UDHR, the implementation of socio-economic rights is contingent upon
the resources that the state has at its command.
However the same article implies a connection between socio-economic rights and
civil and political rights where it speaks about "social and cultural rights" being
"indispensable for [the person's] dignity and the free development of his personality". The
statement in the UDHR preamble that states must secure the universal and effective
recognition and observance of "these rights and freedoms by progressive measures" refers to
all the rights listed in the Declaration. Therefore it cannot be a basis for ranking socio-
economic rights lower than civil and political rights.
3 See Gutto, 1998, p. 86.
4 Ibid.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
In my view Gutto's reading of the UDHR is coloured by his reading of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). I am of the view that if the
UDHR is read on its own terms, it is clear and does not imply a differential approach to the
rights it proclaims. Now, of course, as I have already indicated, the ICESCR is supposed to
give effect to the protection of the socio-economic rights enshrined in the UDHR. Therefore
it would be understandable - it might even be essential - to read the UDHR against the
ICES CR. But I think that, where one discusses the UDHR as such, it is important to read it on
its own terms. On such a reading one must conclude that there is no textual support in the
UDHR for the proposition that rights should be approached differentially. To only read the
UDHR against the ICESCR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), and then proclaim that that is what it means, will impoverish our analysis. It will
render us unable to appreciate the very case that Gutto is making out - viz. that the adoption
of two human rights instruments by the United Nations was, in effect, the concretisation of
ideological resistance to the injunctions of the UDHR on socio-economic rights.
3.1.2 Classifying Rights: International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
In any event it was not long before the custodians of the UDHR started classifying and
ranking the rights it proclaimed. Gutto suggests that this classification and ranking was
probably a function of the "bipolar ideological divisions within the United Nations".5 The
culmination of these ideological divisions was the adoption of two instruments on human
rights - viz. the ICCPR and the ICESCR.6 The ICCPR is not the subject matter of this study,
and will therefore be referred to only if it is necessary for the purpose of making a specific
point.
The ICESCR was adopted in 1966 and requires state parties to:
• Introduce measures for the progressive, though full, realisation of the rights recognised
in the ICESCR, to the maximum of their available resources (Article 2(1));
• Recognise the right to:
5 Ibid, pp. 86-87. See also Alston, 1992, in Alston (ed.), pp. 474 & 485; Craven, 1995, pp. 194 -195.
6 Gutto, supra, p 87.
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• Work, which right means the state must provide vocational guidance and training
programmes and techniques with a view to ensuring full and productive
employment (Article 5(1»;
• Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value;
• A decent living for workers and their families;
• Safe and healthy working conditions;
• Equal opportunity for promotion at the workplace;
• Rest, leisure and a reasonable limitation of working hours. (Article7);
• Form and join trade unions and the right to go on strike (Article 8);
• Social security (Article 9);
• An adequate standard of living for everyone, which right includes the right to
adequate food, clothing and housing (Article 11);
• The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health
(Article 12);
• Education (Articlesl3 & 14); and
To take part in cultural life (Article 15).•
3.1.3 Ranking Human Rights: Generations of Rights
Once human rights were carved into these two broad categories - civil and political rights
on the one side and socio-economic rights on the other - the stage was set for a hierarchical
ordering of human rights. And so it came to pass that human rights got divided into three
generations. Civil and political rights came to be called first generation rights; social, cultural
and economic rights second generation rights; and environmental rights third generation
rights.'
Writers are not agreed on the origins of the division of human rights into generations.
7 Bokor-Szegë, supra, p. 20; De Villiers, in Van Wyk et al., supra, p. 603; Mbaya, supra, p. 68. It is
noteworthy that there does not seem to be consensus even on the question whether there are two or three
generations. Shadrack Gutto, for instance, speaks about a bipolar approach where the division is simply
between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other.
(Gutto, supra, p. 86.) And then writers like Asbjom Eide and Bernt Hagtvet noticeably omit to mention
cultural rights in periodising human rights generations. It is further noteworthy that, where other writers
speak about environmental rights, Asbjom Eide and Bernt Hagtvet speak about solidarity rights. Therefore
there is still a lot of clarification required both about the classification of rights into generations on the one
hand, and the content of the classes of rights as such.
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Asbjom Eide and Bernt Hagtvet, in a footnote to Etienne-Richard Mbaya, write that the
notion of three generations of rights was first proposed by Keba M'Baye of Senegal when he
was the Director of UNESCO's Division on Peace and Human Rights. They suggest that the
reasoning behind the classification was that civil and political rights were the first to emerge
- in the is" century. Social and economic rights, on the other hand, emerged in the 19th and
first part of the zo" century. The zo" century, they write, was time for a third generation of
rights to be recognised, namely solidarity rights." Hanna Bokor-Szegë, on the other hand,
writes that the notion of three generations of human rights was first introduced by KVasak in
La declaration universelle des droits de I 'homme, 30 ans apres in 1977.9
It would appear, though, that M'Baye might have worked in the capacity referred to
above in the 1980s.10 If that is correct, it would appear that preference must be given to the
ascription of the division toVasak, whose work appeared in 1977.
Whatever the origins of the notion, its effect was that only first generation rights came
to be accepted as human rights properly so called. II Socio-economic rights, on the other
hand, were deemed mere directive principles, pointing the direction for policy formulation,
but were not binding at all on the state." The reasons advanced for the reluctance to accept
socio-economic rights as proper rights were, amongst others, the following:
• Whereas civil and political rights are self-executing, socio-economic rights "require
legislative and other state actions".
• The implementation of socio-economic rights is the subject-matter of politics and not of
law.
• Flowing from the reservation referred to above, it is improper for the courts to involve
themselves with socio-economic rights. Such involvement, if there is to be one, will
inevitably involve the courts in politics, and this should not be encouraged.
• Adjudicating over socio-economic rights will negate the trias politica doctrine, in terms
of which the three arms of government - legislature, executive and judiciary - are
separate and independent of one another. Court judgements will have this effect
8 Mbaya, ibid.
9 Bokor-Szegë, op cit, lac cit.
10 Kumar C., South Wind: On the universality of the human rights discourse, in Lindholm, supra, p. 133.
II Gutto, supra, p. 87.
12 De Villiers, supra, pp. 614-621; Davis, 1992, pp. 475 et seq.
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because, in ordering the state to fulfil socio-economic rights, the courts will effectively
be determining the appropriation and application of the budget.
• Socio-economic rights are programmatic in nature and therefore not capable of
immediate realisation.'?
• Issues around affordability make socio-economic rights inappropriate for recognition as
binding human rights.!"
The merit of these objections and whether they still exert influence in South Africa are
discussed under Section 3.2.2.9 hereof.
3.1.4 Implementation and Monitoring Implications of the Division of Rights
Reference was made earlier to Gutto's suggestion that the reading of the UDHR lends itself
to "different implementation or enforcement strategies and means". Whereas I have
expressed my reservation about his reading of the UDHR, I nevertheless agree with his
inference with regard to the implementation or enforcement strategies for the two sets of
rights.
Philip Alston writes that the ideological division within the United Nations also
determined the importance that the contesting parties were to attach to each of these sets of
rights. Countries with a socialist inclination tended to stress the importance of socio-
economic rights and took the view that the full enjoyment of civil and political rights was
contingent on the realisation of socio-economic rights." The African countries, which had
recently been admitted to the United Nations, also often supported the move to strengthen the
commitment to socio-economic rights within the United Nations.16
Because of the dominance of Western Europe in the United Nations.!" their attitude to
socio-economic rights determined the importance attached to these rights by the world body.
But initially this was also aided by the USSR which, in 1951, opposed any reporting system
on progress made in the implementation of socio-economic rights on the basis that it was
13 De Villiers, supra, pp. 606-607.
14 Gutto, 1992, supra, p. 91; De Villiers, supra, p. 623.
15 Alston, 1992, supra, p. 485, Bokor-Szegë, supra, p. 22; Eide, supra, p. Il.
16 O'Donovan, in Alston, 1992, supra, p. 119.
17 See Alston, 1992, in Alston, supra, p. 195; Alston, 1998, in ESR Review, p. 2.
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incompatible with the sovereignty of the state." This view coincided with that of the USA
which, to date, has not ratified the ICESCR, precisely on that account.l"
The result of this attitude towards socio-economic rights by the majority of member
states was that they adopted "institutional arrangements" for implementing and for
monitoring socio-economic rights that were inferior to those adopted in respect of civil and
political rights.r'' Whereas, for example, the rights protected by the ICCPR were required to
be honoured fully and immediately, those protected by the ICESCR were to be fulfilled
progressively and in accordance with resources available to the state. Declan O'Donovan
discusses how the Economic and Social Council (ECOSCO) deliberately and consistently
refused to take decisions that were needed in order to advance a more serious approach to
socio-economic rights."
3.1.5 The Vienna Declaration
The reluctance of the United Nations and its agents to take socio-economic rights seriously
did not, however, dampen the resolve of those who continued their struggle within the United
Nations for the equal treatment of socio-economic vis-a-vis civil and political rights. In 1963,
the USSR changed its tone and argued that implementation measures should be stricter for
socio-economic rights than for civil and political rights. The USSR was concerned that
reluctant member states might use the standard of "progressive implementation" which
applied in respect of socio-economic rights, as an excuse for doing nothing.22
The struggle for the two sets of rights to be placed on an equal footing paid off on 25
June 1993 when the World Conference on Human Rights adopted the Vienna Declaration. In
its preamble the Declaration states that "all human rights derive from the dignity and worth
inherent in the human person" and that "human rights ... are the birthright of all human
beings". (Emphasis added.) And then the Declaration states in Article 5:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.
The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal
manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance
of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and
18 Altson, 1992, supra, p. 485.
19 Alston, 1998, supra, p. 3.
20 Ibid.
21 O'Donovan, supra, p. 115. Perhaps the saving grace for the ECOSCO is that it did not do much for civil and
political rights either.
22 Alston, 1992 supra, p. 486.
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religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of
their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
3.2 Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa
In this section I propose to discuss the situation in South Africa with reference to socio-
economic rights. I shall discuss briefly South Africa's position in relation to the ICESCR;
South Africa's constitutional provisions in respect of socio-economic rights; and some court
judgements on the matter.
3.2.1 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
As I have already pointed out, South Africa signed the ICESCR on 3 October 1994. South
Africa has not, however, ratified the ICESCR as yet. By signing an international agreement, a
country signifies that it intends to bring its laws in line with the relevant agreement. By
ratifying the agreement, a country becomes a full party to the relevant agreement and must,
within two years of signing it, bring its laws on which the agreement has a bearing in line
with it. The country must then submit periodic reports on its performance in the area covered
by the agreement. The effect is, then, that South Africa is not yet a full party to the ICESCR,
but has only signified its intent to be bound by it.
3.2.2 The Constitution
The constitution of South Africa institutes socio-economic rights in respect of the following:
3.2.2.1 Slavery, Servitude and Forced Labour
No one may be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour. (Section 13 of the
Constitution.) This right is direct, immediate and unconditional.r'
3.2.2.2 Labour Relations
Everyone has the right to fair labour practices. Workers are guaranteed the right to form and
join trade unions; to participate in the activities and programmes of their unions; and to go on
strike. Employers are guaranteed the right to form and join employer organisations and to
23 When I use the word "unconditional" in this section, I use it in the sense that everyone is entitled to the right
without regard to the resources commanded by the state and without regard to the circumstances of the
specific bearer of the right.
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3.2.2.3 The Environment
participate In such organisations' activities and programmes. The right to collective
bargaining is guaranteed. (Section 23.) These rights are direct, immediate and unconditional.
Everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to hislher health or well-being.
This entails the right to have the environment protected against pollution and ecological
degradation. In promoting justifiable economic and social development, care must be taken to
secure the ecology and to promote conservation. The first part of this right (as stated in the
first sentence hereof) appears, on the face of the constitution, to be direct, immediate and
unconditional. The second part of the right must be given effect to through "reasonable
legislative and other measures". (Section 24.) Fulfilling the injunction of the constitution with
reference to this right is not contingent upon resources available to the state, but it has to be
balanced against "justifiable economic and social development".
3.2.2.4 Housing
Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. The state must take reasonable
legislative and other measures to achieve the progressive realisation of this right within its
available resources. No one may be evicted from their home or have it demolished without an
order of court. (Section 26.) This is not a direct right: the bearer of the right is not guaranteed
to have a house, only access to it. And then the house need only be "adequate". The right is
not immediate: it allows for progressive realisation. Nor is it unconditional: it is contingent
upon the state's available resources. The second part of the right imposes a negative duty on
the state and on any other person to refrain from evicting a person from or demolishing their
home without a court order.
3.2.2.5 Health Care, Food, Water and Social Security
Everyone has the right to have access to health care services, including reproductive health
care; sufficient food; water; and social security. The state must take reasonable legislative and
other measures for the progressive realisation of these rights within its available resources.
No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. (Section 27.) Except for the right to
emergency medical treatment, none of these rights is direct: people have only the right of
access to their contents. They are not immediate, but allow for progressive realisation. And
they are not unconditional: they are contingent upon the state's available resources.
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3.2.2.6 Education
Everyone has the right to a basic education, including adult basic education. Everyone also
has the right to further education, which the state must take reasonable measures to make
progressively available and accessible. (Section 29.) The first part of the right is direct,
immediate and unconditional. The second part is direct, unconditional, but not immediate: the
state is allowed to bring its realisation about progressively.
3.2.2.7 Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities
Provided that they do not breach any provision of the Bill of Rights, persons who belong to
cultural, religious and linguistic communities have the rights to enjoy their culture, practise
their religion, and use their language. They may form, join, or maintain organisations
associated with these rights. (Section 31, read with Section 30.) Unlike the rights discussed
previously, these rights do not impose any positive duty on the state. The state is not required
to do anything to bring about their realisation. The rights impose a negative duty on the state
- i.e. the state must not interfere with the enjoyment of these rights.
3.2.2.8 Terminology
A number of terms used in the articulation of these rights would require a bit of unpacking. I
do not attempt to do that at this stage. An attempt to unpack these terms will be undertaken in
Chapter 6.
3.2.2.9 The Merits of the Objections to Socio-Economic Rights
In Section 3.1.3 hereof reference was made to the objections raised against socio-economic
rights being justiciable. In this section I propose to discuss the merits of those objections.
3.2.2.9.1 Socio-Economic Rights are not Self-Executing
This objection says, basically, that the state does not have to do anything more in order to
give effect to civil and political rights whereas, with reference to socio-economic rights, that
is necessary. The question suggests itself: what more? Positive state action, the answer is.24
Such positive state action would, clearly, be taken by way of legislation and provision of
funds. The objection asserts, therefore, that the state does not have to do anything more for
the observance of civil and political rights and that, therefore, they are self-executing.
Therefore they are justiciable and socio-economic rights are not.
24 See De Villiers, in Van Wyk, et al. 1994, p. 624.
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Now, in Chapter 2 I discussed the meaning of the term "human right". There is ample
historical evidence that rights are proclaimed, often, precisely because they are not being
observed. And the evidence is that the culprit in the non-observance of human rights that
makes their proclamation necessary is often precisely the state. If human rights were self-
executing, and the state did not need to do anything more for their realisation, the historical
evidence suggests that we might never have all the declarations of human rights that we have
had. But what we have seen is that something more has always been required in order to
compel the observance of human rights. And, what is more, we have seen that the state itself
needs to be compelled to observe human rights.
Conceptually, the notion that there are rights that are self-executing is difficult. At a
conceptual level, therefore, that cannot be a reason for distinguishing socio-economic rights
from civil and political rights. Civil and political rights also depended on the state doing
something more for their realisation before they got established. Even now, the state still has
to do something more for their observance: they are not always observed automatically.
3.2.2.9.2 Socio-Economic Rights: A Question for Politics, not Law
I propose, under this heading, to also discuss the two other objections. These are the
objections that adjudication on the implementation of socio-economic rights would involve
the courts in politics; and that it would blur the separation of powers.
These challenges to the justiciability of socio-economic rights must ultimately boil
down to one issue - viz. that judicial intervention in the implementation of socio-economic
rights is contrary to the doctrine of trias politica. I do not think that we should dwell too
much on the other two elements since, in my view, there is not in practice an iron curtain
between politics and law. Often, in practice, the law is a distillation of the political choices
made by those who are in power." Once those choices have been distilled into law, it is no
longer up to those who made them to see to their enforcement - their enforcement depends
on the executive and the judicial arms of government.
Now, the crux of this challenge is that, by adjudicating on socio-economic rights, the
courts would inevitably encroach on the functional area of the executive to the extent that
such judgements would have budgetary implications. This issue, in South Africa, has been
resolved by the Constitutional Court's judgement in the constitution certification case, which
is discussed under Section 3.2.3.2 hereof. I take the view, however, that this should never
25 See Tigar & Levy, 1977, p. 279; Pashukanis, 1978, pp. 3 & 96.
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have been an issue, and therefore I propose to discuss it in some detail here. In order to make
my point, I propose to discuss briefly the rise of mercantilism and the way in which it
overcame the legal hurdles it faced.
Mercantilism surfaced between the 11th and 12th centuries. The taking of profit and
interest was essential to the development of mercantilism. During this period, however, the
church played a crucial political role in Western Europe, and it was obstructive of the ways of
mercantilism. The church reasoned that it was dishonest to take profit or interest, since one
then received more than the value of the thing or more than one had given. This created a
serious problem for mercantilists, since it rendered their trade precarious. Their efforts to
have laws passed that would secure agreements they had with people in terms of which they
would take profit from their sales or interest on their loans, were in vain, given the political
role played by the church.
The courts, however, were not averse to the notion of profit and of interest, provided
only it could be disguised so that it would not be obvious that something illegal was being
done. Mercantilists, therefore, employed lawyers to draw up contracts that would secure their
rights. Contracts, as we know them today, surfaced during this period. In a large measure,
they were designed to meet the requirements of mercantilism. According to Tigar and Levy
"the writing ... [of the agreement] began to take primacy over the substance'V" The contracts
were crafted in such a way that the profit or the interest was concealed. Thus, for example, if
I borrowed RIOO at the interest rate of 10% per annum, and I was supposed to repay the
money at the end of one year, the contract would state that I have borrowed RIl O.And then it
would state that I forswear my right to dispute receipt of the amount stipulated in the
contract. 27
Now, when a contract says one person has borrowed R110 from another, and that the
borrower hereby undertakes not to place the amount stipulated in the contract in dispute, it
seems quite natural that the person who reads the contract must smell a rat. It would be
strange if the courts that enforced such contracts did not smell a rat - they did! However, as
Tigar and Levy say, the ploy was simply to prioritise the written word over substance.
Moreover, the morality that accompanied the law of contract until now, had to give way to, as
Tigar and Levy call it, the "lawyer's maxim": "God keep us from the equity of parlements.t'"
26 Tigar & Levy, supra, p. 154.
27 Ibid, pp. 172-173.
28 Ibid, p. 151.
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The net effect of this is that the right to take profit and interest could not be established
through political means, for the church obstructed that. Mercantilists and lawyers established
the right via the judicial process. The right is not under attack on that account. It could be
argued, of course, that the trias politica doctrine emerged much later. One can offer two
answers to that.
First, the case for the justiciability of socio-economic rights was never that the courts
should legislate. It was always that the legislature should express socio-economic rights in
laws that make it possible for them to be enforced through the courts. Then the rights would
be enforced like any other right, and if court judgements in such cases had budgetary
implications, in principle that would be no different from other judgements courts make with
budgetary implications.
Second, courts do make law in different ways, in any event, centuries after the
emergence of the trias politica doctrine. Justice Holmes in the United States once observed
that "the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what
I mean by law".29 Even if one takes into account the reservations raised by Paton about this
view (footnote 29 hereof), the debate about the law-making powers of the courts would not
just disappear" Quite apart from the general debate raging out there about the law-making
powers of the courts, South Africa's constitution empowers the courts in given circumstances
to, in effect, make law. According to Section 8(2) of the constitution, the Bill of Rights
applies vertically as well as horizontally." Then Section 8(3)(a)&(b) requires that, in
applying Section 8(2), the courts will check first whether there is any specific legislation
dealing with the right in question. If such legislation exists, the courts should apply that
legislation. If not, the courts must apply the common law or, if necessary, develop it. The
courts are specifically invited by the constitution to develop rules of the common law to limit
29 Quoted by Paton, supra, p. 83. Justice Frank, also of the USA, remarked that before there is a court decision
on any issue, "[the only law available is] a guess as to what a court will decide" - ibid. Paton believes that
Holmes and Frank went a little too far in their formulation, since this has often led to the denial of the
existence of any body of rules and to the view that all the law that exists is "a collection of [court]
decisions". He prefers a formulation by Justice Cardozo, which is that "a principle or rule of conduct so
established as to justify a prediction with reasonable certainty that it will be enforced by the courts if its
authority is challenged ... is a principle or rule of law." Apart from the reservation that people like Holmes
and Frank go too far in emphasising the law-making power of the courts, Paton argues that many rules of
law never go to court. To say that such rules - e.g. rules of administrative law - are not law would be
absurd, Paton reasons.
30 For a detailed discussion of the issue, see Hoffmaster, 1982, pp. 21-55.
31 It binds, in other words, the state as well as persons.
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the right in question, provided only that such limitation complies with Section 36 of the
constitution.Y
Now, the constitution makes this invitation to the courts notwithstanding its clear
entrenchment of the trias politica doctrine.P Even if it were accepted, therefore, that the
justiciability of socio-economic rights would constitute a violation of the trias politica
doctrine, such a violation would not have been something out of this world.
There is another way of approaching the issue. In Section 2.3 hereof I discussed, inter
alia, Dembour and Marx's critique of the theory of natural rights. I argued, with reference to
their critique, that rights are often respected without enforcement. That argument has a
bearing here too. A right is not a right because the bearer is able to litigate in the face of its
violation. Quite the contrary, the bearer is able to litigate in the face of a violation because
he/she has a right. The right, therefore, is logically prior to the ability to litigate.
Now, if the citizen has socio-economic rights, we must assume that the executive will
honour them as a rule. We must assume that failure on the part of the executive to honour
such rights will be the exception and not the norm. We do this in respect of civil and political
rights. If this is accepted, then we must also accept that litigation in order to enforce the rights
will be by way of exception and that it will not be the rule. Therefore we would be entitled to
expect that, in its budgeting processes, the executive will budget for the socio-economic
rights as well as it budgets for the right to counsel, for instance.
So seen, it will remain the executive's responsibility to deal with the budgetary
implications of socio-economic rights, and the judiciary will only ever get involved in the
issue if a specific right is infringed - as it is the case with every other right. The argument
that adjudication on socio-economic rights collapses the boundary between the executive and
the judiciary is based on an incorrect premise and fails to appreciate the point being made
about the justiciability of socio-economic rights. It is premised on the executive not fulfilling
socio-economic rights as a norm, and therefore having to be compelled by the judiciary, as a
norm, to do so. But that understanding of a right is erroneous, since the executive would not
have the choice to ignore socio-economic rights if they are considered fully fledged rights.
32 Section 36 requires that any such limitation be in terms of a law of general application; and that it be
reasonable and justified in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
33 Section 43(a) vests the legislative authority in Parliament. Section 85(1) vests the executive authority in the
President. Section J 65(1) vests the judicial authority in the courts.
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3.2.3.1 Education
3.2.3 Case Law
In this section I propose to discuss briefly some judgements South African courts have
handed down on socio-economic rights in recent years. A number of the cases referred to
here, were decided in terms of the interim constitution. Danie Brand suggests, however, that
they "provide guidance on possible approaches to the interpretation of socio-economic rights
in the 1996 Constitution". 34
Section 32(a) of the interim constitution provided that "[every person shall have the right] to
basic education and to equal access to educational institutions". An order was sought from
the Durban High Court, directing the University of Natal to admit a student to its medical
faculty in terms of this section. The court decided that the term "basic education" does not
include tertiary or higher education, and therefore declined the application." Section 32(a) of
the interim constitution, however, was held to create a positive obligation on the state to
provide basic education to everyone. 36
Section 32(c) of the interim constitution provided that "[every person shall have the
right] to establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on a common culture,
language or religion, provided that there shall be no discrimination on the ground of race".
The court was invited to determine whether the section imposed a positive obligation on the
state to establish schools based on culture, language or religion, where practicable. The
Constitutional Court ruled in the negative."
3.2.3.2 The Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights
Chapter 5 of the interim constitution made provision for the writing, adoption and
certification of the current constitution. In order for it to assume binding force, the current
constitution had to be certified by the Constitutional Court for compliance with the
constitutional principles enunciated in Schedule 4 of the interim constitution." When the
certification process of the constitution came before the Constitutional Court, a challenge to
34 Brand, 1998, p. 8.
35 Motala and Another v University of Natal, 1995(3) BCLR 374 (D).
36 In Re The School Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng) 1996(4) BCLR 537 (CC).
37 In Re The School Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng), supra.
38 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 200/1993171 (l)(a).
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its validity was made on the basis that the inclusion of justiciable socio-economic rights in its
text was at variance with the said constitutional principles, and in particular Principle vi.
The principle read: "There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature,
executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability,
responsiveness and openness." The essence of the challenge was that a judgement that orders
the state to do something by way of honouring a socio-economic right winds down to judicial
budgetary interference. Therefore it blurs the separation of powers as envisaged by
constitutional Principle vi.
The Constitutional Court overruled the challenge, asserting that the judgements of the
courts on a number of civil and political rights have the same effect.39
3.2.3.3 Housing
Section 26 of the current constitution, dealing with the right to housing, has been referred to
already. The Eastern Cape had a law prohibiting certain forms of settlement." Section 3B of
this law allowed for the summary demolition of unauthorised buildings or structures, and did
not require a court order for this. The South Eastern Cape Local Division of the High Court
was invited to pronounce whether such a law could survive Section 26 of the constitution. It
answered the question in the negative."
In Uitenhage Local Transitional Council v Zenza and Others 42 an eviction order was
sought against people illegally occupying land owned by the Council. Section 26(3) of the
constitution requires that the court must consider "all the relevant circumstances" in deciding
a case like this. Floods in this case had destroyed the houses of the illegal occupiers and they
had no alternative dwellings. It also transpired, however, that they had been "recalcitrant" in
their dealings with the Council. The court decided that their recalcitrance, coupled with the
fact that the land in question was needed in order to build houses for 8 000 people,
outweighed the circumstances in their favour. Therefore the court authorised their eviction.
39 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19961996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC).
40 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, 52/1951.
41 Despatch Municipality v Sunridge Estate and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1997 (8) BCLR 1023
(SE).
42 1997(8) BCLR 1115 (SE).
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3.2.3.4 Health
The two leading cases in this regard are B and Others v The Minister of Correctional Services
and Others43 and Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal.44
In the first case the applicants were prisoners. They were HIV-positive and approached
the Cape High Court for an order directing the Department of Correctional Services to supply
them with AZT. They relied on Section 35(2)(e) of the constitution, which reads:
Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right to
conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least
exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation,
nutrition, reading material and medical treatment.
The court entered an order in favour of the applicants. It stated that, once it is established that
any medication other AZT would be inadequate for the task at hand, it is no defence on the
part of the state to say it does not have the money to supply the drug.
The second case went to the Constitutional Court by way of an appeal against a judge-
ment of the Durban and Coastal Local Division of the High Court. Thiagraj Soobramoney,
the applicant, suffered from diabetes, an ischaemie heart disease and had an irreversible
chronic renal failure. He suffered a stroke as a result of cerebro-vascular disease. The only
treatment that could keep him alive was haemodialysis, and it was available at the renal unit
of the Addington Hospital, Durban. Apart from Grey's Hospital in Pietermaritzburg, whose
renal unit is very small, no other hospital in KwaZulu-Natal had dialysis machines.
The Addington Hospital had developed criteria for admitting patients to its dialysis
treatment. Inter alia, the criteria stipulated that the patient must be eligible for a kidney
transplant. Since Soobramoney had other ailments, which prevented him from recovery, he
did not meet the hospital's criteria. Therefore he was refused admission to the hospital's renal
clinic. Soobramoney did not have money to pay private clinics for the treatment. Neither did
his relatives. He was on the verge of dying and approached the court - his prayer, as lawyers
are wont to say, being that the court should direct the hospital and the Department of Health
to admit him to the clinic at the expense of the state. He relied on Section 27(3) of the
constitution, which reads: "No one may be refused emergency medical treatment." His
counsel told the court, amongst other things, that Soobramoney had a life expectancy of
another 15 to 20 years ifhe received regular dialysis.
43 1997(6) BCLR 789 (C).
44 1997(4) BCLR 1696 (CC).
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In argument, the court put it to his counsel per Justice Albie Sachs that Soobramoney
was competing for state resources with people dying from AIDS and TB and with children
dying from lack of simple nutritional support. Aren't all these factors the court must attach
weight to? Counsel for Soobramoney agreed, but reminded the Constitutional Court that he
was also competing for state resources with people who are receiving benefits for non-life-
threatening problems. The Constitutional Court ruled against him. The court reasoned that a
chronic disease does not constitute an emergency within the meaning of the Bill of Rights
even if it is life threatening. What was envisaged with the phrase "emergency medical
treatment", the court opined, was something in the order of a sudden catastrophe, calling for
immediate medical attention so as to avoid harm. The court, moreover, was satisfied that the
hospital authorities had applied their mind properly on the criteria for admission to the clinic,
and that it was not its place to interfere with the hospital's "rational decision". Soobramoney
died shortly afterwards.
3.3 Socio-Economic Rights: The Stepsister of Civil and Political
Rights?
Alston writes that socio-economic rights have been "the poor and neglected cousins of civil
and political rights" for many years.45 Should they have been?
In Chapter 2 I have argued that human rights are an expression of basic human needs,
and that these needs are natura1.46 I have argued that civil and political rights, although their
naturalness is not immediately obvious, are also an expression of basic human needs. In my
view the connection between nature and socio-economic rights is much more obvious than
the connection between nature and civil and political rights. It is odd, therefore, that so much
effort had to be laid out in justifying socio-economic rights whereas civil and political rights
were embraced more readily. Upon serious reflection it becomes clear that calling the status
of civil and political rights into question would in fact have had more conceptual integrity
than calling the status of socio-economic rights into question.
In Chapter 2 and in this chapter I have referred to suggestions that, in the end, the full
enjoyment of civil and political rights is in fact contingent upon the enjoyment of socio-
economic rights. Denial of the right to health care, for instance, impacts directly and
45 Alston, 1998, supra, p. 4.
46 I am not concerned here with the question whether there is something like human nature or not, in the
manner debated by Andrew Collier - c.f. Scientific Socialism and the Question of Socialist Values in
Mepham & Ruben (eds), 1981, pp. 5-13. I am concerned only with the view posited in Chapter 2 that normal
people want to do or have the things signified by the statements expressing human rights.
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fundamentally on the right to life. When the United Nations General Assembly initially
debated the ICESCR in 1950, 'the "socialist" states argued for the inclusion in the Covenant
of an article on the right to work. They argued that the right to work is the cornerstone of
modern society and that it is foundational to many other rights, notably the right to life.47 It
has also been suggested that without shelter, food and education, not only is the right to life
precarious, but that human dignity vanishes instantly. Karl Marx understood this only too
well when he wrote:
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real
premises from which abstractions can only be made in the imagination. They are
the real individuals, their activity and the real material conditions under which
they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their
activity .... The first premise of all human history is ... the existence of living
human individuals. [The first historical act of these individuals distinguishing
them from animals is not that they think, but that they produce their means of
subsistence.t8
It was only after people had overcome these subsistence problems, Ernest Mandel writes, that
it was possible to free some from productive labour and assign specialised, though non-
productive, duties to them. These included, indeed, governing others, which throws up the
discourse on human rights as we know it today. Writes Mandel:
The birth of the state is therefore the product of a double transformation: the
appearance of a permanent social surplus product, relieving a part of the society
from the obligation to work in order to ensure its subsistence, and thus creating
the material conditions for this part of society to specialise in the accumulative
and administrative functions; and a social and political transformation permitting
the exclusion of the rest of the community from the exercise of the political
functions which had hitherto been everyone's concern."
These views, it is important to state, were also well taken by Franklin Roosevelt as evidenced
by his Four Freedoms Speech. In any event, the Vienna Declaration just about seals the
debate on the status of socio-economic rights. Alston writes:
47 Craven, 1995, p. 195.
48 Marx, 1984, in MarxlEngels/Lenin, p. 17.
49 Mandel, 1979, p. 27.
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A key principle of international human rights law is that all human rights - civil
and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights - are closely
interrelated and of equal status. Practical experience has shown that it is erroneous
to assume that if one set of rights is implemented, the other will follow
automatically. 50
The case law referred to in South Africa also seals the question whether socio-economic
rights are justiciable or not - they are. Bertus de Villiers writes:
[T]here is general agreement in South Africa that the state, acting on its own and
in partnership with the private sector, has a responsibility in fields such as
housing, welfare, education and employment. The disputed question is whether
the state could and should be placed under a legal obligation in terms of a Bill of
Rights to undertake certain actions and develop assistance programmes or if it is
purely a matter for legislative and political discretion to develop such
programmes."
It is only necessary to add that, after De Villiers had written about the disputed question
referred to in the foregoing passage, the constitution indeed placed the state under a legal
obligation to undertake such actions. And the Constitutional Court ruled that that is as it
should be. Therefore, in my view, it is not valid/legitimate, and it never was, to view socio-
economic rights as a stepsister to civil and political rights.
50 Alston, 1992, supra, p. 2.
51 De Villiers, in Van Wyk et al., 1994, p. 621.
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Chapter 4
Monitoring Socio-Economic Rights:
Some Methodological Issues
4.1 Background
South Africa has a constitutionally sanctioned system of monitoring the implementation of
socio-economic rights. First, the constitution calls into existence a Human Rights
Commission.' And then it gives the Commission the power to call upon organs of state
annually to provide it with information regarding the measures they have taken towards the
realisation of the rights to housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the
environment? On the basis of such information, the Commission compiles a report for
parliament on progress the country is making in the realisation of socio-economic rights.
In this chapter I undertake to inquire into the methodes) used by the SAHRC to collect
its data and whether, therefore, the inquiry was methodologically so geared that it could yield
reliable information. The data were gathered by:
• The SAHRC from government departments and other organs of state in 1998;
• The Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) on behalf of the SAHRC in the
same period; and
• The South African Non-Governmental Organisations Coalition (SANGOCO).
4.2 Data Collection of the South African Human Rights Commission
The SAHRC sent out questions to government departments and other relevant organs of state
as these are defined in Section 239 of the constitution.' These questions were contained in
documents called "Protocols for Requesting Information". CASE conducted a nationwide
survey on public perceptions regarding government's delivery on socio-economic rights. In
partnership with SANGOCO and the Commission on Gender Equality (CGE), the SAHRC
conducted countrywide public hearings on poverty.
I Section 181(1)(b).
2 Section 184(3).
3 Section 239 of the constitution defines an "organ of state" as a government department, or any functionary or
institution exercising power or performing a function in terms of the national or provincial constitution. An
institution exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of a statute is also an organ of
state, but this does not include the courts.
Socio-Economic Rights 43
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4.2.1 The Protocols
In essence the protocols are international reporting instruments on human rights. They were
adapted in order to take cognisance of the specific legal formulations on socio-economic
rights in the South African constitution. In total, there were seven protocols covering the right
to the following: housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and
environment. On average each protocol was about 14 pages long. In view of the fiscal
implications of socio-economic rights, a special protocol was developed for the Department
of Finance. Considering the centrality of land to the realisation of socio-economic rights, a
special protocol was also developed for the Department of Land Affairs.4 The table below
shows the departments or organs of state to which the protocols were sent.
Table 1: Departments or Organs of State to which Protocols were sent
Protocol Department/organ of state
Housing National Department of Housing; National Department of
Correctional Services; provincial and local governments
Health care National Department of Health; provincial and local governments
Food National Department of Agriculture; provincial and local
governments
Water National Department of Water Affairs & Forestry; provincial and
local governments
Social security National Department of Welfare; provincial and local governments
Education National Department of Education; National Department of
Correctional Services; provincial and local governments
Environment National Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism;
provincial and local governments
Finance National Department of Finance
Land National Department of Land Affairs; provincial and local
governments
Source: SAHRC, Economic & Social Rights Report, Vol. 1, 1997-1998
National, provincial and local spheres of government did not receive identical protocols,
since their competencies are not the same in respect of the rights under consideration. The
departments or organs of state were requested to complete the protocols and return them to
the SAHRC for evaluation. They were asked:
• To describe their systems of gathering the information and of monitoring the
implementation of socio-economic rights;
4 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. I, p. 16.
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• To list the legislation, policies and other measures they have introduced in order to
bring about the realisation of socio-economic rights; and
• To provide their own interpretation of their obligations, emanating from the constitu-
tion, on the realisation of socio-economic rights.'
In order to facilitate the answering of the questions and uniformity, departments and state
organs were provided with guidelines on how to answer the protocols." The data relating to
the protocols were gathered between December 1997 and February 1998.7
All ten national departments to which the protocols were sent returned them completed.
Out of the nine provincial governments to which the protocols were sent, five returned them
completed whilst the remaining four did not respond. It is not clear how many local
governments the protocols were sent to. Nor is it clear how many responded. On the face of
the report it seems only the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council responded. It is also
clear from the SAHRC's displeasure that there was a poor response rate from local
government.8
4.2.2 Public Perceptions: The CASE Survey
CASE conducted a survey into public perceptions on the realisation of socio-economic rights
in South Africa. The survey took place between February and March 1998, and was
conducted in all nine provinces. There is no indication in the report as to the sample size of
the survey, but on the face of the questionnaire it seems that at least 1 200 people were
interviewed.
The questionnaire was administered personally, and "in the language most commonly
spoken by the interviewees"." However there is no indication in the report as to who
administered the questionnaire; what training they had; what measures were taken to ensure
that questions asked in different languages remained essentially the same; or what levels of
proficiency the interviewers had in the various languages the questionnaire was administered
m.
5 SAHRC, 1998, VI, p. 5.
6 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. I, p. 15. See also SAHRC, Vol. VI, p. 5. The guidelines themselves are by way of an
"explanatory memorandum", an example of which is published in SAHRC, 1998, Vol. II, pp. 1-4. The
guidelines explain the legal basis of the inquiry; terms that are used in the protocols; and indicate the
documents departments or organs of state should attach to the protocols.
7 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. I, p. 19.
8 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. I, pp. 20-21.
9 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. VI, p. 6.
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The CASE survey was aimed at "[enriching] the Commission's understanding by
providing a sample of the views and perceptions of the public and some non-governrnental
organisations't.l'' It was also aimed at "[shedding] light on the nature and reach of
governrnent policies, seen from the point of view of their intended beneficiaries". I I The
survey tested public perceptions on:
• Human rights broadly;
• The general living conditions of people in South Africa;
• New development projects;
• The environment; and
• Housing, health, food, water, social security and education.
CASE also conducted interviews and held meetings with a number of NGOs and human
rights activists with a view to supplementing the quantitative data emanating from the
survey.f
4.2.3 Public Perceptions: The SANGOCO Poverty Hearings
The SAHRC, in partnership with SANGOCO and the CGE, held public hearings on poverty.
These hearings, convened under the title "National Speak Out on Poverty", occurred between
March and June 1998.13 Although the report has a methodology section.l" there is no
description in that section of how these hearings were conducted. It is, however, possible to
glean the methodology of the hearings in an unrelated section in the report. In total, ten
hearings were held throughout the country. Seven of the hearings focused on a single social
and economic right, whereas the remaining three hearings were non-thematic. Approximately
10 000 people participated in the hearings, of whom 600 made oral submissions. The rest
either made written submissions or participated simply by attending the hearings or
mobilising others to attend. IS
One can observe in parenthesis that sufficient care was not taken in some of the
formulations in the report. The statement, for instance, that seven hearings focused on a
10 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. I, p. 16.
Il SAHRC, 1998, Vol. VI, p. 6.
12 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. VI, p. 6.
13 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. I, p. 17.
14 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. V, p. 3.
15 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. V, p. 1.
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single right, is ambiguous. It could convey the sense that all seven hearings focused on the
same right. But it could also signify that each one of the seven hearings focused on a different
right. I suggest that a contextual reading of the report would support the second possibility,
the context being that there are seven rights at issue, and therefore it would make sense to see
every hearing as a kind of focus group, each dealing with another right. In the light of the
context in which these hearings took place, the first interpretation would invite a little bit of
justification. Had all seven hearings, for instance, focused on one right only, one might
expect the relevant right to be named, and that there would be some explanation why seven
hearings would be held on a single right.
The aim of the public hearings was to "listen to the experiences and opportunities of the
poor"." The hearings also aimed at gathering information from poor people themselves on
what economic and social rights mean for them, and what obstacles and difficulties they had
in gaining access to these rights."
4.3 Methodological Issues
In this section I propose to investigate some of the methodological strengths and weaknesses
of the SAHRC's inquiry into the implementation of socio-economic rights. In part, the
investigation will be whether the methodology employed can and does lead to answers to the
questions that the SAHRC's study raises for itself. And then the inquiry must also consider
whether such answers as the SAHRC's study yields are reliable, given the way in which they
are arrived at.
I must emphasise that at this stage I am not concerned with the findings of the
SAHRC's study - those will be the subject matter of Chapter 5. The concern here is whether
the findings, whatever they are, were arrived at in a methodologically sound manner. In other
words, whether the findings, whatever they are, are scientific. That is not to say the scientific
method is the only route to truth. Every now and then people are known to stumble upon
truths quite per adventure." But where people deliberately set out to study a phenomenon, the
study has to conform to set standards and the purpose of this section is to test the SAHRC's
study for compliance with those standards. The standards I shall test the SAHRC study's
methodology against are objectivity, representativeness and reliability. However, it is
necessary to inquire into the nature of the SAHRC's study first, and satisfy ourselves that it
16 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. V, pp. 1 and 3.
17 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. V, p. 3.
18 Martin, 1997, supra, p. 14.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
was indeed a research project, before subjecting it to standards that might otherwise be
foreign to it.
4.3.1 The Nature of the Study
A major problem we face in respect of the nature of the study is that the SAHRC's inquiry is
a hybrid study. It is at once a legal inquiry and a research project properly so called. The
CASE survey and the interviews that were conducted to supplement its quantitative data
constitute research, properly so called. There can arise no question about the propriety of
imposing the research standards referred to earlier on this aspect of the inquiry.
The protocols process constitutes a legal inquiry. The protocols, as pointed out
previously, are in essence reporting instruments of international law.19 But quite apart from
that, the SAHRC's study is a legal inquiry also in the sense that it is based on the injunctions
of the constitution. The registration by the SAHRC of its displeasure at some government
structures failing to return the protocols, seals the legal nature of the inquiry:
This unconstitutional conduct on the part of some national, provincial and local
government structures is unacceptable and will not be tolerated ... in the future.
Governmental departments should be aware that they have a legal obligation in
terms of the Human Rights Commission Act ...20
Although that is so, the SAHRC approached the protocols process on the basis that it was
research. In the preparatory phase, the SAHRC held a series of seminars and workshops in
order to thrash out a number of issues that would impact on the inquiry. The chairperson of
the SAHRC, Barney Pityana, was clear that the exercise had to be informed by the
international experiences on the monitoring of socio-economic rights; that it had to be
theoretically embedded; and that it had to be methodologically sound." Further, the SAHRC
analysed the data that it gathered on the basis that the data were research data_22
Although, therefore, the legal aspect of the inquiry does not lend itself too easily to the
kind of analysis researchers are accustomed to, the understanding of the SAHRC of the task it
undertook constitutes an open invitation to bring established research standards to bear on it.
Therefore whilst we can expect to find no explicit hypothesis formulation and/or testing in
19 See Bayat, Bekker & Heyns, 1997, in Liebenberg (ed.), pp. 9-10.
20 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. r, p. 21.
21 Letter dated 10 September 1997 to partners in the inquiry and "Concluding Address" in Liebenberg, supra,
p.35.
22 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. III, p. 149.
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the legal aspect of the work, this being foreign to legal thinking, we would still be entitled to
inquire into the theoretical embeddedness of the study. We would still be entitled to inquire
into the study's intemallogical consistency.
4.3.2 Objectivity
Generally a study is considered to be objective if it is as free as possible of the influence of
the specific researcher who conducted it.23Mouton suggests that, to be objective, a study
must satisfy four criteria, namely, theoretical validity, measurement validity, reliability and
inferential validity."
4.3.2.1 Theoretical Validity
Theoretical validity requires that the theory or interpretation informing the study must be
logically consistent, enjoy wide applicability, and have explanatory and predictive potential.
In applying the test of theoretical validity to the SABRC's study, we must therefore inquire
into the conceptualisation of the study; the theoretical framework that undergirded it; and the
degree of literature support the study's hypothesis enjoys.25
4.3.2.1.1 The Protocols
Sandy Liebenberg outlines the theoretical framework within which the protocols process
occurred.i'' Unfortunately this framework does not at all go beyond the constitution. As
Liebenberg says herself, "[the] framework for identifying violations is derived from the
constitutional duty of the state to 'respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of
Rights'"." Barring the occasional reference to clauses of the constitution, the paper is bereft
of any reference to any literature whatsoever.
We must conclude that the protocols process was conceptualised around the
constitution. It is not, therefore, embedded in the vast literature that is available on socio-
economic rights. For that reason we cannot say that the SABRe's inquiry was undergirded
by a theoretical framework that enjoys wide application or that it has explanatory or
predictive potential. This deficiency affects the SABRC's analysis of the data it works with, a
23 Mouton, 1996, supra, pp. 112-113; McNeill, 1985, p. 5; Maykut & Morehouse, 1994, pp. 19-21; Martin,
1997, p. 324.
24 Mouton, supra, in Wallace & Wolf, 1980, pp. 53-54.
25 Mouton, 1996, p. 110.
26 Liebenberg, in Liebenberg, supra.
27 Liebenberg, supra, p. 14.
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matter we shall return to in Chapter 5. For now, suffice it to say that in the analysis of its data
the SAHRC makes no effort, for instance, to reconcile assertions that are clearly
contradictory. It makes no effort to establish any articulation between the results of the
different data-gathering processes it followed, a matter discussed in greater detail under
Section 4.3.2.34 hereof.
Having said that, however, it can be stated that the SAHRC went to great lengths to
ensure that the protocols are consistent with the relevant sections of the constitution in respect
of which they sought information. Therefore there is logical consistency between the
protocols and their relevant constitutional bases.
4.3.2.1.2 The CASESurvey
Like the protocols study, the CASE survey was conceptualised around the constitution. It has
no explicit hypothesis formulation and/or testing. In discussing their findings, however,
CASE makes reference to relevant literature. The study's limitation in this regard is that it
refers to single sources in respect of any matter that it references. We therefore do not get a
fuller spectrum of the literature on any of the issues in respect of which it cites sources.
Consequently we do not know whether there are competing views or not on the issues it
covers. Nevertheless it remains possible to say that this section of the SAHRC's inquiry is
more embedded in the literature and therefore enjoys more theoretical validity than the
protocols study.
The CASE part of the study, moreover, has explanatory as well as predictive potential
precisely because it is, albeit in a limited sense, embedded in the literature on the subject it
deals with. When, for instance, CASE tells us that "provincial government does not feature in
people's minds as an important actor in service delivery" there is an explanation for that
phenomenon. We are told that it is probably because no distinction is drawn between the
provincial government's work and the work of national government. (We do not know from
the study who is the agentes) not drawing this distinction, but there is at least an explanation.)
And support for that explanation is found in previous studies that have been conducted on the
matter. 28 (So, if it is crucial to know who is failing to make this distinction we can hopefully
refer to the literature available on the issue.) Armed with such information, we can now
predict that if the failure to distinguish between the work of the provincial government and
28 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. VI, p. 23.
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that of national government persists, provincial government will become irrelevant to the
needs of the people.
4.3.2.1.3 The PovertyHearings
It is not clear at all how the poverty hearings were conceptualised. The only thing we know
about the reason for holding them is that it was felt necessary to "listen to the experiences and
opportunities of the poor", although to what end, we are not told. I would suggest that we see
these poverty hearings as some kind of focus groups, given the manner in which they were
conducted. If the protocols process was thin on theoretical embeddedness, the poverty
hearings are even thinner.
4.3.2.2 Measurement Validity
Measurement validity requires that the measurement instrument the study uses must be able
to do what it is supposed to do. It must be stable and consistent over time and in different
contexts. In this section I propose to examine the research instruments used in the SAHRC
study for compliance with the standard of measurement validity.
4.3.2.2.1 The Protocols
Insofar as the protocols were structured in the language of the constitution, they should have
been able to measure progress made in steps introduced for the realisation of socio-economic
rights. The protocols were adapted to fit in with the requirements of different departments.
Abstractly viewed, it is possible to say that they were therefore not kept constant under
different circumstances. But to have kept them constant in that sense would have defeated the
purpose not only of the inquiry itself, but of the notion of consistency too, since it would have
rendered the protocols inapplicable in most departments and state organs.
The departments were asked, moreover, to describe the effects of past policies,
legislation and practices they were dealing with in their socio-economic endeavours.i"
Therefore it should have been possible to draw historical comparisons in inquiring into the
progress made. As such there should have been no confusion about what the situation was at
the time when the measures, whatever they are, were introduced. In other words, it would
have been possible to analyse the situation being dealt with independently of what the
situation was before the measures were instituted, and therefore to measure the progress
made.
29 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. I, p. 16.
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The researcher is arguably the most important research instrument in this kind of
qualitative study. In scrutinising the ability of the research instrument to measure what it is
meant to measure, the researcher also needs to be factored in. Therefore it is customary, in
writing a research report, to state clearly who the researcher was and what training he/she
had. If interviewers were used to administer a questionnaire, it is customary to state clearly
who they are, and what training they have received. I indicated earlier that the protocols were
sent to the departments and other organs of the state for completing. The report does not state
who filled in the protocols and what training they had. Nor does it deal with the possible
threats to the validity of the information yielded by the protocols process as a result of
"interviewer effects", or what was done to control for such threats.i''
From the standpoint of the protocols as a research instrument, therefore, it seems that
the study had measurement validity. The same can however not be said in respect of the
actual process of completing the protocols.
4.3.2.2.2 The CASE Survey
The research instrument used in the CASE survey was a questionnaire, and it sought to
establish perceptions of the public on the content of the seven socio-economic rights listed in
Section 184(3) of the constitution (listed under Section 4.2.1 hereof). It also sought to
establish perceptions of the public on whether government was delivering in terms of the said
rights. The questions asked were clear and should therefore occasion no difficulty in yielding
appropriate data in terms of what the study sought to understand. The questionnaire had clear
instructions for the interviewers and it should therefore have been possible to avoid any
unnecessary variations in the administration of the questionnaire by the interviewers.
However the problem I have raised about the researcher or the interviewer being a
research instrument (Section 4.3.2.2.1 hereof), applies here too. It is a deficiency of the study
that it does not tell us who the interviewers were and what kind of training they received
before being sent to the field. A further difficulty in this respect relates to the failure to
indicate what measures were instituted in order to ensure that questions asked in different
languages remained essentially the same (see Section 4.2.2 hereof). These deficiencies
undermine the measurement validity of the research instrument and could seriously
compromise the reliability of the data.
30 See Mouton, 1996, supra, pp. 148-150.
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4.3.2.2.3 ThePovertyHearings
On the face of the report, no questionnaire or interviewing schedule was used for these
hearings. Therefore it is not possible to assess whether the research instrument in that sense
would satisfy the test for measurement validity. Apart from being told that the poverty
hearings were held at the behest of the SAHRC, CGE and SANGOCO, we do not know who
conducted these hearings and what training they had.
From the standpoint of the reliability of the research instrument it is therefore not
possible to assess the public hearings.
4.3.2.3 Reliability
The test for reliability demands that the data collected as evidence, and the data collection
process, must be reliable. That requires, in tum, that the sources of the data must be authentic,
representative and accurate, and that the process of gathering the data must warrant this.
4.3.2.3.1 TheProtocols
I have pointed out under Section 4.2.1 hereof that all ten government departments to which
the protocols had been sent, returned them completed. Out of nine provincial governments to
which the protocols were sent, five returned them completed. On the national and the
provincial levels the response rate was high and the data gathered through the protocols
process are therefore representative in the sense that it would be possible to generalise from
them. On the local level the response rate was very poor and the data cannot be seen to be
representative in that sphere of government.
However other factors have to be taken into account before we can accept the data
gathered in the national and provincial spheres without any reservation. The remarks made
under Section 4.3.2.2.1 hereof have a bearing on this question. Therefore all the data
collected by the protocols process are reliable to the extent that the process itself was reliable.
To the extent, then, that the protocols were designed in strict compliance with the
constitutional stipulations on the rights in question, they should be able to yield the
information required by the constitution. In other words, the correct questions were asked for
the purpose of securing the facts that the constitution says must be secured.
With regard to the filling in of the protocols, however, I think that the reliability of the
data can be challenged on two fronts. First, as I have already pointed out, the validity of the
study can be challenged on the basis that we do not know enough about the people who
completed the protocols insofar as they were a research instrument. We do not know enough
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about the measures taken by the SAHRC to control for errors that may have arisen as a result
of who completed the protocols.
Second, the study can be challenged on the basis that the people who completed the
protocols were also the source of the information they reported on." The question must
therefore arise whether, and to what extent, the research instrument (i.e. the government
official who completed the protocols) was able to detach itself from the phenomenon it was
collecting and supplying information on.32 Quite apart from the ethical questions that must be
asked about the source of the data also being the research instrument, the risk for bias is
great. The report does not deal with this and so once again we do not know if the SAHRC has
controlled for errors which might arise as a result of this.
We must conclude therefore, it seems to me, that an "unscientific" process of gathering
the data in this regard does not and cannot warrant the authenticity and accuracy of the data.
This does not necessarily mean that the data are therefore inauthentic and inaccurate. It is
possible, as I have suggested previously, that an unscientific process may yet lead to a
statement that is, objectively viewed, true. But then, as I have also suggested, there is no
point in undertaking a study if we can only hope to arrive at correct conclusions by fluke.
4.3.2.3.2 The CASESurvey
We may have expected that CASE would disclose in their report not only how many people
were interviewed, but also how their sampling was done.33 (I am aware of the fact that I have
made reference to the statement in their questionnaire to the effect that at least 1 200 people
would be interviewed. I do not think that it therefore follows that 1 200 were interviewed.
And in any case their questionnaire is not attached to their report and therefore cannot form a
part of one's reading of that report.)
Sampling is so central to survey research, it would not be an exaggeration to say that if
one's sampling is not sound, the entire study is tainted. The reason for this is that research
logic is essentially inductive." Because we proceed from the particular to the general, it is
essential that the particular that we proceed from is representative of the general. As Mouton
says, "Unless the sample from which we will generalise 'truthfully' represents the population
31 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. I, p. 15.
32 About the importance of researcher detachment from the phenomenon or event being studied, see Mouton,
1996, op cit, pp. 150-152; McNeill, supra, pp. 70-71; Hammersley& Atkinson, 1996, p. 110.
33 See Mouton, 1996, supra, pp. 175-176; McNeill, supra, pp. 125 & 128.
34 Mouton, 1996, supra, p. 71; Martin, supra, p. 76; Strauss & Corbin, supra, p. 148.
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from which it is drawn, we have no reason to believe that the population has the same
properties as those of the sample"."
The failure by CASE to disclose information relating to sampling makes it impossible
to assess the merits of the study."
4.3.2.3.3 ThePovertyHearings
We do not know who participated in the poverty hearings or what qualified them to speak on
behalf of the poor on the issues under consideration. Neither do we know how they were
selected. We know that out of 10 000 people who "participated" in these hearings, 600 made
oral submissions. An undisclosed number made written submissions and another number
"participated" merely by being present at the hearings or by mobilising others to attend. We
do not know what qualified those who mobilised others to do so, or what methods or tactics
of mobilisation they used. Neither do we know the criteria they used for selecting people to
be mobilised. Therefore we must conclude, it seems to me, that this part of the study, if
indeed such it may be called, is impossible to evaluate on the yardstick of reliability.
Once again, this is not to say that the things that were said at these hearings are false -
many of them may be true - but only that, if it is a part of a systematic study, one is entitled
to expect it to be conducted in a manner that inspires confidence in its findings.
4.3.2.3.4 Triangulation
I have suggested while discussing the reliability of the data, that the critique I make does not
necessarily mean that the data are false - only that, for the reasons mentioned, they are
unreliable. The data could be rendered more reliable if confirmed by other reliable means.
Now, the SAHRC employed different methodologies in order to inquire into the
implementation of socio-economic rights in South Africa. The reasoning behind the
employment of more than one methodology can be gleaned from the report:
The state protocols have been administered, collected and analysed. In addition,
following a suggestion made by CASE, the SAHRC decided to embark on
another and more innovative process. This consisted of going to the grassroots
to ask ordinary citizens if and how their lives have been affected by the work of
government at national, provincial and local levels. CASE has taken charge of
35 Mouton, 1996, supra, p. 136.
36 McNeill, supra, p. 125.
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this aspect of the research, by conducting a national survey of the population
and reporting on their responses, perceptions and views .... Grand policy
proclamations, Green and White Papers, Bills and Acts of Parliament, can thus
be measured through the prism of their real effects, rather than their intended
effects." (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, quite clearly, the intention with employing different methodologies was to obtain a
balanced picture. Consequently, one is entitled to expect that there would be an effort to
reconcile the data gathered through the protocols method with the data gathered through the
CASE survey and the poverty hearings. Further, CASE itself went a step ahead and, in
addition to the survey, conducted interviews and held meetings with "a wide range ofNGO's
and activists who work with disadvantaged communities on various socio-economic issues".
The point of these interviews and meetings was "to supplement the quantitative information"
emanating from the surveyr"
Unfortunately the report makes no effort to reconcile the data it received from its
different research activities. Itmakes no effort to confirm one data set against the other, and it
thus misses a golden opportunity to place its data on a safer footing. We are left, instead, with
a disclaimer by CASE:
The report is not an evaluation of government performance, or a comprehensive
study of the state of socio-economic service delivery in South Africa. Rather it is a
study that draws attention to the views and perceptions of people on the ground.
Our brief focused on capturing the views of the public and NGO's, rather than on
evaluating government claims against empirical evidence of delivery. It is the task
of the SAHRC to reconcile official and non-official versions, and offer an overall
view of the state of realisation of' socio-economic rightsr"
Therefore lack triangulation of methodologies and of researchers leaves the SAHRC
study as unreliable as it was before.
4.3.2.4 Inferential Validity
Inferential validity requires that the evidence must support the conclusions the study arrives
at. I shall deal with the conclusions drawn by the study from the materials it received in
37 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. VI, pp. 5-6.
38 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. VI, p. 6.
39 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. VI, pp. ii and 6.
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Chapter 5. I propose, therefore, to defer discussion on whether the evidence gathered supports
the conclusions drawn until I have dealt with the Commission's conclusions.
4.3.3 Representativeness
The question of representativeness with reference to the SAHRC study has already been
touched on. I have indicated that the data gathered through the protocols process are
representative of the national and the provincial spheres of government and that they are not
representative of the local sphere. (See Section 4.3.2.3.1 hereof.)
With reference to the poverty hearings, although the report indicates that some 10 000
people participated in it, I do not think that the question of representativeness is germane. I
have suggested that the poverty hearings be seen as some kind of focus groups. It is not
expected of focus groups that they should be statistically representative.t" It is, however, a
requirement of focused interviews that the interviewee must be representative in the sense
that he/she is knowledgeable in the research subject." I have indicated (Section 4.3.2.3.3
hereof) that we do not know who the interviewees were for the poverty hearings or how they
were selected. Therefore it is not possible to assess their representativeness.
The CASE survey, as I indicated, hopefully interviewed at least 1 200 people, but we
do not know anything about the survey's sampling method. True, we know that some people
lived in urban areas and others in rural areas; that some were men and others were women;
that some were white and others were black; and that some lived in formal and others lived in
informal settlements. But that is not much to go by, since in every one of these settings there
must be variations. Therefore not much can be said by way of evaluating the
representativeness of the interviewees.
4.4 Conclusion
Although the SAHRC study has methodological weaknesses, it has, as I have indicated,
strengths. However I think that the weaknesses are far too numerous and, I may add, totally
unnecessary. In Chapter 3 I have discussed the challenges generally facing the project on
socio-economic rights. Philip Alston shows that the United Nations does not take socio-
economic rights as seriously as it should.V He suggests that the normative content of socio-
40 See Rubin & Rubin, 1995, p. 5.
41 Ibid, pp. 83-85.
42 Alston, 1992, supra, p. 485.
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economic rights is far from clear and that the reports of states are crucial to the clarification
of the normative content of these rights.43
In view of the numerous challenges still facing socio-economic rights, and the fact that
reports like the one under review playa crucial role in clarifying the normative content of
socio-economic rights on a world scale, one might have thought that the SAHRC study on
socio-economic rights undertaken by people who champion those rights would have been
methodologically robust so as to place its findings beyond question.
43 Ibid, p. 491.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 5
Implementation of Socio-Economic Rights in
South Africa - A Critique
5.1 Background
Christof Heyns of the Human Rights Centre, University of Pretoria, analysed and evaluated
the data gathered from government on behalf of the SAHRC. The Centre for Applied Legal
Studies (Wits University) and the Community Law Centre (University ofthe Western Cape)
assisted him. In analysing and evaluating the data, government responses were measured
against the protocols requesting the data, as well as guidelines, norms and standards
emanating from international instruments. I
In this chapter I shall discuss the evaluation of the data by the SAHRC. In doing so, I
shall also attempt to unpack some of the terms that I alluded to in Section 3.2.2.8 hereof. And
then I shall attempt a critique of the SAHRC's evaluation of the data it was working with.
5.2 The SAHRC's Analysis and Evaluation of the Data
The analysis and evaluation of the data are fashioned after the protocols that were used to
request the information. Therefore government's responses are analysed and evaluated
separately in respect of each of the seven socio-economic rights. The SAHRC inquires into
government's understanding of its obligation under the specific right; pronounces on the
correctness of such understanding; and then inquires into the things government has done in
response to the injunction of the right. The injunction of every right conveys different
expectations in the sense that government is variously required to respect, protect, promote
and fulfil the specific right.' Consequently the SAHRC's analysis and evaluation of the data
inquire into government's understanding of its obligations in respect of these different
expectations too.
I SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 1. The international agreements referred to are the Limburg Principles on the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Maastricht
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and general comments of the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
2 Section 7(2) of the constitution.
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5.2.1 Housing
Housing is discussed under the three spheres of government - i.e. national, provincial and
municipal. At national level, the departments that receive consideration are the Department of
Housing and the Department of Correctional Services. The provinces dealt with by he
SAHRC with respect to housing are Mpumalanga, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and
Northern Cape. The Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (GJMC), being the only
local sphere of government to respond to the SAHRC's protocols, is the only one dealt with
in the report.
5.2.1.1 National Department of Housing
The principal national laws in this regard, which the SAHRC considered, are The
Development Facilitation Act,1 The Extension of Security of Tenure Act' and The Housing
Act'. The policy document to which the SAHRC gives consideration is the White Paper on
Housing. The SABRC analyses the data in terms of the concepts: adequate housing;
progressive realisation; respect for, protection, promotion and fulfilment of the right.
5.2.1.1.1 Adequate Housing
The SABRC is satisfied that government understands its obligations in terms of the right of
access to adequate housing. The way government understands this obligation is that everyone
must have the opportunity "to exercise a choice in respect of housing options, and to access
such elected options".
Once reference is made to adequate housing, the question as to the precise meaning of
the term must inevitably arise. The SAHRC makes reference to government's understanding
of the term, and states that it does not expressly reflect the definitions of the lCESCR. To
comply with the provisions of the lCESCR, government's understanding must make
reference to "legal security of tenure, availability of services, materials, facilities and
infrastructure, the affordability, the accessibility, the location or the cultural adequacy of the
housing"." And then it observes that the laws referred to in Section 5.2.1.1 hereof above do in
fact take cognisance of these issues to a significant extent.' Further, the SAHRC states that
3 Act No 67 of 1995.
4 Act No 62 of 1997.
5 Act No 107 of 1997.
6 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 1.
7 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 1. See, indeed, Section 3.2.3.3 of this report in respect oflegal security of tenure.
If one accepts, as the SAHRC suggests, that there is a disjunction between the data supplied by the official(s)
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existing legislation'' makes provision for "habitable, stable and sustainable public and private
residential environments" in its definition of "housing development".
One can infer from these that the construction the SAHRC places on "adequate
housing" is that:
• The addressee of the right must have legal security of tenure;
• Government must provide certain unspecified services, materials, facilities and
infrastructure;
• The housing must be affordable and accessible;
• Cultural factors must be taken into account in determining the adequacy of the house;
• The housing must be habitable, stable and sustainable;
• The housing must afford its inhabitants adequate protection against the elements of
nature;
• The housing must afford its inhabitants reasonable levels of privacy; and
• There must be sanitary facilities.9
In my view the considerations around infrastructure and cultural factors are germane to the
meaning of "adequate housing". So are the considerations around services, certain materials,
habitability, stability and sustainability of the housing. However I think it is necessary to spell
out more precisely what is entailed in some of those considerations, rather than leave the
matter vague. To leave the matter vague would make it difficult, almost impossible, to
measure progress, since there is no clear indication of what is expected. Therefore it seems to
me that, for instance, under infrastructural adequacy we could, without limiting the ambit of
the right, nevertheless specify requirements like:
• Electrification of the houses and streets;
• Running water; and
• Effective communication facilities, including road and transport networks and tele-
communication services.
who completed the protocols and provisions of the law covering the subject of investigation, it seems to
follow that the officials are not always aware of the laws having a bearing on the issues they deal with. The
possibility therefore exists that, in giving effect to the right to housing, they might short-change the
addressees of the right.
S The Housing Act.
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Under cultural factors we might specify, among others, that people's different cultural and
traditional patterns will be taken into account in determining whether, in any given set of
circumstances, the housing is adequate. These factors would include considerations such as
the prevalence of the institution of the extended or the nuclear family, as the case may be,
among different groups. Therefore, in my view, the size of the family has to be factored into
the inquiry whether any given house is adequate.
Under services we could specify, amongst others:
• Effective refuse removal; and
• Effective servicing and maintenance of all infrastructures provided.
The relevance of afJordability and of security of tenure to the issue of adequate housing is not,
obvious and need some elaboration. There can be no doubt about the importance of
affordability and of security of tenure, but I think that conceptually those speak to a different
question. A house could, in a given set of circumstances, be adequate but not affordable and
vice versa. Similarly, one could have secure tenure without the house being adequate and vice
versa.
Because socio-economic rights are so important, and because they have so many
detractors, I think that it is vital that some analytical rigour be shown in articulating them.
Lack of analytical rigour in the concepts used to convey socio-economic rights must
inevitably lead to the rights not being taken seriously and therefore being discredited.
5.2.1.1.2 TheDuty toRespect
The state's duty to respect the right to "adequate housing" consists in the state refraining
"from taking any action which prevents people from satisfying the right when they are able to
do so themselves". 10 The SAHRC is of the view that the Housing Act and the Prevention of
Illegal Evictions from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act are evidence of government's
fulfilment of its duty to respect this right.
The SAHRC further notes that there rests on the state an obligation to prevent unfair
discrimination in the provision of access to adequate housing. According to the SAHRC, "the
goal of equality in access to adequate housing requires special measures for certain sectors of
the population" .11 The SAHRC lists the poor, the disabled, female-headed households,
9 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 2.
10 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 9.
II SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 9.
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children, the youth, the elderly, farm workers and rural households as groups in need of
special measures with regard to the right of access to adequate housing.
I am of the view that the SAHRC's analysis is confused in this area. The SAHRC, as
we have pointed out, takes the view that the duty to respect the right of access to adequate
housing is a negative one and consists merely in the state refraining from taking action that
impedes citizens from providing for themselves. There is support for this proposition in the
literature on the meaning of the duty to respect a right.12
Therefore the matter the SAHRC should investigate in this regard is whether the state
does anything the effect of which is to hinder citizens in their efforts to provide housing for
themselves. Understandably, this inquiry would include a consideration of laws and policies
that might have that effect. It should not be necessary to inquire into measures the state has
undertaken in order to help any of the groups mentioned by the SAHRC to have access to
adequate housing in discussing this aspect of the right. In fact, the whole notion of some
groups being vulnerable and therefore requiring special measures in the interests of equality
sits awkwardly in this discussion. Therefore the discussion of laws and schemes the
government has put in place should not be part of this discussion and belong, on a proper
construction, to a different place. Helping any person or group is a positive act and therefore
something not required by the duty now under consideration.
Similarly, the SAHRC's proposition that the duty to respect the right entails the
prohibition of unfair discrimination in the provision of access to adequate housing seems a
contradiction in terms. If the duty of respect conveys only the idea that the state should
abstain from acting in an obstructive manner when people try to fulfil the right to adequate
housing by their own means, state intervention aimed at prohibiting unfair discrimination is
part of a different discourse.
An interesting question that arises in this context is whether a discussion of the repeal
of laws that had the effect of obstructing citizens from fulfilling their right to adequate
housing can be properly entertained in this section.l'' The existence of such laws clearly
indicates the state obstruction that is prohibited by the duty of respect imposed on the state.
Not to repeal such laws would therefore have perpetuated the obstructive state conduct that is
prohibited.
12 See Craven, 1995,p.109.
13 See SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 7.
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As indicated above, the SAHRC indeed discusses the matter in this section. My view is
that the discussion does not belong in this section where, by definition, the state is not
required to do anything but merely to abstain from obstructive conduct. When the state
removes its own obstructive conduct as reflected in its laws, it is doing something and not
refraining from acting obstructively. The objection should not be read to suggest that the
state should not repeal such legislation - only that the discussion belongs to a different
section.
5.2.1.1.3 The Duty to Protect
The duty to protect the right of access to adequate housing requires that the state prohibit
"any possible violation of this right by other more powerful individuals and groups in
society"." Such protection would include measures such as:
• The prohibition of unreasonable rent and/or unreasonable increases thereof; and
• The prohibition of eviction from a house or land one occupies except in accordance
with the directives of relevant legislation.
The SAHRC accordingly finds that the Rent Control Act, 15 the Prevention of Illegal Evictions
from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Actl6 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Actl7
concretise the state's compliance with its duty to protect the right of access to adequate
housing.
I think that this would be the place where one discusses the repeal of laws that are
obstructive of citizens' right of access to adequate housing, for one of the "powerful groups
in society" that the SAHRC refers to is indeed the state. Similarly, the discussion on the state
protecting citizens from unfair discrimination in the acquisition of access to adequate
housing, belongs to this section.
5.2.1.1.4 The Duty to Promote
The SAHRC combines the duty to promote and the duty to fulfil the right of access to
adequate housing under one heading, and writes:
14 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 8.
15 Act No 80 of 1976.
16 Act No 190f1998.
17 Act No 62 of 1997.
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. .. the duty to promote the right of access to adequate housing means that the
government must educate the public about their rights, and must strive to create a
culture in which the right of access to adequate housing can become a reality."
The SABRC proceeds and details mechanisms that the government has put in place for the
purpose of promoting the right of access to adequate housing and these are by way of:
• An ongoing communication campaign aimed at informing people about the National
Housing Programme;
• Housing support centres that are established in residential areas for the purpose of
informing people about possibilities and options that are available with regard to
housing; and
• A website that can be visited on the internet for accessing information on housing.
The SAHRC indicates that it was not able to assess any of the measures stated above, since
relevant documentation was not provided. In view of the time constraints the SAHRC
faced," it is perhaps possible to understand why it did not call for the relevant
documentation. But that cannot be an excuse for the Commission's failure to browse the
department's website in order to check what information is available there and the extent to
which such information lends itself to analysis. Similarly, the Commission's failure to
problematise the materials and concepts it is working with militates against a sympathetic
view of the real problems it might have had in analysing the data. An example of this can be
found in the way it articulates the duty to promote the right of access to adequate housing,
quoted above.
What does it mean to "create a culture in which the right of access to adequate housing
can become a reality"? The "becoming a reality" part of the definition seems to me to belong
to the duty to fulfil the right, rather than the duty to promote it. Assume, however, for a
moment that it is also relevant to the duty to promote the right.
The problem one then faces is that the entire text on the subject suggests that what the
SAHRC was dealing with was the promotion of the right in the sense of making people aware
of it and of how they can access it. Therefore it would be hard to arrive at the conclusion that
the Commission was concerned, however remotely, with the actualisation of the right of
18 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 9.
19 I have in mind here the fact that the Commission had to table a report to parliament at the beginning of the
year.
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access to adequate housing in this section. But let us suppose that by making the right a
reality, one is also thereby promoting (advancing) it. Then one might expect that the
Commission would write its report in such a manner that its awareness of the different
constructions that might be placed on the word "promote" is clear. But it does not. In any
event, if one promotes the right by making it a reality, why would the state bear the duty both
to fulfil and to promote the right? Itseems clear to me that the obligation is spelled out in a
dual way because it is a dual obligation - i.e. government is expected to do two things. Ifwe
conflate the two, and speak about them as if they were one, we create an environment where
the state might select the easier of the two possibilities and do that only.
5.2.1.1.5 TheDuty to Fulfil
The SAHRC does not define this duty having subsumed it, as it were, under the duty to
promote the right of access to adequate housing. Craven defines the duty, however, in the
following words:
The "obligation to fulfil" requires the State to take the necessary measures to
ensure the satisfaction of the needs of the individual that cannot be secured by the
personal efforts of that individual.2o
Consequently, the duty to fulfil the right requires that the state must take action towards the
actualisation of the right. I think that the SAHRC communicates this sentiment too, where it
writes "in order to fulfil the right of access to adequate housing, the National Housing
Subsidy Scheme has been implemented"."
Although the Commission noted previously that it could not assess the National
Housing Subsidy Scheme "due to documentation regarding the exact details of this policy not
having been provided'v? it discusses the scheme in a fair amount of detail. It refers to the
scheme as "the cornerstone of government adhering to its obligation of fulfilling the right of
access to adequate housing". The SAHRC indicates that:
• Subsidy amounts are allocated among provinces according to criteria such as
population, income categories, existing informal housing, backlogs, urbanisation, etc.;
• Individual ownership subsidies are allocated to beneficiaries to assist them to acquire
ownership of fixed residential property for the first time;
20 Craven, supra, p. 109.
21 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 9.
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• The subsidy levels are linked to household income;
• There are two types of individual ownership subsidies, namely project-linked subsidies
and individual subsidies. The former affords housing opportunities to individuals in
projects approved by the Provincial Housing Board. The latter enables individuals to
acquire ownership of existing property or property not approved by the Provincial
Housing Board;
• The consolidation subsidy enables people who received housing assistance from the
state before the advent of the National Housing Subsidy Scheme to apply for further
benefits in order to improve existing property;
• Institutional subsidies are available to institutions that provide affordable housing;
• All subsidies are paid out from the National Housing Fund in order to allow qualifying
applicants to acquire residential property with secure tenure at an affordable price;
• The Subsidy Implementation Manual provides information on the housing subsidy
scheme;
• Policies are being developed on the rural housing subsidy and on variation of the
subsidy amount for disabled persons; and
• Government has set up various bodies such as the National Housing Finance
Corporation and the Rural Housing Loan Fund.23
The SAHRC does not interpret or analyse any of the assertions referred to above. An
attentive reading of the details provided in the report on the National Housing Subsidy
Scheme suggests, however, that the Commission's statements are inconsistent on this matter.
First, the details that it provides suggest that the Commission must either have read the
relevant documentation or that sufficiently detailed information about the scheme was placed
before it. Second, in order to judge the scheme as "the cornerstone of government adhering to
its obligation of fulfilling the right of access to adequate housing", the Commission must be
sufficiently familiar with the scheme's provisions.
It seems to follow, then, that the Commission's failure to assess the National Housing
Subsidy Scheme cannot be ascribed, as it suggests, to relevant documentation not having
being placed before it.
22 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 7.
23 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, pp. 9-10.
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5.2.1.1.6 Available Resources
Section 26(2) of the constitution requires that "the state must take reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of [the
right of access to adequate housing]". (My emphasis.) Therefore the state is required to
institute legislative as well as other measures in order to bring about the actualisation of the
right of access to adequate housing. The state can therefore be justified by two factors only in
failing to bring about the realisation of the right of access to adequate housing - namely,
that the action required of the state is not reasonable, and/or that it falls outside its available
resources.
I take the view that there is no support in the language of Section 26(2) or indeed the
constitution for supposing that the two factors have to be present contemporaneously. In any
event it is possible to imagine that a course of action might fall within the resources available
to the state, but that it might nevertheless be unreasonable for the state to follow that course
of action. Similarly, a course of action that is reasonable might conceivably also fall outside
of the state's available resources.
In this subsection I propose to consider the meaning of the qualification of the state's
obligation to make adequate housing available by "its available resources". Notably, the
SAHRC does not discuss this qualification. Therefore it does not, for instance, inquire
whether, given the resources available to the state, the measures, legislative or otherwise,
instituted by the state are satisfactory.
Craven writes that the qualification of the state's obligation by its available resources
was never meant to exonerate states from the obligation to bring about the progressive
realisation of the right of access to adequate housing. All that was conveyed by the
qualification was that the general economic situation in every country would be a factor to
consider in assessing state reports. Furthermore, the inquiry into the resources available to the
state is an objective one and does therefore not depend on how individual states themselves
assess their own resources. And, which is more, the allocation of resources within the state is
not immune to scrutiny, and it is therefore possible to impugn the manner in which the state
prioritises competing claims within its available resources.i"
The SAHRC, as I have suggested, has confined itself, lil assessing government's
fulfilment of the right of access to adequate housing, to the policy and legislative sphere.
Whereas it considers the National Housing Subsidy Scheme as the cornerstone of govern-
24 Craven, supra, pp. 136-137 and 142-143.
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ment's fulfilment of this right, it inquires neither into the houses the scheme has delivered,
nor into the adequacy of those houses in terms of its own stipulations of what is to count as
"adequate housing". The by-product of this omission is that the SABRC does not address the
question whether the state has given effect to its obligation, in the language of the ICESCR,
to the maximum of its available resources.
That the SABRC's approach is inadequate is underpinned by the NEDLAC Annual
Report for the period 1 April 1998 to 31 March 1999. The report states that the provision of
permanent housing is "an important part of protecting the poor against the negative health
consequences that result from exposure to the elements". It further states that:
• 16% of South African households lived in informal dwellings in October 1996;
• 17% of South African households lived in single-room dwellings in the same period;
• 46,5% of South African households lived in 3-room dwellings in the same period; and
• the Department of Housing had allocated just over 200 000 housing subsidies in August
1998, of which women received 37%.25
The inadequacy of the SAHRC's approach is also underpinned by its own investigation,
which revealed that 60% of its interviewees hold the view that government has not delivered
on its promise to provide houses./" One might therefore have expected that the SAHRC
would inquire into the progress made on these issues and pronounce on the adequacy of the
dwellings referred to above.
The SAHRC's approach can possibly be justified in the light of Opsahl's argument,
although he speaks of civil and political rights, that the content of state reports need only
indicate measures they have adopted to give effect to the Covenant.Y However it is
significant that Opsahl himself subsequently argues as follows:
The terms used in the Covenant - "measures", "progress", "factors", and
"difficulties" - indicate that it is not enough to report solely on constitutions and
laws or regulations relevant to the implementation of civil and political rights. The
purpose of reporting also suggests that facts are as important as law. The
consistent attitude of the Committee has confirmed what its guidelines might have
perhaps made more clear that no matter how adequately the relevant rights are
25 NEDLAC Annual Report, 1 Apri11998 to 31 March 1999, p. 20. See also SAIRR, 2000, p. 164.
26 SABRC, 1998, Vol. VI, pp. vand 39. See also SAHRC, Economic & Social Rights Report, Vol. V, pp. 14-
18.
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reflected on paper, the reports must also refer to actual practice. In this regard,
statistical data is often useful and sometimes even necessary"
To be able to evaluate the state's fulfilment of its obligation in terms of the right of access to
adequate housing, one must therefore look outside of the SAHRC report. A useful place to
start at would be the national budget. One would then have to establish the amounts
committed by the state to the fulfilment of the right. And then one would also have to
compare the allocation to other allocations in the national budget, and inquire whether the
state's prioritisation is in line with the state's obligation to fulfil this right.
The total estimate of state (national) expenditure on housing for the period studied by
the SAHRC (1999/2000) was R3 529 825b.29 It is well worth noting that the expenditure was
reduced by a whole R99 482m from the previous year's projected expenditure on housing.
For the year 2000-2001 the national budget for housing is R3,3b and is therefore
approximately R200 OOOmless than the previous year's provision."
The available data suggest that the budgetary allocation with respect to the right of
access to adequate housing has shrunk over the past two fiscal years. The data further suggest
that the size of the budgetary shrinkage has itself increased substantially over those years.
Therefore, not only has the state decreased expenditure on housing over the stated period -
it has also increased the size of the decrease. Table 3 below in fact suggests that overall
budgetary projections on housing decreased by some 65,9% between 1989/90 and 1999/00.
In my view the shrinkage of money that the state budgets for housing in itself already affects
the right of access to adequate housing negatively. However, even if the state held the budget
constant in the period under review, a substantial portion of it would have been absorbed by
inflation. To do justice to the right of access to adequate housing, therefore, it would have
been necessary to adjust the budget upward. It consequently seems, then, that the budgetary
reduction establishes, prima facie, a double denial of the right.
Craven writes that the "progressive achievement" of a right requires that its "implemen-
tation should be continued 'without respite' so that full realization could be achieved 'as
quickly as possible'"." He suggests further that the duty to bring about the progressive
27 Opsahl, in Alston (ed.), 1992, supra, p. 400.
28 Opsahl, supra, p. 40 I.
29 See Annexure 3, "Estimate of Expenditure to be Defrayed from the National Revenue Fund during the
Financial Year ending 31 March 2000", p. xviii.
30 Fair Share, n.d., "Summary of National Budget Expenditures", p. I.
31 Craven, supra, p. 13I .
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realisation of a right implies that there must be no "backward movement of any kind".32 The
reduction in expenditure on housing, together with the progressive increase of that reduction,
establishes precisely the respite that is precluded by the right. It has the effect that full
realisation of the right cannot be achieved as quickly as possible. The progressive reduction
in resources being made available for housing is precisely the retrogressive measure
precluded by the duty to fulfil the right.
But that is not quite the same thing as violating the right. Craven notes that the Com-
mittee on Social and Economic Rights in its general comment does not necessarily consider
"retrogressive measures" as violations of the lCESCR. The Committee accepts that retrogres-
sive measures may be fully justified by an economic crisis that would render such retrogres-
sive measures inevitable. Further, retrogressive measures may be introduced if the purpose is
to improve "the situation with regard to the 'totality of the rights in the Covenant'" .33
The question that arises, then, is whether, in the context of South Africa, the reduction
of expenditure on housing can be justified on the basis of the considerations mentioned
above. That South Africa is in no such crisis as the Committee envisaged is self-evident.
Therefore the budgetary reduction on housing cannot be justified on that basis. It is not quite
so easy to answer the second question - i.e. whether the reduction can be justified in terms
of an overall improvement of other rights named by the lCESCR. To try and answer that, one
must compare how those other rights have fared in the same period.
32 Craven, supra, p. 131.
33 Craven, supra, pp. 131-132.
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Table 2: National Budget Allocations for Socio-Economic Rights: 1998/1999:1999/2000
Budget Item Rand 1998/99 % Budget Rand 99/00 % Budget
Housing R3,6b 1,8 R3,5b 1,6
Education" R46,3b 22,1 R48,5b 22,4
Health care R23,2b 12,2 R24,Ob 11,1
WaterJ~ R2,9 1,1 R2,5b 1,1
Welfare/Social security R19,3b 9,7 R19,6b 9136,
Environment R463m 0,23 R632m37 0,29
Agriculture (food) R718,8m 0,33 R637m 0,31
Source: Fair Share, Summary of National Budget Expenditures
Table 2 suggests that, although state expenditure on education, health care, social security
and the environment, expressed in absolute figures, has increased, each of these items has
received less than the previous allocation, expressed as a percentage of the total budget. The
environment is the only budget item that fares well both in absolute figures and as a
percentage share of the total budget, and then only by a fraction of a percentage/"
But I do not think that much can be made of the environment budget item, since it is
combined with tourism. South Africa has been on a serious drive to attract tourists for the
past six years. It would therefore be safe to surmise that a substantial portion of this budget
item would go to the service of tourism rather than the advancement of the right to an
environment that is not harmful to the health or well-being of the citizens. Whilst water gets a
bigger allocation, expressed in absolute figures, it fares no better than in the previous year,
expressed as a percentage share of the total budget. Expenditure on food as represented by
34 It would probably be fair to take into account parts of the budget on arts, culture, science and technology in
this budget item, since much of it has an inherently educational value. The arts, culture, science and
technology budgets for 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 respectively were R738m and R804m. This reflects a
nominal increase of R66m but in real terms a decrease of 1,2% - Fair Share, Summary of National Budget
Expenditures, 1998/1999 and 1999/2000.
35 This budget item also includes sanitation. Sanitation is not only a water issue but a health as well as an
environmental issue as well. Therefore one would have to take this into account in debating the adequacy of
the health and environmental budgets. The flip side of this concession is that one then also has to reduce the
expenditure on water qua water (Section 27(J)(b) of the constitution) by the amount of the water budget that
would have been spent on water as a health and as an environmental issue. It is further worth noting that this
budget item was increased by a further R120m on 16 March 1999 - Fair Share, Summary of National
Budget Expenditures, 1998/1999: 1999/2000.
36 In the source document this is discussed under the heading "Pension", but Fair Share indicates that under
that heading is subsumed the whole concept "social welfare".
37 Included in this category is also tourism. I have calculated the % myself in respect of the environmental
expenditure, since Fair Share did not have percentages in respect of this subject. For the period 1999/2000 I
calculated the % on a total of R216,8b and for the period 1998/1999 on a total of R205b. The totals are
derived from Fair Share, Key Elements of the 1999/2000 Budget and Key Elements of the 2000/2001 Budget
respectively.
38 A budgetary change by 0,5% and less is insignificant - see Fair Share, 2000/01 National Budget Handbook,
p.7.
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expenditure on agriculture, takes a nosedive. Holistically viewed, therefore, the possibility to
justify the reduction in state expenditure on housing on the basis of an overall improvement
of other ICESCR rights remains open to challenge. In considering state expenditure on the
right to food (agriculture), one has to bear in mind that the implementation of the right resides
with four departments - viz. Agriculture, Welfare, Health and Finance.39 Although the
spread over four departments affects the total funds available, I suggest that it does not affect
the comparison since the spread applied in the previous year as well.
In assigning value to the budgetary allocations one must of course bear in mind that not
all the budgeted funds actually go towards providing houses. A fair amount of these go
towards administrative and other expenses. In the period studied by the SAHRC, for instance,
the projections were:
Table 3: Projected Application of National Housing Budget
Budget Item Amount
89/90 90/00 % Increase
Administration R28177m R30483m 7,5
Policy Development R226097m R49656m (78,03)
Housing Performance R457725m R469844m 2,58
SA Housing Fund R2 909 713b R2 971 121b 2,06
Total R3 621 712b R3 521104b (65,89)
Source:RSA Estimate of Expenditure'"
The table suggests that of the budgeted total for housing, R2 971 121b (82,6%) went to the
South African Housing Fund and possibly, therefore, towards the actual provision of houses.
This represents an increase of 2,6% in comparison with the budget allocation towards
housing in the previous year. Although very substantial (78,03%), the decline in the
budgetary allocation towards policy development seems perfectly understandable. It would
have been surprising if the state maintained high-level expenditure on policy development,
for there must come a point where it concentrates on policy implementation, rather than
development. The table further suggests that provision for administration costs increased by
7,5%. It is therefore once again remarkable that of the budget items that increased in the
period under review, the money allocated for actual provision of houses experienced the least
growth, expressed as a percentage of the allocations.
39 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 21.
40 RSA, Estimate of Expenditure to be Defrayed from the National Revenue Fund during the Financial Year
ending 31 March 2000, pp. 16-19. See also HRC Quarterly Review, October 1999, p. 47 by way of example
of how a province might apply the funds.
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I suggested earlier that it is necessary to inquire into the state's prioritisation of the
competing claims to its resources in order to make sense of its fulfilment of the obligation to
give effect to the right according to available resources. In doing so, I shall not pitch one
socio-economic right against another. Quite apart from the fact that I have already done that,
it would, as I have already suggested, be permissible for the state to treat one socio-economic
right somewhat less favourably than another so as to bring overall improvement in respect of
the ICESCR. What I undertake to do, therefore, is rather to compare state expenditure on
socio-economic rights and unrelated budget items. Specifically, I propose to compare state
expenditure on socio-economic rights with state expenditure on interest on the debt, security,
central statistical services, constitutional development and local government, correctional
services, foreign affairs, home affairs, justice, public enterprises, public service commission,
revenue services, government communication, and trade and industry.
Table 4: State Expenditure on Socio-Economic Rights and other Interests
Budget Item Amount % Amount 0/0
1998/99 1999/00
Interest on Debt R43,8b 20,7 R48,2b 22,2
Education R45,4b 22,1 R48,5b 22,4
Security R34,3b 16,1 R35,5b 15,1
Health care R23,2b 12,2 R24,Ob 11,1
Welfare R19,3b 9,7 RI9,8b 9,1
Transport R3,2b 1,6 R3,5b 1,6
Housing R3,6b 1,8 R3,5b 1,6
Water R2,9b 1,1 R2,4b 1,1
Trade/Industry R2,4b 1,1 R2,lb 0,9
Central Statistical Services R92,6m 0,45 R141m 0,07
Constitutional Dev. & Local Gov. R3,Ob 1,46 R3,2b 1,48
Correctional Services R4,3b 2,1 R4,5b 2,08
Foreign Affairs Rl,2b 0,59 Rl,2b 0,55
Home Affairs Rl,lb 0,54 RI,3b 0,6
Justice R2,I2b 1,03 R2,35b 1,08
Public Enterprises R28m 0,14 R3Im 0,14
Public Service Commission R27,6m 0,14 R50,6m 0,24
SA Revenue Services Rl,7b 0,83 Rl,86b 0,86
Govt. Communication & Info R46,8m 0,23 R48,2m 0,22
Total41 R20Sb 100 R216,8b 100
Source: Fair Share, Summary of National Budget Expenditures: 1998/99: 1999/00.
41 As a result of some budget items not being stated, the totals do not add up. From Central Statistical Services
through to "Govt. Communication & Info", Fair Share offered no percentages and I have therefore myself
calculated those.
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An examination of the above table suggests the following order of priorities:
(1) Education; (2) Interest on Debt; (3) Security; (4) Health Care; (5) Welfare; (6)
Correctional Services; (7) Transport and Housing; (8) Constitutional Development and Local
Government; (9) Water; (10) Justice; (11) Trade and Industry; (12) SA Revenue Services;
(13) Central Statistical Services; (14) Home Affairs; ( 15) Foreign Affairs; (16) Public Service
Commission; and (17) Government Communication and Information System.
Consequently, of the sampled budget items education receives top priority. It is
significant that three of the top five budgetary priorities are related to socio-economic rights.
It remains possible to bemoan the fact that housing only features at position seven and that
debt service eats up so much of our national budget. It seems trite, however, that it is not now
possible to assail government's priorities on the basis that they elevate other interests at the
expense of socio-economic rights. It is instructive, though, to examine how budgeting
priorities have changed in the period 1995-2000.
In discussing changes in budget priorities in the period under review, it is necessary to
state that the National Party drew up, that is, the 1995/96 budget.42 Table 5 indicates that
financial planning on housing was cut by 50% in the first budget the ANC drew up, that is,
for the period 1996/97, and that it was more than doubled in the next financial year. But then
it was cut again in 1998/99 and even further in 1999/00. The result is that, expressed as a
percentage, the budget on housing reflects a negative average increase of 0,075% in the
period under review. And that is before one includes inflation.43
Table 5: Changes in Budgetary Priorities between 1995 and 2000
Budget R95/96 % R96/97 % R97/98 0/0 R98/9944 0/0 R99/00 %
Item
Int. on Debt 28b 25,5 34b 19,5 39,6b 20,0 43,8b 20,7 48,2b 22,2
Education 3Ib 20,0 35b 19,8 40b 21,0 45,4b 22,1 48,5b 22,4
Security 2Ib 13,5 24b 13,3 30b 17,0 34,3b 16,1 35,5 15,1
Health care 15b 10,0 17b 9,8 20b 11,0 23,2b 12,2 24b 11,1
Welfare 16b 10,5 14b 7,6 18b 10,0 19,3b 9,7 19,8b 9,1
Transport 3b 1,9 3b 1,8 3,3b 1,7 3,2b 1,6 3,5b 1,6
Housing 3b 1,945 I,5b 0,8 4b 2,0 3,6b 1,8 3,5b 1,6
Water 0,9b 0,6 2,4b 1,4 2,Ib 1,0 2,9b 1,1 2,4b 1,1
Trade & 3,5 2,3 3,3b 1,9 3b 1,6 2,4b 1,1 2,Ib 0,9
Industry
Source: Fair Share, Key Elements of the 1997/98 Budget.
42 Fair Share, 2000/0J National Budget Handbook, p. 7.
43 Fair Share, 2000/0J National Budget Handbook, p. 6.
44 I have extrapolated the figures for 1998/1999 & 1999/2000 from Table 4 above.
45 Fair Share reflects this as 3,4% (Key Elements of the J997/98 Budget, p. 2). But this is of course wrong
arithmetic, and Transport, just above Housing, also at R3b, is reflected as 1,9%.
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Overall, therefore, the available data suggest that the state has undertaken retrogressive
measures insofar as the right of access to adequate housing is concerned since the current
government came into office. As I have suggested, it does not seem that these retrogressive
measures can be justified on the basis of an overall improvement of other socio-economic
rights. Could they, perhaps, be justified on the basis of an economic crisis?
Table 6: SA's GOP: 1995-2000
Nominal Real in-
ePIYear GDP (at Popula- GDP per increase RealGDP Increase Real crease
current tion head inGDP (at con- (decrease) GDP (decrease)
prices) (current per head stant 1995 in real GDP per inGDP
prices) prices) head per head
1995 R548,lb 39477100 RI3884 - R548,lb - RI3884 - 8,7%
1996 R618,4b 40342300 RI5329 10,4% R570,9b 4,2% RI4150 1,9% 7,4%
1997 R683,7b 41226700 RI6584 8,2% R585,3b 2,5% RI4196 0,3% 8,6%
1998 R740,6b 42 130500 RI7579 6,0% R588,9b 0,6% RI3979 (1,5%) 6,9%
1999 R795,lb 43054300 RI8467 5,1% R594,8b 1,0% R13 815 (1,2%) 5,2%
2000 R865,9b 44 OOI500 R19679 6,6% R615,4b 3,5% RI3986 1,2% 5,0%
Source: SAIRR,Fast Facts, April 2000, p. 3.
It is evident from Table 6 that, overall, SA's GDP declined between 1995 and 2000. But it is
also evident that it grew from 0,6% in 1998 to 1,0% in 1999. In any event Table 6 does not
paint a picture of a country whose economy is in a crisis. Therefore the state's retrogressive
measures in respect of the right of access to adequate housing cannot be attributed to an
economic CrISIS.
Previously I indicated that the state's failure to discharge its constitutional obligation
with reference to socio-economic rights can be excused either on the basis of a lack of
resources or on the basis that the measures advocated are unreasonable. Presumably,
retrogressive measures could also be justified on the same bases.
It does not seem to me possible to sustain a claim that the state's retrogressive measures
in respect of the right to adequate housing were necessitated by a lack of resources. The total
budget for the relevant years was R153b (1995/96); R196b (1997/98); R205b (1998/99) and
R216,8b (1999/00). Therefore, expressed in absolute terms, the budget size has been
increasing steadily in the relevant period. What we see instead is that as the budget size
increased, the slice of it that went towards housing shrank, expressed both in absolute terms
and as a percentage of the budget.
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It remains, then, to consider whether the retrogressive measures in respect of the right
of access to adequate housing can be justified on the basis that they were reasonable. It is
admittedly a Herculean task to undertake to say what is reasonable in any given set of
circumstances. I take the view, however, that insofar as the constitution allows the state to
plead reasonableness for not fulfilling a socio-economic right, one is entitled to venture an
opinion on the question, provided only it is on a reasoned basis. The reasoning I propose to
follow is that there is a clear constitutional injunction that the state shall fulfil certain socio-
economic rights and that a deviation from this obligation can be justified on five grounds
only. The said grounds are:
• That the state does not have the resources that are necessary in order to fulfil the rights;
• That, whilst the state might have the resources, it would nevertheless be unreasonable
for it to embark on the action required for the fulfilment of the rights;
• That the rights have been fully realised already;
• That there was a crisis as a result of which the deviation was inevitable; and
• That the deviation was in pursuit of an overall improvement with regard to other
ICESCR rights.
Now, the two last-mentioned grounds are admittedly not in the text of the constitution.
However they are an authoritative interpretation of the ICESCR by the Committee on Social
and Economic Rights. About the fact that the socio-economic rights enshrined in our
constitution emanate from the ICESCR, there can be no debate. Therefore I think it is
permissible to inquire into the extent to which the conduct of the state is in line with the
interpretation by the Committee on Social and Economic Rights' of the ICESCR in
investigating whether, in our endeavour to give effect to that covenant, we have acted
reasonably.
If, however, it turns out that I am mistaken in this view, the state's deviation becomes
even less sustainable in reason, since we then have to judge it basically on two grounds only,
being availability of resources and reasonability. Since reasonability is the question we
have to answer, it could not possibly form part of our attempt to answer the question.
Therefore we would be left with one yardstick only, namely available resources.
In short, therefore, I maintain that the state acts reasonably if it gives effect to the
injunctions of the constitution or, alternatively, if its conduct can be justified on the grounds
mentioned above. Conversely, the state acts unreasonably if it fails to give effect to the
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injunctions of the constitution in circumstances where the failure cannot be justified on the
grounds mentioned above.
Barring the defence that the right has already been fully realised, I have already
discounted the possibility that the deviation might be justified in terms of any of the grounds
mentioned above. Therefore there remains one question only, namely, whether we could say
in South Africa that the right of access to adequate housing has already been fully realised.
This is essentially an empirical question and ought to give rise to no serious problems. I
referred earlier to the NEDLAC, SAIRR and indeed the SAHRC's findings on this matter,
which suggest that the right is far from full realisation. Table 7 shows the housing shortage in
South Africa during the period studied by the SAHRC.
Table 7: Shortage of Houses by Province in SA
Province Shortage Proportion of Shortage as Number of Houses to be
total shortage proportion of houses to be built as pro-
total provin- built in 1999 portion of
cial house- housing
holds shortage
Eastern Cape 338239 13% 25% 152000 45%
Free State 132323 5% 21% 69000 52%
Gauteng 836784 32% 42% 243000 29%
KwaZulu- 473214 18% 28% 195000 41%
Natal
Mpumalanga 109825 4% 18% 53000 48%
North West 296561 11% 41% 70000 24%
Northern Cape 20462 1% 11% 18000 88%
Northern 180667 7% 18% 86000 48%
Province
Western Cape 215642 8% 22% 114000 53%
South Africa 2603717 100% 29% 1000000 38%
Source: SAIRR, South Africa Survey 1999/00, p. 166.
In analysing Table 7, one may note the fact that the housing backlog is estimated less
conservatively by others. Rick de Satge and Colleen Morna, for instance, estimated the
backlog at between three and four million in July 1996.46 With reference to "houses to be
built" the SAIRR clearly proceeded on the basis of undertakings the ANC made before
becoming the governing party. However on government's own admission the goal of a
million houses was not attained. By March only account for 38% of the total housing
shortage. It is obvious therefore that in terms of government's own planning the country is
nowhere near to full realisation of the right of access to adequate housing. Therefore the
46 Rick de Satge and Colleen Morna, Homeless Have Little Hope of Help from Government, Reconstruct: Mail
& Guardian, July 12 to 18, 1996.
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. I
retrogressive measures government has introduced in respect of this right cannot be justified
on the basis that the right has been fully realised.
If the reasoning outlined above is accepted, it seems to me quite clear that it is not
possible to advance any justification at all for government's retrogressive measures in respect
of the right of access to adequate housing.
5.2.1.2 National Department of Correctional Services
The SAHRC's report in this regard deals with conditions such as protection from the cold,
dampness, heat, structural hazards and overcrowding. It states that no supporting documents
were supplied to show that the conditions in prison are in accordance with public health
legislation."
This section of the SAHRC's analysis is not particularly helpful. But, in any event, I am
not sure that it was a viable thing to do to try and study housing issues with reference to the
Department of Correctional Services. If the SAHRC had meant to do a meaningful study of
this nature, it would in my view have been necessary to work out what the same terms mean
in different contexts. That prisoners have socio-economic rights seems to me a matter about
which there can be no debate. However I think we would require a different vocabulary in
order to study the socio-economic rights of prisoners, from the one we use in studying socio-
economic rights in general. The following terms or concepts seem to me obviously
inappropriate in studying the socio-economic rights of prisoners:
• Legal security of tenure;
• Affordability of the house;
• Cultural factors - at least as I defined them in this study;
• Privacy; and
• The state refraining from interfering with the person from satisfying the right
him/herself.
Although it seems obvious that one cannot raise these issues in studying the socio-economic
rights of prisoners, there is no indication in the SAHRC's report that it has considered this. In
any event the SAHRC has a national prisons project in terms of which it monitors conditions
in prison and the treatment of prisoners generally. I think that the project would have been an
adequate basis for considering some of the things it wanted to examine in the current study.
47 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 10.
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Therefore it was not necessary in my view to force the issue into its constitutional mandate to
monitor the implementation of socio-economic rights.
5.2.1.3 Provincial Housing Departments
The government's housing policy is implemented through the provincial governments. The
provincial governments that answered the SAHRC's protocols were mentioned in Section
5.2.1 hereof.
5.2.1.3.1 The Mpumalanga Department of Housing
The SAHRC states that different directorates within the department responded to the
questionnaire and that it is therefore not possible to gauge "a full picture of the housing
situation within the province". It proceeds and states that numerous initiatives were referred
to in the replies to the questionnaire, but that no comprehensive overview of the housing
situation in the province was provided." Nothing more substantial is mentioned.
In my view the fact that numerous directorates answered the questionnaire is not a
sufficient reason for the SAHRC not analysing the data those directorates supplied. So far
from being disabling, the fact is the basis for thorough-going analysis. The fact that different
directories answered the questionnaire means that it would have been possible to compare
and crosscheck what those directorates said, and probably get a more balanced picture of the
housing situation in the province than if a single directorate had answered.
And, which is worse, the SAHRC does not even tell us what those directorates said, and
so we cannot assess the situation ourselves.
5.2.1.3.2 The Free State Department of Housing
The SAHRC states that the department provides a comprehensive list of initiatives
undertaken in the province in order to ensure the realisation of the right. It finds that this list
reflects "an overall picture of the housing situation within the province". It however also
finds that, on account of there being no NGO input on the matter, and also due to lack of
supporting documentation, the accuracy of the department's information cannot be vouched
for.49
The SAHRC's assessment of the housing situation in the Free State seems manifestly
inconsistent. On the one hand, the SAHRC finds that it is in a position, on the basis of the
48 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. Il.
49 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 12.
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data, to assert that it has "an overall picture of the housing situation within the province".
And then in the same breath it finds that it cannot vouch for the accuracy of the information
at its disposal. If indeed the department provided a comprehensive list of initiatives
undertaken in order to ensure the realisation of the right of access to adequate housing in the
province, it should be possible to analyse that list without reference to the NGO input. In any
event there are grave methodological problems about the gathering and analysis of data from
the NGO community. 50 Therefore it is doubtful that the input, if the SAHRe had it, would
advance the credibility of the other data that it worked with from government sources.
5.2.1.3.3 The Gauteng Department of Housing
The SABRe states that the department has undertaken two initiatives within the province in
order to ensure the realisation of the right. These initiatives are by way of two statutes,
namely the Provincial Housing Act and the Landlord and Tenant Act. Then the SABRe
states that the accuracy of the information from government sources could not be determined
due to lack of supporting documentation and an NGO input. The SAHRe further states that
the initiatives indicated by the department "by no means reflect a clear overall picture of the
housing situation within the province't."
One might expect the SABRe to analyse the statutes referred to and indicate their
adequacy or inadequacy for bringing about the realisation of the right in the province. It does
not even indicate what the provisions of those statutes are, so that we might ourselves judge
whether they are adequate or not.
5.2.1.3.4 The KwaZulu-Natal Department of Housing
The SAHRe states that the department referred to some initiatives, such as the Provincial
Housing Strategy, to address the realisation of the right but that no supporting documentation
was provided. It states further that there was no NGO input. Therefore it was unable to assess
the picture with regard to the housing situation in the province.Y
50 See Chapter 4 hereof. Since this is a recurring reservation the SAHRC raises in a number of provinces, I
shall not repeat this in discussing other provinces, although this critique must stand in respect of those
provinces too.
51 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 12.
52 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 12.
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5.2.1.3.5 The Northern CapeDepartment of Housing
The SAHRC notes merely that the information received from the department was incomplete
and vague and that there was no NGO input. Then it asserts that the housing situation in the
province could not be gauged. 53 However it does not say in what respects the information is
incomplete and vague. Nor does it table the information it received so that the readers can
themselves assess it.
5.2.1.3.6 A Critique
In setting out the Commission's analysis of the data, I have already expressed some criticism
thereof. I have also indicated that provincial governments are on the coalface of delivery in
respect of the right of access to adequate housing. Therefore one might have expected the
Commission to be rigorous in analysing the provinces' data insofar as the right is concerned.
What we have instead is a refrain in respect of all provinces dealt with that it was impossible
to assess the housing situation.
Whereas some of the concerns raised by the Commission are legitimate and indeed
have a bearing on the analysis of the data - e.g. lack of supporting documentation - it is in
my view unacceptable that the Commission failed to analyse the data that it did have before
it. But even with reference to the lack of supporting documentation it is noteworthy that other
institutions - e.g. the Human Rights Committee and the South African Institute of Race
Relations - were able to access the relevant information and made an informed analysis of
the housing situation in the provinces. Table 7, for instance, details the housing shortage by
province in South Africa even if, as I have suggested, some studies fix the backlog somewhat
higher than it appears in Table 7. Table 8 shows the delivery of houses by province between
April 1994 and March 1999 (and therefore up to the end of the period studied by the
SAHRC).
53 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 12.
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Table 8: Delivery of Houses: April 1994-March 1999
Province Proportion of Actual Total number Houses Proportion of
1m target to number of of subsidies built or provincial
be met houses to be approved under con- target built or
built struction under con-
struction
Eastern Cape 15,2% 152 000 93773 78393 52%
Free State 6,9% 69 000 52278 57434 83%
Gauteng 24,3% 243 000 328 030 177802 73%
KwaZulu- 19,5% 195 000 176 044 149 126 76%
Natal
Mpumalanga 5,3% 53 000 64156 47595 90%
North West 7,0% 70 000 84697 60 631 87%
Northem Cape 1,8% 18 000 22264 21256 118%
N. Province 8,6% 86 000 89890 49750 59%
Western Cape 11,4% 114 000 124 029 103730 91%
Total 100% 1000000 1035161 745717 75%
Source: SAIRR, SA Survey: Millennium Edition, p. 168.
It was therefore not impossible, as the Commission suggests, to form a picture of the housing
situation in the provinces. The Commission could either have called for the information, or it
could have extracted it from other studies. The Commission's problem, it seems to me, was
its legalistic approach to the study, rather than the absence of data. Indeed this is clear when
one considers its analysis of data at the national level, where it did not necessarily have
similar problems with the data supplied. Yet a clearer picture of the housing situation in
South Africa does not emerge from the Commission's analysis of that data set.
Further, the SAHRC's analysis is contradictory in places. I have already referred to
some of this in setting out their analysis. It is noteworthy that, in dealing with the way
departments answered the questionnaire, the Commission asserts, with reference to the Free
State, that it "provided an excellent overview of what is being done to realise the right of
access to adequate housing'Y" If it is so, how must one understand the Commission's
contention that it is not possible to assess the housing situation in the Free State? Why is the
department's overview "excellent" if it does not shed any light on the housing situation in the
province?
5.2.1.4 Local Governments
As it was pointed out previously, the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (GJMC) is
the only local government that answered the SAHRC's questionnaire. The Commission states
54 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 18.
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that the GJMC made no reference at all to the right in its answer. Further, the Commission
finds that such reference would in any case have been impossible since the GJMC takes the
view that local government has no role to play in the realisation of the right in the first
place.55
The SAHRC takes the VIew that the GJMC is mistaken in believing that local
government has no role in the realisation of the right of access to adequate housing, as the
relevant legislation is clear on the matter. 56
5.2.2 Health Care
The SAHRC discusses this right under two headings, namely "National Department of
Health" and "Provincial Governments".
5.2.2.1 National Department of Health
The Commission does not present the data submitted by the department. It states instead that
the data do not reflect a clear understanding of the different obligations, namely to respect,
protect, promote and fulfil the right. It finds that at times the department lists obligations
belonging under one heading under the wrong heading. The Commission further finds that
the department shows no commitment to primary health care, notwithstanding that this is the
cornerstone of the World Health Organisation's Health for All Programme. Nor, as the
SAHRC finds, does the department have a clear plan of action for implementing health
rights.57
It is noteworthy that the Commission deals with health care at national level in four
short paragraphs. Although it refers to the different obligations imposed on the state by the
right, it makes no effort to analyse the department's data in accordance with those different
obligations. The Commission says, of course, that the department itself confused those
obligations. The department's confusion is, needless to say, unfortunate, since one must
wonder how it hopes to give effect to the right if it is confused about the obligations created
by the right.
However the department's confusion does not absolve the Commission from analysing
the data. If the Commission was able to work out that this datum belongs here, rather than
there, then it was possible to place it where it belongs and then do the analysis, rather than
ss SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 16.
56 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 20.
S7 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, pp. 20-21.
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content itself with criticising the department. There can be no question about the department
having earned the criticism, but that fact does not absolve the Commission from doing the
analysis required of it by the constitution.
5.2.2.2 Provincial Governments
The SAHRC deals with the provincial data In two sentences. It says the provincial
governments provided fragmented information from which it is difficult to form a clear
picture as to benchmarks and plans of action. Then it states that there seems to be no
understanding on the part of provincial governments of their constitutional obligations in
respect of health care services."
5.2.2.3 A Critique
It is quite evident that the Commission's analysis of the data on health is inadequate.
Reference was made to NEDLAC's report previously, where NEDLAC suggests that
inadequate housing may have a negative impact on the health of the poor (Section 5.2.1.1.6
hereof). This position enjoys the support of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights.i" That the housing situation in South Africa is not satisfactory seems to emerge
clearly from Tables 7 and 8, together with the NEDLAC statistics (Section 5.2.1.1.6 hereof)
read together with the SAIRR statistics.Ï" If one accepts these, and the suggestion that
housing has a bearing on the health of people, it would not be unreasonable to expect the
Commission to deal more meaningfully with the data regarding the right to health care.
Further, the United Nations General Assembly resolved on 18 December 1982 that all
people have an inherent right to life. It resolved that safeguarding this right is an essential
condition for the enjoyment of the entire spectrum of socio-economic and other rights."
Now, a person's health has a direct bearing on his/her right to life. It is of course so that there
is a view that this is not the proper meaning of the right to life. Fawcett, for instance, argues
that points such as the one I argue are mistaken in that they fail to understand that "it is not
life but the right to life, which is protected by law".62 The United Nations Human Rights
Committee, however, has stated explicitly that:
58 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 21.
59 See E/CNA/SR.222 at 17 (1951).
60 SAIRR, South Africa Survey 1999/00, p. 164.
61 See Ramcharan, in Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. XXX, 1983/3, p. 301.
62 Fawcett, 1969, p. 31.
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The right to life has often been too narrowly interpreted. The expression "inherent
right to life" cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner and the
protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures. In this
connexion the Committee considers that it would be desirable for States parties to
take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life
expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and
epidemics.f
If this view is accepted, it follows that the right to health care is intimately linked to the right
to life. And, as the United Nations General Assembly resolved, the enjoyment of all other
rights is contingent on the right to life, at least in the sense that when one is dead the question
of all other human rights for that person disappears with that. From this angle too, therefore,
one might have expected the SAHRC to deal more meaningfully with the healthcare data that
it had before it.
The national health budget for the period studied by the SAHRC was R23,2b (see
Tables 2 & 4). Table 5 suggests that the national health budget, expressed in absolute figures,
increased from R15b in 1995/96 to R17b in (1996/97) and R20b in 1997/98. Expressed as a
percentage of the national budget, it stood at 10% in 1995/96; 9,8% in 1996/97; 11% in
1997/98 and 12,2% in 1998/99.
Consequently, in the period 1995-1999, in nominal terms, state expenditure represented
a retrogressive measure insofar as the right of access to health care is concerned once only -
i.e. in 1996/97 - whereas, expressed as a percentage of the budget, it dropped from 10% to
9,8%. It is noteworthy that in 1999/00 the national health budget increased to R24b (11,1%)
and, therefore, another retrogressive measure, expressed as a percentage of the budget.
Holistically viewed, however, the national health budget in the period under
consideration is encouraging since, when viewed against the inflation rate in that period, it
represents a positive growth in each one of the financial years.t" It accordingly seems to me,
therefore, that, from the standpoint of the national budget, the state has dealt with health
better than it has dealt with housing in the period under review. It is also heartening that in
the financial year 2000/01 the budgetary allocation for health is R25,5b, which represents
63 Ramcharan, supra, p. 301.
64 According to the SAIRR, Budget 2000 - and Beyond, in "Fast facts" p. 3, the inflation rate for 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998 and 1999 was, respectively, 8,7%; 7,4%; 8,6%; 6,9%; and 5,2%. A little bit of arithmetic would
show that the budget increases on health are more than the adjustment that would have to be made if one
took into account inflation. But of course there are other variables, e.g. increase in pressure on the health
budget, which might change the picture.
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13,8% of the national budget.f
Having said that, however, it remains necessary to inquire into the state of health in
South Africa and whether, therefore, though positive, the national budget is adequate to meet
the challenges at hand.
Table 9: Notifiable Diseases in SA by Province: 1997 & 1998
Pro- Malaria Measles Menin- Tetanus Tuberculosis Typhoid Viral
vince gococcal Hepatitis
infection
97 98 97 98 97 98 97 98 97 98 97 98 97 98
E. Cape 4 7 50 82 15 12 5 2 9367 13 124 166 173 74 60
FIState 46 27 80 98 3 0 1 0 6210 6692 3 1 72 40
Gau- 556 214 163 114 68 21 2 1 9061 9410 24 10 296 240
teng
KZN 11425 13352 213 102 16 28 1 2 10075 9672 49 35 96 205
M/Lan- 5708 5852 57 79 8 3 2 2 2347 3098 71 44 52 50
ga
N/West 329 194 56 25 1 0 2 1 6733 5576 8 0 14 18
NICape 15 8 10 11 4 16 0 1 2362 2587 0 3 20 28
N/Pro- 4814 3413 164 198 0 0 3 4 1947 2112 98 92 109 141
vince
W/Cape 53 29 221 95 214 139 0 0 15034 18964 6 10 309 322
Out- 146 396 0 0 0 1 0 0 28 68 0 3 0 2
side"
Total 23096 23492 1014 804 329 220 16 13 63164 71303 425 371 1042 1 106
Source: SAIRR, 1999/2000, South Africa Survey, p. 211.
Table 9 is an indication of only seven out of the 33 notifiable diseases in South Africa. The
table suggests that some cases are on the decline, whereas others are on the increase. It is
particularly worrisome that South Africa should have experienced such a substantial increase
of malaria and tuberculosis cases. The SAIRR records that in 1998 a total of 2 741 people
died of tuberculosis in South Africa, which represented an increase of 40% in comparison
with the figure for the previous year, and a total of 169 people died of malaria in South Africa
in 1998, representing a 101% increase on the 1997 figure."
South Africa is sufficiently advanced to entitle one to expect that diseases like malaria
and tuberculosis would not be killing so many people and that, to the extent that such deaths
occur, they would be on a downward swing. It thus becomes a pertinent question as to why a
country as advanced as South Africa would show an increase in these deaths despite the
constitutional promise of health care services. The easy answer to the question is that South
65 See Fair Share, 2000/01 National Budget Handbook, p. 7.
66 Source of infection outside SA.
67 SAIRR, supra, pp. 211 and 213 respectively.
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Africa is at once a developed and a developing country. This view will, indeed, be supported
by an examination of the incidence of these diseases by population group.
Table 10: Tuberculosis Notification Rate per 100000 of the Population
Year African Coloured Indian White
1970 361 330 152 22
1975 . 312 322 79 19
1980 216 335 89 13
1985 185 429 84 15
1990 213 609 61 17
1991 191 652 57 15
1992 198 662 55 19
1993 207 713 51 19
1994 199 739 45 17
1995 179 671 69 16
Source: SAIRR, 2000, p. 216.
Table 10 suggests that the incidence of tuberculosis in the period studied by the SAIRR has
been highest in the coloured and African communities and lowest in the white and Indian
communities. In general terms the African and the coloured communities have traditionally
been on the lower rungs of the economic scale in South Africa. Although it is baffling why
the coloured community had a higher incidence of tuberculosis than the African community
from 1975 onwards, it is however understandable on the two-world thesis why the two
communities were worse afflicted than the white and Indian communities.
I contend, however, as I have already suggested, that the two-world thesis is an easy
explanation of the problem. The health rights clause of our constitution was written against
the background, precisely, that there were two worlds in South Africa, one rich and the other
poor. If we suppose that the incidence of tuberculosis and malaria deaths in 1998 was
attributable to this fact then, I contend, that is precisely what needs to be explained. How is it
that, four years after the constitutional promise of better health, tuberculosis fatalities increase
by a whole 40% whilst malaria fatalities more than double?
This fact, I suggest, raises the question whether our resources are adequate to meet our
health problems. I refer both to primary health care resources and curative resources. The
SAIRR found that between 1992 and 1997, a total of 2 388 nurses had completed primary
health care training in South Africa, and that their training did not properly equip them to
deliver primary health care services." Note may be taken of the fact that, at the end of 1997,
68 SAIRR, supra, p. 235. The figures did not include the Free State and the Northern Cape. If one proceeds on
the basis that the average would have been approximately 341 per province, one might liberally project that,
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there were some 175 599 registered nurses in South Africa.69 It is in my view regrettable that
the SAIRR does not state in what respects the training of these nurses was inadequate, but
there can be no question about their sheer number being totally inadequate.
The ratio of medical doctors to the population also calls for examination if one is to
make sense of the health care situation in the country. In 1998 South Africa had some 7 206
medical doctors." That means there was one doctor for every 5 551 people. The Ministry of
Health under Nkosazana Zuma recognised this as being inadequate and therefore embarked
on a drive to bring in foreign doctors. By 1998 a total of 1 666 foreign doctors had
successfully been attracted to work in South Africa." That means a total of 8 872 doctors and
therefore one doctor for every 4 509 people. That this was still inadequate can be gleaned
from the fact that Zuma found it necessary to compel new doctors to do community service.
In 1998 there were some 360 public hospitals and 344 private hospitals in South
Africa." Unfortunately most of the public hospitals did not indicate the number of beds they
had. Therefore it is not possible to analyse the adequacy of such facilities. However it is
common knowledge that the situation is far from satisfactory and that overcrowding is a
perennial problem at public hospitals. It is also common knowledge that private hospitals are
generally inaccessible to a huge majority of South Africans. Therefore it would not be unfair
to assert that such health facilities as we have in South Africa are not enough to deal with the
health situation in the country.
It is not clear how many public clinics there are in South Africa, but figures cited by the
SAIRR seem to bring them close to the order of 3 257.73 Many of these clinics are under-
resoureed and do not function optimally.
When one considers all these facts, together with the fact that consideration was not
given to a majority of diseases that plague South Africa and especially HIV/AIDS, it would
not be unfair to assert that a lot of improvement is still necessary in respect of health care
rights. Therefore, the SAHRC could have been more rigorous in its analysis of the data
having a bearing on the right.
had the two provinces been included, the figure might be 3 070. I suggest that this would not make any
substantial difference.
69 SAIRR, supra, pp. 227 & 230.
70 SAIRR, supra, p. 228.
71 SAIRR, supra, p. 228.
72 SAIRR, supra, pp. 231 and 234 respectively.
73 SAIRR, supra, p. 234.
Socio-Economic Rights 89
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.2.3 Food
The SABRC identifies the departments of Agriculture, Finance, Welfare and Health as the
national departments primarily responsible for implementing the right to food. The
Department of Agriculture's report was however not available at the time when the
Commission undertook the study. The SABRC received the said report in August 1998.74
The Commission did not ask for reports relating to food from the departments of
Health, Welfare and Finance." Therefore the Commission makes no report on food at the
national level, although it did receive data on food from the Department of Correctional
Services. It further attributes its inability to report on the subject to the fact that "government
departments did not respond to the specific questions asked in the protocols". 76
5.2.3.1 A Critique
I have indicated under Section 4.2.1 hereof that the data on which the SAHRC report is based
were collected from government between December 1997 and February 1998. Therefore it is
correct that the submission of its report in August 1998 by the Department of Agriculture was
long the deadline set for returning the protocols to the Commission. The degree of lateness on
the Department's part in submitting its report to the SAHRC is in reason unconscionable.
But was the Commission justified in therefore not analysing the data submitted late and
in not including it in its report? In its Fourth Annual Report, the Commission states that it
released its First Annual Socio-Economic Rights Report in March 1999.77 Therefore there
were at least six months between the submission of its report by the Department of
Agriculture and the release of its report by the SAHRC. Without making light of the
Department of Agriculture's unconscionable conduct, it nevertheless seems that the
Commission had sufficient time to analyse the report and factor it into its own. This is
especially so if one considers that this was the first time in South Africa that government
departments were required to give such reports. Therefore mishaps were bound to occur. It
would have been an entirely different situation if the Department of Agriculture had tabled its
report at a time when the Commission had almost completed its analysis and was finalising
its report. But not even the Commission itself says that was the case.
74 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 21.
75 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 21.
76 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, pp. 21-22.
77 SAHRC, Fourth Annual Report, December 1998-December 1999, p. 55.
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In discussing the health report of the SAHRC reference was made to the fact that the
right to life is foundational in the sense that all other human rights disappear when one dies.
Reference was also made to the fact that one's state of health has a direct bearing on one's
right to life. Food, and therefore the right to it, has a direct bearing on one's state of health
and therefore on his/her right to life.78 Further, it was suggested in Chapter 3 that not only is
the right to life precarious without food, but that human dignity disappears instantly. Thus the
World Food Conference, convened under the auspices of the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 16 November 1974, adopted the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of
Hunger and Malnutrition.
Article 1 of the Declaration states that every man, woman and child has the inalienable
right to be free from hunger and malnutrition. Article 2 proclaims that it is the fundamental
responsibility of all governments to work together for higher food production and a more
equitable and efficient distribution thereof between and within countries. Article 4 requires
every state to remove the obstacles to food production and to provide proper incentives to
agricultural producers. Article Il requires all states to strive to readjust their agricultural
policies so that they prioritise food production."
The right to food is therefore very important and it is extremely unfortunate that the
Commission did not deal with it in its report.
Section 27(2) of the constitution requires the state to take reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources, towards the progressive realisation of the right
of access to food. Section 7(2) requires the state, among other things, to fulfil the right of
access to food. In Section 5.2.1.1.5 hereof it was pointed out that the duty to fulfil a right
requires that the state should take the necessary measures to ensure the satisfaction of the
needs in respect of people who cannot satisfy those needs out of their own efforts. In Section
5.2.1.1.6 hereof it was pointed out that the duty to bring about the progressive realisation of a
right means, among other things, that the state must not introduce retrogressive measures in
respect of the right. How do we assess the state's performance in view of these injunctions?
The national budget for agriculture in 1997/98 was R1,Ob.80 In 1998/99 it was reduced
to R718,8m, and in 1999/00 it was further reduced to R637m. Therefore the state did
introduce retrogressive measures in respect of the right of access to food. There is in my view
78 See Article 11 of the ICESCR; Craven, supra ("The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living"), pp. 307-308;
Rameharan, supra, pp. 305-307.
79 See Tomasevski, 1987, pp. 5-7.
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no reason for supposing that the retrogressive measures in respect of the right of access to
food can be justified any more than those in respect of the right of access to adequate
housing. Therefore, in my view, the state has baulked at the obligation to bring about the
progressive realisation of the right of access to food in the period under review.
What about the duty to fulfil the right? An examination of the income patterns in South
Africa in 1998 would be useful for scrutinising the state's performance in respect of its duty
to fulfil the right of access in the period under review.
Table 11: Monthly Household Income by Population Group: 1998
Income Total African Coloured, White
Group/Month _population Indian, WhiteSt
Percentage
RI-R499 19,0 26,3 1,9 0,7
R500-R899 17,6 23,3 4,2 1,4
R900-R1399 16,4 20,7 6,4 2,8
Rl 400-R2 499 14,7 16,2 11,1 6,5
R2 500-R3 999 9,3 7,1 14,7 12,1
R4 000-R5 999 7,1 3,5 15,6 15,6
R6 000-R9 999 8,6 2,4 23,4 29,1
RIO 000+ 7,2 0,7 22,7 31,7
Source: SAIRR, 2000, p. 296.
Table 11 suggests that in 1998 some 36,6% of South African households lived on a monthly
income of less than R900 whilst 53% lived on a monthly income of less than Rl 400. It is
against this background that the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference stated that
53% of South Africans live in poverty, and issued a pastoral statement under the title,
Economic Justice in South Africa, in 1999.
The point at which one fixes the poverty line will always be a question for lively
debate. The 14,7% households living on a monthly income of between R1400 and R2499
should arguably not fall through the poverty sieve. However a sizeable proportion of them
probably live in conditions of poverty now.
It is noteworthy that the SAIRR refers to the income reflected in Table 11 as claimed
income. Therefore, it seems to me, there is a subtle suggestion that the data might not be a
reflection of the true state of affairs. What does one make of this? In doing social research
through interviews, virtually every response one gets can be considered to be a claim.
80 Fair Share, Summary of National Budget Expenditures: 1997/98 and 1998/99, p. 5. Fair Share states the
agriculture budget as R726,9m for 1998/99.
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Therefore there is a sense in which it is superfluous to label the responses one gets as claims.
And it does not make sense to conduct interviews if one is going to take that kind of attitude
to the responses one gets. In any event if one chooses to label some responses and not others
as claims, then one has to justify that discrimination. The SAIRR provides no justification for
selecting this datum for the label and not the other data it has worked with.
However a critique of the SAIRR's attitude to the data does not make the data reliable.
Therefore it remains possible to agree with the critique, but still wonder: Are the data
reliable? It is generally recognised that the responses one gets in conducting interviews might
not reflect the true state of affairs. But one can only work with the responses one gets.82
However the responses can be checked against other studies on the same subject. In this
regard reference can be made to a SANGOCO studl3 whose figures are very close to those
cited by the SAIRR. Further, the unemployment figures cited by the SAIRR do not
undermine the thesis that a sizeable majority of South Africans lived in poverty in 1998. The
SAIRR records that in 1997 the unemployment rate in South Africa was 26,9%, using the
strict definition of unemployment, and 49,5%, using the expanded definitiont"
Now, the strict definition only counts as unemployed those people who have not
worked during the seven days preceding the interview; who are available to take up
employment within seven days of the interview; and who have taken steps to look for
employment in the four weeks preceding the interview. The expanded definition, on the other
hand, does not require that the person must have sought employment.f
For current purposes I would argue that it really does not matter that a person has been
unemployed for more than seven days prior to the interview: the person is simply not in a job.
By a parity of reasoning, the fact that an unemployed person did not actively look for
employment in the four weeks prior to the interview does not change the reality that he/she is
not having a job. Therefore the unofficial, and therefore probably truer, unemployment rate
was likely to be higher than 49,5% in 1998.
Consequently it seems to me that the thesis that a sizeable majority of South Africans
lived in poverty in 1998 must survive the subtle cynicism of the SAIRR. If we read the
statistics on unemployment together with the fact that many of those who do have
81 The SAIRR explains that the individual groups were too smaIl to record. Therefore they are combined in this
manner.
82 See McNeiIl, supra, p. 13.
83 NGO Matters, 1997,2(9), August.
84 SAIRR, supra, pp. 306 and 307.
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employment earned a pittance, the inference of poverty for a sizeable majority seems to me
obviously inescapable.
What is the relevance of this inference for the critique of the SAHRC's report? The
question I am trying to answer is whether the state has complied with its obligation to fulfil
the right of access to sufficient food in the period under review. The fact that there are so
many people who were unemployed and so many who earned a pittance raises the question
whether they would have been able to satisfy their needs out of their own efforts in respect of
the right.
I have already indicated that government reduced state expenditure on this right in the
relevant period. In view of the levels of poverty referred to above, such a reduction is hard to
justify. What is even more disturbing is the knowledge that the Department of Welfare, one
of the departments in which the implementation of this right resides, spent less than 1% of its
budgeted funds on poverty relief in the 1998/99 financial year.86 Therefore it seems clear that
the state failed in this obligation.
5.2.4 Water
The SAHRC deals with the right of access to sufficient water under the three spheres of
government, viz. national, provincial and local. The relevant national department is Water
Affairs and Forestry .
5.2.4.1 National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
The Commission finds that the Department's understanding of its obligations under the right
is excellent both in terms of the constitution and international jurisprudence. The obligation is
to "create an enabling environment" through which everyone can have access to water and
sanitation services and to support people in gaining access to these services." The
Department defines the "sufficiency" of water in terms of the water's capacity to support
human life and personal hygiene. It derives its notions on the quantity of the basic minimum
that must be supplied to everyone from the World Health Organisation's guidelines. The
medium and long-term goals with regard to water provision are similarly derived. The water
legislation and policy documents take cognisance of questions relating to the quality,
85 SAIRR, supra, pp. 299 and 300.
86 See Evening Post, 19 April 2000.
87 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 22.
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availability, assurance of supply, upgradability of services, equitable access, sustainable
management and use, and cultural and social appropriatenesa "
5.2.4.2 Provincial Governments
The SABRC notes that the Eastern Cape, Northern Province and North West did not respond
to the protocol on water. The six provinces that responded did not provide sufficient details
on their understanding of their obligations in terms of the right. Such information as they
provided was fragmented and did not reveal a coherent description of what each provincial
government saw as its specific role and function in bringing about the realisation of the right.
It was also difficult to work out which department bears primary responsibility for water at
the provincial level. Most provincial governments understood the "sufficiency" of water
exactly as the National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.V
5.2.4.3 Local Governments
The GJMC, as pointed out previously, is the only local government that responded to the
SAHRC's protocols. lts understanding of the right of access to water was that water must be
supplied to paying consumers. However it has a policy to cover the provision of water to the
indigent. The provisions of this policy are not outlined or analysed in the SAHRC report.Ï"
5.2.4.4 A Critique
The Commission deals more meaningfully with this right than it has with the other rights
previously discussed. It notes, for instance, that an assessment of any progress made in the
realisation of the right requires a concrete analysis of the existing situation." Thus it does not
content itself with a statement of what laws and policies exist in respect of the right, but also
inquires into whether those laws and policies have actually translated to the concrete
realisation of the right. The Commission then refers to statistics supplied by the Minister of
Water Affairs and Forestry, which suggest that:
• More than 12m people are without access to potable water; and
• Over 20m people are without adequate sanitation.Y
88 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, pp. 22-23.
89 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, pp. 24-25.
90 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, pp. 25-26.
91 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 26.
92 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 26.
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Although the Commission takes a positive step in reaching beyond the law and raising
questions of fact, it does not go far enough. It cites the statistics referred to above and others,
but does not carry the analysis any further. What does it mean, for instance, that there are
over 12 million people without potable water and over 20 million without adequate
sanitation? Do these figures indicate progress in the endeavour to realise the right of access to
sufficient water? If so, is the pace of the progress sufficient? The Commission asks none of
those questions. Therefore we have to construct that picture ourselves.
Table 12: People Provided with Water by Province: March 1994-March 1999
Province Number Proportion of Total %
Eastern Cape 1 210229 34
Free State 193686 6
KwaZulu-Natal 435643 12
Mpumalanga 480933 14
North West 437572 12
Northern Cape 24932 1
Northern Province 619775 18
Western Cape 121 607 3
Total 3324447 100
Source: SAIRR, 2000, p. 160.
There being no indication to the contrary, we must suppose that the statistics from the
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, cited by the SAHRC, were provided in the first two
months of 1998. Now, it is noteworthy that the SAIRR relied on figures from the Department
of Water Affairs and Forestry for the data reflected in Table 12. It is further noteworthy that
the table refers to people who were provided with water in the stated period. Therefore we
can extrapolate that of the 12 million people the Minister had identified to be without safe
and potable water in South Africa at the beginning of 1998, 8 675 553 (72,3%) remained
without safe and potable water more than one fiscal year thereafter.
The SAIRR paints an even less lustrous picture in asserting that according to the Water
Affairs and Forestry Minister 12 million people remained without water after the 3.5 million
referred to in the table were provided with it.93 The fact that the Department would have cited
the same figure (to the SAHRC) a year or so previously, raises reservations about its co-
ordination of its own information. It is possible, however, that the confusion arose partly
from the change in personnel. The SAHRC, for instance, cites Minister Kader Asmal,
93 SAIRR, supra, p. 160. See SAIRR's endnote no 40 on page 179 of its report, according to which the
Department released the figures in issue on 16 April 1999.
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whereas the SAIRR cites Minister Ronnie Kasrils. But the SAIRR writes later that Kasrils
stated in August 1999 that his Department had reduced the backlog to 7,5 million which
reduces the margin of discrepancy appreciably. However I do not think anything will be
gained by making too much of an issue about this since, whichever way one looks at it, the
conclusion must be that a substantial number of people in South Africa still lacks access to
safe water.
What about the 20 million who were without adequate sanitation? The last figures on
sanitation facilities in South Africa were released in 1996. Adequate sanitation, however, is
closely tied up with the availability of running water. This is borne out by the fact that
sanitation is included in the national water budget (see Table 2). Therefore it is safe to
suppose that, from the figures on water delivery, more than a substantial number of the 20
million identified by Asmal as lacking adequate sanitation in 1998 would be in the same
position still.
The national budget for water in 1997/98 was R2,9b (see Table 2). In the previous year
it had been R2,4b.94 The 1997/98 budget represented an increase of 17,2% over the previous
year's water budget before taking inflation into account. But even after taking inflation into
account the 1997/1998 water budget still represented a real increase, keeping in mind the
inflation rates mentioned in footnote 64 of Chapter 5. Therefore in the period studied by the
SAHRC the state did not introduce retrogressive measures from the standpoint of the budget
insofar as the right of access to sufficient water is concerned.
But for the year 1999/00 the funds allocated to water were reduced to R2,5b (Table 2).
Fair Share estimates that this represented a negative (real) increase of 19,9%.95 In this period
the state, then, introduced a retrogressive budgetary measure in respect of the right of access
to sufficient water. As I have already argued, the measure would be hard to justify.
A point to bear in mind in assessing the adequacy of the water budget in any given year
during the period under review is that the budget must also cater for forestry.
5.2.5 Social Security
The SAHRC discusses the right of access to social security in terms of two government
spheres, namely national and provincial/local. The national department responsible for the
implementation of this right is National Welfare.
94 Fair Share, Key Elements of the 1997/98 Budget, p. 2.
95 Fair Share, Summary of National Budget Expenditures: 1998/99 and 1999/00.
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5.2.5.1 National Department of Welfare
The policy document discussed by the Commission with reference to the Department is the
White Paper for Social Welfare. The White Paper endorses the provision of comprehensive
social assistance to those without means of support. It commits the state to build a
comprehensive, integrated social system in order to ensure the realisation of the right of
access to social security. The White Paper envisages a social security system that will ensure
"universal access" to a "minimum income sufficient to meet basic subsistence needs" and
that will "work inter-sectorally to alleviate poverty". The White Paper enshrines a rights-
based approach to social security; equity, non-discrimination, participatory democracy;
improved quality of life; transparency and accountability; accessibility; and appropriateness.
The White Paper also seeks to ensure that every member of society who is in need of care
will have access to support, social welfare services and social security benefits in an enabling
environment." The SAHRC pronounces the White Paper to be in line with international
trends and standards.
The Commission further refers to the Social Assistance Act and regulations framed
thereunder without indicating what the provisions of the Act or the regulations are. But it
does indicate that the Department's understanding of "appropriate social assistance" is that
the assistance must be based on particular circumstances and in keeping with the Act. Quite
naturally, then, the SAHRC does not evaluate the adequacy of the Act. However it
encourages the Department to "evaluate the adequacy of the existing legislative criteria
governing access to social security".
The Commission finds that the Department fails to provide analytical data on the
number of poor people in South Africa who need assistance and that it has no standards on
who should qualify for assistance and whether the social benefits are adequate."
5.2.5.2 Provincial and Local Governments
The Commission states that most social welfare departments of provincial governments that
responded to the protocol had a fair general understanding of the constitutional provisions
relating to social security. The GJMC did not provide a coherent account of its understanding
of its obligations under the right.
96 SABRC, 1998, Vol. IV, pp. 32-33.
97 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 34.
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5.2.5.3 A Critique
The Department clearly has sound and lofty policies in place, and the Commission did a good
job of flashing them out. The Commission's failure to evaluate the adequacy of the
legislation in place for delivering social security, however, boggles the mind. What boggles
the mind even more is its advice to the Department that it (the Department) must evaluate
those laws. The constitution has created the Commission exactly, among other things, so that
it should evaluate such laws and report to parliament about how they facilitate or hamper the
delivery of the contents of socio-economic rights.
The Commission once again correctly raises factual questions III respect of the
realisation of the right, but does not take the matter any further. If it had; the Department
would have been the wiser for it and its scandalous failure to use 99% of the funds budgeted
for poverty relief might have been nipped in the bud. The fact that the Department has put in
place such sound and lofty policies, and then does the diametric opposite of what those
policies require, vindicates the argument by Opsahl, referred to earlier, that it is not enough to
report on laws and constitutions only.
With reference to projected public expenditure on social security, Tables 2 and 5 should
be consulted. The social welfare budget in 1997/98 was R18b. It made up 10% of the national
budget and represented a 22,2% increase over the previous year's welfare budget. Therefore
in the period studied by the SAHRC the government did not introduce retrogressive
budgetary measures in respect of social security. In fact, expressed in absolute figures, the
government has introduced no retrogressive budgetary measure in respect of social security
right through to the 2000/01 fiscal year." Expressed as a percentage of the total budget,
projected public expenditure on social security shrunk from 10,5% in 1995/96 to 7,6% in
1996/97; increased to 10% in 1997/98; shrunk to 9,7% in 1998/99; to 9,1% in 1999/00 and
then to 9% in 2000/01. The result is that, overall, the 2000/01 social welfare budget
represents a (real) negative increase of 1,5%.99Viewed over a longer period, therefore, and
taking inflation into account, the government has introduced a retrogressive budgetary
measure in respect of social security.
98 The social welfare budgets for the relevant years were R19,3b (98/99); R19,8b (99/00) and R23,3b (00/01).
99 Fair Share, 2000/01 National Budget Handbook, p. 4.
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Table 13: Monies Lost by Department of Social Welfare between 1996 & 1998
Province Period Amount Lost Source of Loss
Eastern Cape 1996-97 R5 390 000 UnsQecified
Eastern Cape 1996-97 R610 000 Robbery During Transit
Free State 1996-98 Rl 073 000 Unspecified
Free State 1996-98 R927 000 Robbery During Transit
Gauteng 1996-98 R422559 Theft
Mpumalanga 1997-98 R165 000 Theft
North West 1996-98 R3 200 000 Theft
Northern Cape 1997-98 R965 015 Theft
Western Cape 1996-98 R2 600 000 Robbery During Transit
Western Cape 1996-98 R200 000 Theft from Post Office
Total RIS 552 57410U
Source: SAIRR, 2000, p. 238.
Crime has also had its fair share in undermining the fulfilment of the right of access to social
security.
5.2.6 Education
The Commission discusses the right to education under two national departments and under
provincial/local governments. However nothing is said about local governments. The two
national departments are National Education and Training and Correctional Services.
5.2.6.1 Department of National Education and Training
The SAHRC notes that the Department has a clear understanding of its obligations in terms
of the right to education, as well as a clear interpretation of the terms "basic education" and
"adult basic education". However the Commission does not say what those clear
understandings and interpretations are. It notes further that the Department appreciates the
difficulties of changing [the] education [system] overnight.
The Commission expresses reservations about the Department's failure to indicate that
undue delay would be intolerable. Similarly, the Commission is critical of the department's
ruling on when it would be reasonably practicable to offer education in a particular language.
It seems from the criticism of the Commission that the Department's policy on the matter is
100 According to the SAIRR the total mentioned by the Minister is in the order of R20m. The total indicated in
the table is the sum of the provincial breakdowns as they are stated by the SAIRR. The discrepancy between
the figure of R20m and the table total seems to arise from what appears to be an error of calculation on the
part of the SAIRR. It would seem the Institute has added the totals mentioned in respect of provinces to
their breakdown. So, where the Eastern Cape lost R6m, of which R610 000 was attributed to robbery in
transit, the SAIRR seems to have added the two figures. So calculated, the total becomes R19 925574, and
therefore very close to the SAIRR's R20m.
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that there must at least be 40 learners in a class requesting to be taught in that language. The
SABRC argues, I think correctly, that the ruling is onerous and that it would be better to
stipulate a percentage.
The Commission refers to statutes that were cited by the Department in its response.
The statutes are the National Education Policy Act, the South African Schools Act, and the
Higher Education Act. It notes that these statutes were cited as measures for protecting
people from discrimination in private educational institutions and from other practices in the
private sector that might impact on the right to education negatively. It judges the
Department's understanding of its obligations under the right to be in line with international
norms and the constitution. The Commission similarly adjudges the Department's definition
of "inferior standards", although it does not say what that definition is.IOI
5.2.6.2 Department of Correctional Services
The Commission notes that the Department of Correctional Services did not say anything
about its understanding of its obligations with reference to reading materials for prisoners.I02
Nor did it give any information about facilities it has to enable inmates to study courses that
are approved, 'or of the numbers of inmates who use such facilities as may exist.I03 Further,
the Department makes no reference to any plan for the realisation of the right to reading
materials of detained persons.i'"
5.2.6.3 Provincial and Local Governments
Of the five provinces 105 that responded to the questionnaire none provided adequate
information on their understanding of their obligations under the right. The Free State
Education Department had taken steps to make education compulsory for all learners under
the age of 15 years and to criminalise non-compliance.l'" The Commission finds that, with
the exception of the Free State and Mpumalanga, no coherent plan of action for the
realisation of the right to education emerges from the data submitted by provincial
101 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 38.
102 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 39.
103 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 40.
104 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 42.
105 Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Northern Cape.
106 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 39.
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governments.l'" However the Commission does not say what those action plans are in the
two provinces.
5.2.6.4 A Critique
Although the Department refers to things that should be changed in the education system,
there is no indication of what those things are and what should be put in their place. Nor is
there an indication of any time frames the Department has set for itself to change whatever it
is that must be changed or, indeed, of the progress it has made so far. I suggest that this is a
weakness in that it is therefore not possible to evaluate what the Department is saying. If it is
not clear what it is government wants to change in the education system and what it wants to
put in its place, any talk about change is meaningless.
Further, to protest that change cannot take place overnight is to state the obvious. What
would be more meaningful would be to specify the changes that the Department wants to
bring about and the timeframes within which they are envisaged.
Once again the Commission lists statutes that have been introduced without stating
their provisions and analysing their reasonableness and adequacy for the fulfilment of the
right. It also fails once more to inquire into the facts in order to see whether any progress is
made in the realisation of the right and whether, if so, the progress is reasonable. This latter
inquiry would have been all the more interesting because, unlike the five rights previously
discussed, the constitution does not make the state's obligation to fulfil this right contingent
upon its available resources. It simply instructs the state to take reasonable measures to
ensure that education is progressively available and accessible.
Table 5 indicates that in the period under review, state expenditure on education has
increased consistently, expressed in absolute figures. Therefore, stated as absolute figures, the
state has not introduced any retrogressive budgetary measure in this period insofar as the
right to education is concerned. Table 5 also suggests, however, that as a percentage of the
budget, projected education expenditure declined in the financial year 1996/97 and rose again
in the subsequent financial years. Over the entire period under review, the overall percentage
increase is 0,6% and thus barely significant, if it is accepted, as proposed earlier, that an
increase ofO,5% and below is insignificant (see footnote 38, Chapter 5).
If, now, it is accepted that the increase in public expenditure on education is
insignificant over the period under review, it seems to follow that state expenditure on
107 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 42.
Socio-Economic Rights 102
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
education is not adequate for the realisation of the right to education. However there is a
more direct way of approaching the question.
Table 14: Education Levels of People of 20 years and above by Province: 1996
Province No Some Some Std 10 Higher Unspeci- Total
Schooling Primary Secondary fled/Other
E. Cape 617796 899 711 966341 328637 139200 88987 3040672
F. State 236 148 458384 493 148 199654 76265 49453 1513052
Gauteng 419 157 812267 1 780368 1042744 369672 402764 4826928
KZN 957217 1026021 1 328708 665303 200819 217428 4395496
M.langa 410337 307000 403474 203 102 69551 58967 1452430
N. West 403 143 503301 560987 236 188 75258 61 774 1 840651
N. Cape 97692 134 149 139233 53482 25939 18027 468521
N. Province 771587 376663 556667 293703 94107 95312 2 188040
W. Cape 153 109 556696 901 196 435620 243954 119 855 2420430
Total 4066187 5084189 7130121 3458434 1294720 1112568 22 146220
Source: SAIRR, 2000, p. 110.108
Thus, at the beginning of the period in respect of which the SAHRC conducted the study,
some 18,4% of what one might call South Africa's adult population had no education at all.
On the other side of the spectrum, a mere 5,8% had post-matriculation education. It is evident
from this that a lot of effort and money had to be invested in adult basic education as well as
further education in order to bring about the realisation of the constitutional promise. How,
then, does public expenditure in the period under consideration match up to this task?
Fair Share suggests that the 1997/98 education budget translates to annual public
expenditure of RO,31 per illiterate person in the country and R9 400 per tertiary student.l'" It
seems quite clear that thirty-one cents per illiterate person per annum would be inadequate
even if South Africa did not have the high illiteracy levels that it has. Fair Share writes that
the entire training of a medical doctor in South Africa in the period under consideration cost
R750 000110 and therefore, over seven years, approximately RI07 143 per annum. R9 400 per
annum represents a mere 8,8% of what it cost to train a medical doctor per year. That also
seems clearly inadequate.
108 The SAIRR notes that totals might not tally, although they should, due to rounding off.
109 Fair Share, Key Concerns About the 1997/98 Budget and the Macro-economic Plan (GEAR), p. A-3.
110 Ibid., p. A4.
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Section 29( 1)(b) of the constitution requires the state to make basic education, adult
basic education and further education progressively available and accessible. Under Section
5.2.1.1.6 hereof! made reference to Craven where he argues that the obligation to bring about
the progressive achievement of a right requires that the full realisation of that right be
achieved as quickly as possible. It seems clear that the public expenditure referred to above
cannot bring about the full realisation of the right to education as enshrined in the Bill of
Rights as quickly as possible. And this is true even though, from the standpoint of the budget,
the state cannot be seriously accused of having introduced retrogressive budgetary measures
insofar as the right to education is concerned.
A further problem in this regard is that even if the state had invested all the funds at its
disposal in education, it is by no means obvious that the full realisation of the right might be
expedited. This seems clear from the fact that what resources the state has made available are
not taken full advantage of.
Table 15: Candidates who wrote the Matriculation Examinations: 1996-1999111
Province 1996 1997 1998 1999
Wrote Passed Wrote Passed Wrote Passed Wrote Passed
E. Cape 66809 7061 76851 7526 82517 6533 79831 5438
Free State 35554 4208 40157 4296 40777 4338 33004 3484
Gauteng 73 152 14057 75910 13 135 76861 12498 71 757 11479
KZN 86608 20040 105449 19 199 108063 17998 103268 16575
Mpumalanga 41 731 4332 39091 3630 41 612 5 184 38236 4188
N. Cape 7111 1225 7611 1 122 7429 806 7160 808
N. Province 126081 9351 128559 7266 114621 7780 104200 7861
N. West 46349 7611 48542 5336 42436 5691 39819 4702
W. Cape 34830 12 130 37063 8617 38546 9028 37199 9090
Total 518225 80015 559233 70127 552862 69856 511474 63725
Source: Department of Education, Report on the 1999 Senior Certificate Examinations.
There was thus a 7,3% increase of candidates sitting for the matriculation examinations in
1997 over those who took the examinations in 1996. However candidates who took the
examinations in 1998 dropped by 1,1% in comparison with those who took them in 1997.
Candidates who took the examinations in 1999 dropped by 7,5% in comparison with those
who wrote the matriculation examinations in 1998. Overall, the number of candidates sitting
for the matriculation examinations dropped by 1,3% between 1996 and 1999. Table 14
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suggests that only 15,6% of the adult population in South Africa had matriculation
qualifications in 1996. The 1,3% reduction in the number of matriculation candidates
between 1996 and 1999 means that we are moving backwards. It means that we are not
increasing the ratio of people with matriculation qualifications in relation to the entire
population.
Table 15 suggests that 15% of the candidates who took the matriculation examinations
lil 1996 obtained university entrance for purposes of a degree. In 1997 the percentage
dropped to 12,5 and increased to 12,6 the following year. In 1999 it fell back to 12,5.
Therefore, not only has the number of candidates taking the matriculation examinations
declined in the period under consideration; those who pass the examinations are also on the
decline. This seems to clearly militate against the realisation of the kind of society envisaged
by the Bill of Rights in enshrining the right to education. It also quite clearly is out of line
with South Africa's innovation policy, which promises a future where all South Africans will
enjoy improved and sustained quality of life and share in a democratic culture.112
Peter Drucker gives us a glimpse of the conditions that must be fulfilled if the promise
held out by the White Paper on Science and Technology must be realised. He writes:
[The] great majority of the new jobs require qualifications the industrial
worker does not possess and is poorly equipped to acquire. They require a
great deal of formal education and the ability to acquire and apply theoretical
and analytical knowledge. They require a different approach to work and a
different mindset. Above all, they require a habit of continuous learning.
Displaced industrial workers thus cannot simply move into knowledge work or
services the way displaced farmers and domestic workers moved into
industrial work ... 113
Therefore it seems obvious that, for future South African generations to enjoy the kind of life
held out by the S&T White Paper and by the Bill of Rights, they have to pay more serious
attention to education now than they do. In Section 2.7 hereof I argued that rights create for
their bearer obligations as well. I want to argue that the right to education creates an
obligation not only for the state and teachers, but also for learners. To speak about the right to
education in a situation where there is no effective learning seems to me a travesty of public
III I count as passes only those candidates who gained university entrance qualifications for purposes of a
degree.
112 White Paper on Science and Technology, supra, p. 3.
113 Drucker, 1994, p. 62. Indeed, this is also a view expressed in the S&T White Paper itself - see at p. 5.
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funds. Therefore, in investing the taxpayer's money in education, it seems quite obvious that
there is also a need to ensure that the money is well spent. Therefore learners must be made
to appreciate the need to engage seriously with the learning materials available to them even
if it means coercing them to do so. After all, an obligation means that if the person on whom
it falls does not execute it volitionally, the necessary pressure will and must be brought to
bear on him/her in order to ensure the execution of the obligation. It seems to me blatantly
incongruous to demand of the state to make education resources available to the maximum of
its abilities, if we are not also going to insists that those for whom they are meant must avail
themselves of them to the maximum of their abilities!
5.2.7 Environment
The right that is protected here is the right to an environment that is not harmful to the health
or wellbeing of people. The state is directed to introduce reasonable measures to prevent
pollution and ecological degradation; to promote conservation and to secure ecologically
sustainable development and use of natural resources.
The national department that bears responsibility in respect of this right is the National
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.
5.2.7.1 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
The SABRC notes that the Department understands its duty to respect environmental rights
to include the development of mechanisms and exercising proper judgement in granting
permits for development. The said mechanisms include policy and legal frameworks for the
regulation of the conduct of public and private persons insofar as it may have a bearing on the
right. However the Commission bemoans the failure of the Department to grasp that it also
has a duty to take remedial action to rehabilitate a damaged environment. The SABRC then
cursorily alludes to "three major limitations" about the Department's report but does not
really detail those limitations, save to state that they were referred to above. However, there
are more than three limitations that the Commission has referred to, and it is by no means
clear which are the major three.'!"
114 The Commission, for instance, decries the fact that the Department failed to take account of the additional
requirements to "prevent" and to "secure" in addition to the duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the
right - see Economic & Social Rights Report, Vol. IV, p. 43. Where the Department reports that in the
previous regime black people tended to be located close to polluting and unhealthy areas which were also
prone to floods, the Commission remonstrates that these phenomena should have been linked to specific
categories such as "harmful to health and well-being" etc. - pp. 42-43. Where the Department reports about
the rationalisation of laws and policies, the Commission notes that more information could have been
Socio-Economic Rights 106
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The SAHRC notes that the Department understands its duty to protect environmental
rights to include the establishment and enforcement of adequate legal and regulatory
frameworks in respect of the right. The Commission regrets the Department's failure to
include environmental impact assessment in its report. However it pronounces the
Department's report in respect of the duty to protect better than its report regarding the duty
to respect the right. I IS
The Commission finds that the Department's understanding of its duty to promote and
fulfil the right is satisfactory if somewhat narrow. It notes that the duty to promote and fulfil
the right is connected to respecting and protecting the right, but does not say how.116
Reference is made to the budget figures provided by the Department but no effort is
made to analyse them since "the information does not indicate where the rest of the DEAT's
budgetary allocations are spent".117
In respect of the component "not harmful to health or well-being", the Commission
finds the Department's report to be "precise but cryptic" in that the Department failed to
explain the phrase.i" The Commission finds no fault with the Department's conception of the
term "sustainable" although it does not say what that conception is. It merely states that the
Department "clearly recognises use and conservation of resources as well as the
intragenerational and intergenerational concepts't.I" The Commission, however, does not
find the department's articulation of "justifiable economic and social development" to be
comprehensive and well thought out. It argues that the concept "development" is often
misunderstood in South Africa in that any construction is taken to translate to development.
The Commission thinks that the Department ought to have referred to the Development
Facilitation Act in answering the protocol.l'"
provided - p. 43. Where the Department furnishes information about pollution, waste disposal, purification
and conservation, the SAHRC notes that the focus should have been on how rationalisation or lack of it
impacted and continues to impact on the victims of discrimination - p. 43. I have already made reference to
the SAHRC's bemoaning of the fact that the Department's understanding of its duty does not include the
taking of restorative measures - p. 43. The SAHRC also refers to the fact that other departments administer
a number of laws having a bearing on the environment and that there is no co-ordination - pp. 43-44.
Finally, the SAHRC refers to the fact that there is no effective body regulating pollution in South Africa -
p.44.
115 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 44.
116 Ibid., p. 45.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., p. 46.
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5.2.7.2 Provincial Governments
The Commission finds that the Free State's conception of the terms "respect", "protect",
"promote" and "fulfil" is general and tends to their literal meaning. Further, the Commission
finds, it is not clear what the structure of provincial government is and therefore where
responsibility for environmental rights falls.121
The Commission is impressed with Gauteng's grasp of the constitutional text and
judicial interpretations on socio-economic rights. However it does not indicate what this
understanding is and it also finds that, like the Free State, it is not clear where primary
responsibility for environmental rights rests in Gauteng.122
Because of its long coastal line, industrial centres and natural resources, the SAHRC
opines that KwaZulu-Natal provides a context for different environmental challenges.
However it does not say what those different challenges might be. KwaZulu-Natal, however,
the Commission finds, shows a poor understanding of the key concepts, namely, "respect",
"protect", "promote" and "fulfil".123
Mpumalanga has a department dedicated to environmental affairs and tourism. The
Commission finds that its report is focused on environmental laws, policies and regulations
and that it is therefore useful. The Commission finds that the Department "does not highlight
Section 24" but deals with issues of education and then proceeds to focus on conservation
and pollution control. Although the Commission finds Mpumalanga's report "promising" it
does not say how the province dealt with the subject matter of the inquiry save to state that it
focused on it.124
The Commission finds the Northern Cape's grasp of the key terms ("respect",
"protect", "promote" and "fulfil") satisfactory, but its lack of focus on environmental rights
worrisome. The Northern Cape also has a department dedicated to environmental affairs.125
Although the Western Cape sent a response, there was nothing in it on environmental rights
as required by the protocol.l'"
121 Ibid., p. 48.
122 Ibid., p. 49.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
125 Ibid., p. 50.
126 Ibid.
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5.2.7.3 Local Government
Although the GJMC sent a response in which it reveals, as the Commission finds, a sound
grasp of the "key terms", there is nothing in it on environmental rights.127
5.2.7.4 A Critique
As it was with other rights, the Commission's analysis of the data in respect of environmental
rights suffers from its preoccupation with legalism. Even though it asks pertinent empirical
questions on this right, the Commission makes no effort to deal with those pertinent empirical
issues. So, for instance, it raises the question whether the relevant government department
should not have done an environmental impact assessment of applicable laws and policies.
On the face of the report, the Department did not. But even if it had, that would not absolve
the Commission from its constitutional obligation to evaluate both the adequacy of applicable
laws and policies in bringing to fruition the injunctions of the constitution and the validity of
such assessment. The fact that part of the data before the Commission was that under
apartheid rule there was a tendency to locate dumping cites next to black people increases the
urgency that it should at least have made an effort to deal with the rather crucial question that
it raises itself.
Similarly, the Commission raises the importance of considering budgetary allocations
for the realisation of environmental rights but does not take the matter any further on the
basis that the data before it do not indicate where the allocations are spent. That may well be
so, but the budget itself stipulates where the allocations should be spent.128 Therefore the
Commission could have argued with the Department for not specifying the destination of the
relevant allocations, but establish that destination itself and then inquire whether the
allocations are adequate for the task at hand.
Table 2 indicates that in 1998/99 the environmental budget was R463m and constituted
0,23% of the national budget. It was increased to R632m in the following year (0,29% of the
national budget). I have indicated at the beginning of this section that the right that is
protected here is to have an environment that is not harmful to one's health and wellbeing. In
Section 5.2.4.4 hereof I suggested that a substantial number of the 20m people identified by
127 Ibid., p. 51.
128 See, for example, Estimate of Expenditure to be Defrayed from the National Revenue Fund, Financial Year
Ending 31 March 2000, pp. 11-17, which details the destination of various allocations of the environmental
budget for the period 1998/99. The same information would have been reflected in the national budget for
that period.
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Kader Asmal as lacking adequate sanitation in 1998 would have been in pretty much the
same position at the end of the period studied by the SAHRC. If one combines this with the
data that under apartheid rule there was a tendency to locate dumping cites next to black
residential areas, it seems clear that the public funds set aside to deal with environmental
issues were not adequate for the task at hand at the relevant time. Nor were they adequate in
the year after, as I have suggested in Section 5.2.1.1.6 hereof, since the budgetary increase
over the previous cycle was barely significant and would in real terms have been a negative
increase.
5.2.8 Department of Finance
The Commission discusses the Department of Finance's role in the implementation of socio-
economic rights as an over-arching one, as one of facilitation, 129 since the responsibility to
implement the rights rests with stated departments and spheres of government. Although that
is so, the Commission nevertheless inquires into the Department's understanding of the "key
terms" and is satisfied that the Department correctly understands those terms and does not
take the inquiry much further. So it misses a golden opportunity to inquire into the budgetary
allocations that it felt hamstrung by in examining the data emanating from the Department of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism. It also misses the opportunity to inquire into the way in
which the Department prioritises or fails to prioritise socio-economic rights in the budgeting
process.
129 SAHRC, 1998, Vol. IV, p. 52.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In drawing the conclusions that I do, I am mindful of the fact that the SAHRC study under
review was the first of its kind in South Africa and also a first for the Commission. Therefore
we were all on a learning curve in many respects. So seen, one should perhaps be less critical
and more supportive. However I propose, while recognising the good work of the
Commission, to treat the Commission in the same way as I argue it should have treated the
state. In other words, failure to offer legitimate criticism timeously might establish non-
normal conduct and make it less easy to criticise it in future.
In Chapter 4 I have dealt with the methodological strengths and weaknesses of the
SAHRC inquiry into the implementation of socio-economic rights. I reserved the question
whether the evidence gathered supports the conclusions drawn to a stage when I would have
dealt with the Commission's conclusions (see Section 4.3.2.4 hereof). A cursory glance at the
contents of Chapter 5 would suggest that it is hard to pinpoint conclusions drawn by the
Commission that might even remotely throw up the question of inferential validity. As I have
pointed out repeatedly in dealing with the Commission's analysis of the data, the question
that concerned it most was whether respondents to its protocols understood the meaning of
the key terms - viz. "respect", "protect", "promote" and "fulfil".
At places the Commission concludes that respondents understood the terms and at
others that they did not. Whatever its conclusions, the methodological question of inferential
validity simply does not arise, since the respondents' understanding or misunderstanding of
those terms has nothing to do with the methods used by the Commission to gather or analyse
the data. But if that is so, the question as to the utility of the SAHRC study must arise. In
other words, if the Commission does not draw any conclusions that can be tested in respect of
validity, what was the cash value of the study?
I take the view that this is a major weakness of the SAHRC's inquiry, and I think that
this weakness is attributable to the Commission's legalistic approach to the monitoring of the
implementation of socio-economic rights. This is not to say legal issues are irrelevant to the
inquiry-quite the contrary, they are central. The issue, however, as Opsahl writes, is not
only to determine what laws and policies governments have written and, we may add, how
they understand constitutional terms, but also how those laws, policies and understandings
translate to better life in reality. (See Section 5.2.1.1.6 hereof.)
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The SAHRC's legalistic approach to the inquiry is perhaps understandable, even
though it has only a limited potential to deal meaningfully with the task at hand. By its very
nature, an organisation such as the SAHRC must place a premium on advocacy work, which
in tum locates it in a criticising mode. Therefore it makes sense for it to examine
government's understanding of the law and then whether government is acting in terms of the
law. However a fuller inquiry would require that the SAHRC steeps itself in the method and
practice of empirical and factual investigation.
I have attempted to fill in the empirical gaps left by the Commission's preferred style of
inquiry. It seems clear in respect of each of the seven socio-economic rights that, from an
empirical standpoint, there is a huge distance that must still be travelled before the
deprivation which is sought to be addressed by the seven rights can be dented. This is not to
deny that progress has been made in the fulfilment of a number of the seven rights under
consideration. With reference to housing, for instance, it is significant that 75% of the houses
government promised in 1994 have been delivered. To be sure, their adequacy is a matter that
must always be open to healthy debate. The failure to deliver the remaining 25%, together
with the question whether one million houses should have been the projection, must also
always be open to healthy debate. But still, 75% delivery is significant.
However that should not preclude an inquiry into whether, in terms of the set standards
and criteria, the fulfilment of these rights is as it should be. Whilst recognising the positive
results achieved, the limitations should be pointed out consistently. Where, for instance, the
state introduces retrogressive measures in respect of any of the rights under review, that fact
must be pointed out. It must be pointed out that such retrogressive measures, such as indeed
was the case with many of the rights, amounts to their denial unless justified by recognised
grounds.
True, there are limited funds available for the fulfilment of these rights. However that is
a matter to be argued by the state in the face of critical inquiry into its failure to live up to the
injunctions of the constitution. It is not an argument to be internalised by those charged with
monitoring the performance of the state with reference to socio-economic rights. Failure to
pose the relevant questions and to offer the justified criticism will get the state accustomed to
the fact that the questions are not asked and the criticism is not made. Over a time such
complacency might end up being the norm. Then the intended beneficiaries of these rights
might be placed in the situation where they have to justify their expectation that the state will
deliver certain goods and services, whereas it is the state that must justify its failure to
provide them.
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Consequently, it is important that the Commission revisits its approach to such inquiry
at least in three respects. First, the Commission can attach the necessary significance to
factual matters as distinct from legal matters. Such an approach would not exclude legal
questions from the Commission's inquiry. It would only mean that once those have been
sorted out, their application and effect on real life situations must still be determined. As I
have tried to show, it is not necessary that the Commission do all the empirical investigation
that might be necessary. It could use the work of others in the field in order to try and answer
questions that arise in its own study.
Second, the Commission might need to take methodological issues a bit more seriously.
That the Commission invests a lot of effort in the work it does on monitoring the
implementation ofsocio-economic rights can never be doubted. Precisely because it takes its
work in this area so seriously, it seems to me obvious that the Commission should not open
itself up to situations where its findings can be impugned for want of a sound methodological
approach. What the Commission did in the study under review was laudable and should have
yielded a lot of reliable data. However there is no clear research plan in the Commission's
inquiry to indicate why it embarked on three separate research processes in order to
investigate the same issue which, as I suggest, was a sound beginning. Why, not even in its
analysis of the data that emanated from these three separate processes does the Commission
make an attempt to marry their outcome!
Third, the Commission could be a little more rigorous in its analysis of the data it has.
The very least that can be expected of any study is that it must answer the question(s) it raises
for itself. If it fails to answer other questions, it is possible to defend it on the basis that it was
not concerned with such questions even though it might be argued that it ought to have been.
But if a study fails to answer its own questions it becomes indefensible. I have referred at
different places in this study to questions that the Commission raises but makes no effort to
answer and instead blames government for not answering the said questions. That is one
indication of the weakness I refer to. Another, and probably the bigger, is that the
fundamental question lying at the heart of the SAHRC study is whether the government is
honouring its constitutional mandate in respect of the realisation of socio-economic rights. If
the Commission had answered this question, the study would be monumental even if it were a
failure in all other respects.
In that, I suggest, lies the importance, at least in part, of a meta-analytical approach to
the study. It fulfils a dual purpose. It is at once an analysis of what government does or does
not do and of how those who hold a constitutional brief to monitor government's
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performance carry out that brief. Therefore the reader can in one glance, as it were, form a
picture of how well government is doing in its constitutional mandate to give effect to socio-
economic rights and of how well the SAHRe is fulfilling its monitoring constitutional
mandate.
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